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 The death penalty, as the ultimate sanction, has always served as a source of great 
debate and remains one of the most controversial punishments meted out by the criminal 
justice system.  Due to concerns of its administraton and application, a moratorium on the 
death penalty was declared by the U.S. Supreme Courtin Furman v. Georgia in 1972, and 
states were mandated by the Court to overhaul their respective death sentencing statutes in a 
manner that would conform to Court-approved standards under the U.S. Constitution. After 
the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, it was believed by many that the deficiencies cited 
in sentencing outcomes in capital cases four years earlier in Furman would either be 
eliminated or at least brought within constitutionally cceptable levels.  Although there has 
been a wealth of empirical studies over the years at the state level, very few analyses have 
focused on how the death penalty is administered in the Federal system.  In 2002, a study 
was funded to examine the potential influence of race in decisions by U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices to seek or not seek the death penalty for defendants charged with death-eligible 
offenses under Federal law.  Three independent research teams investigated whether 
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charging outcomes could be explained by relevant legal factors such as the heinousness of 
the offense.  However, unlike the wealth of death penalty research which has conducted 
such analyses using more traditional multivariate models to isolate the effect of race on 
charging and sentencing outcomes, the three research teams conducted alternate analyses to 
compare outcomes in white victim versus non-white victim cases.  The purpose of the 
current study will be to examine the role of race on charging decisions made in the federal 
death penalty system using more traditional logistic regression analyses.  The final results 
suggest that capital cases involving white victims may have a higher risk of being charged 
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A. Opening Remarks 
 In the area of criminal justice and criminology, there may be few subjects that evoke 
as much controversy and debate as the death penalty.  Although the death penalty is thought 
to be an appropriate sentence for the “worst of the worst”, critics characterize this sanction 
as capricious, arbitrary, and discriminatory.  In 1972, the United States Supreme Court 
struck down existing death sentencing statutes nationwide in the landmark case of Furman 
v. Georgia1, and declared them to be in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution.  Although a very fractious opinion, the common sentiment that 
resonated among the plurality was the belief that the s atutes were arbitrary, capricious and 
discriminatory in their application.  These statutes, he Court held, were administered in 
such a manner that extra-legal criteria such as the race or social class of the victim and 
defendant could have influenced sentencing outcomes in the decision making.   The Court 
was also concerned with the legal structure of the existing death sentencing statutes and their 
failure to provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary and capricious sentencing in cases 
where the death penalty was permissible by law. 
 Accordingly, all states with capital sentencing statutes that wanted to retain the death 
penalty in their jurisdictions were required to revis  their statutes in order to correct the 
deficiencies cited in Furman.  The four year moratorium on the death penalty was lifted in 
1976 when the Court found that procedural and substantive changes in a number of state 
                                                
     1408 U.S. 238, 1972. 
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statutes were sufficient enough to pass constitutional scrutiny in Gregg v. Georgia2 and its 
companion cases.3  Unlike the statutes prior to Gregg, which gave the jury complete and 
unfettered discretion in the sentencing process, the new Georgia statute guided the 
sentencing body’s discretion by enumerating a specific list of statutorily defined aggravating 
circumstances which had to be considered before the pronouncement of sentence.  In cases 
where at least one of the newly crafted aggravating circumstances was found beyond a 
reasonable doubt, juries were also required to consider those circumstances against factors 
proffered by the defense in mitigation prior to the imposition of a death sentence.4  Other 
features of the new system included a bifurcated hearing, which consisted of two 
proceedings where guilt and penalty were determined separately, and automatic appellate 
review. While it was not clear from the Furman decision which procedural safeguards, if 
any, were required, these revisions, it was believed, would produce sentencing outcomes 
that were equitable and consistent in comparison to the previous statutes.     
 As of February 2008, there were 3,2635 inmates on death row in the nation's prison 
system.  Of the 1,057 inmates executed between 1977 and December 2006, 79 percent of the 
                                                
     2428 U.S. 153, 1976. 
      
 3The death sentencing schemes in Florida and Texas were upheld in Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, respectively, on the same day as 
the Gregg decision.  Mandatory death sentencing statutes in North Carolina and Louisiana 
were struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 and Roberts v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325, respectively. 
 
    4It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court also approved two 
different death sentencing statute revisions in Florida and Texas on the same day that the 
Georgia death sentencing statute was approved. 
     
 5The Death Penalty Information Center.  (2008, February).  Facts about the Death 
Penalty.  Retrieved February 1, 2008, from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf 
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victims involved in those cases were white while only 14 percent were black and 7 percent 
were victims of Asian, Native American or Hispanic origin.6  Similar differences were also 
found to exist when the combination of the race of the defendant and victim are taken into 
account.  Cases involving white defendants and white victims accounted for 53% of those 
executed while cases involving white defendants and black victims resulted in 1.4% of those 
executed since 1977.  Also, cases involving black defendants and white victims resulted in 
21% of total number of executions and cases where t defendant and victim were both 
black resulted in 11% of all executions since 1977 with the remaining 25% racial 
combinations consisting of whites, blacks, Asians, Hi panics and Native Americans.7    
 While these apparent differences in sentencing outcomes do not establish proof of 
racial discrimination towards one particular group, they do, however, raise concerns of 
whether justice is being meted out fairly in the prsent system of capital punishment, and 
questions whether the deficiencies cited in Furman were properly corrected after the Court's 
ruling in the Gregg decision.  Despite the Court's belief, in the absence of empirical 
evidence at the time, that procedural reforms in state law had created a fairer way of 
imposing the death penalty, post-Gregg studies have suggested that the pattern of racial 
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty condemned in Furman was still present in 
the new statutes.   
 Early studies in the pre-Furman era suggested that race figured prominently in 
charging and sentencing outcomes.  Studies on sentenci g rates in the early 20th century 
                                                
 6NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.  Death Row USA. (Winter, 
2007).   
      
 7Id. 
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found that defendants who killed whites were more likely to receive a sentence of death and 
less likely to have those sentences commuted than defe ants who killed blacks.8   
 Consistent with pre-Furman research in the area of racial disparities in sentencing, 
several more recent studies have concluded that defen ants whose victims were white had 
the greatest likelihood of receiving a death sentence (Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Jacoby and 
Paternoster, 1982; Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth, 1983, 1985; Bowers, 1983; Gross and 
Mauro, 1984; Smith, 1987; Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1988; Vito and Keill, 1988; 
Paternoster and Brame, 2003; Pierce and Radelet, 2005).  These findings are somewhat 
problematic in view of the fact that the procedural revisions in the death sentencing statutes 
were believed to be consistent with principles of afair and equitable system of justice. 
However, these empirical studies have painted a different picture of the new death 
sentencing statutes in operation.  This discrepancy sets up the inevitable clash between the 
claim that the procedurally revised statutes had adequat ly corrected for the possibility of 
race-based decision-making and the empirical studies which show the existence of 
unexplained racial differences in charging and sentencing outcomes.   
 This issue would ultimately be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In considering 
the claim that statistical studies were sufficient to prove that the death penalty was imposed 
in a manner that was inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court 
focused on the intent of such legislation.  Specifically, a state's death sentencing statute 
could be invalidated if it was determined that such legislation was enacted and/or 
                                                
 8Garfinkel, H. (1949).  Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides.  Social 
Forces, 27:369-380.   
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maintained because of an anticipated discriminatory effect on a particular group of people.9  
In such a case where it was alleged that equal protecti n rights were violated, the defendant 
had the burden of proof of showing what the Court refer ed to as "purposeful 
discrimination."10  Since the Court believed that statistical evidence could only show a 
correlation between race and death sentencing, it reasoned that no equal protection 
violations were present under the death penalty sysem in question.  Similarly, the Court 
concluded that no Eighth Amendment violations existd since the decision making process 
in capital cases was based on rational criteria in determining whether or not the 
circumstances of a defendant's case warranted the impos tion of a sentence of death. 
 Although a number of empirical studies have found little or no significance between 
the race of the defendant and charging and sentencig outcomes, the race of the victim has 
been cited in numerous studies as having a significa t effect on the decision to seek a death 
sentence and the imposition of a death sentence in cap tal cases cases.  The influence of race 
is important since the Court's ruling in Furman was due in part to the possibility that racial 
considerations could taint the charging and sentencing process.  After the Court's ruling in 
Gregg, which was followed by several procedural revisions f tate death sentencing 
statutes, a finding of a "suspect" factor such as race would seem to call into question the 
fairness of the revised statutes in eliminating discriminatory decision-making.  Although the 
Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp, would ultimately rule that general statistical studies which 
noted certain racial disparities in sentencing were insufficient to establish purposeful 
                                                
      9See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct., at 1766. 
     
  10Id. 
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discrimination, a body of research has questioned whether revisions to death sentencing 
statutes in several state jurisdictions have reduced the constitutionally significant risk of 
racial bias cited in Furman given the number of safeguards afforded to defendants in the 
death sentencing process.11   
 B.    Study Objective 
 The potential role of racial disparity in charging and sentencing outcomes has been a 
constant source of controversy in cases involving the imposition of the death penalty.  Since 
the landmark decisions of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, a body of research 
examining the influence of race in capital cases has que tioned whether the overhaul of 
death sentencing schemes nationwide accomplished their goals of creating a system of 
justice that was free from the potential of arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory 
application of the capital punishment.12  A significant body of research which has examined 
the role of race in capital cases has suggested that the concerns raised by the Furman Court 
are still an issue in the aftermath of substantive and procedural changes in death sentencing 
statutes.  A number of these studies have suggested the role of the victim may influence 
whether a sentence of death is sought by the state and rendered by the sentencing authority 
                                                
      11The Court's ruling in McCleskey also stated that the state legislatures should decide 
for themselves if the safeguards afforded to defendants in the sentencing process were 
sufficient enough to reduce the risk of racial bias in sentencing of defendants in capital 
cases.  Such a ruling would seem to make any state data to the contrary relevant to the issue 
of whether or not the state's death sentencing statute was operating in an equitable manner.  
  
 12The issue of race in capital cases would initially be addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama (1932).  The Court declared that all 
defendants in federal or state criminal trials had the fundamental right to adequate counsel 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend t.  The Court’s decision in 
Powell would lead to subsequent Court rulings which would prevent the systematic 
exclusion of potential jurors from jury service based on race or ethnicity.    
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in death penalty cases.  An examination of several studies at the state level has revealed a 
significant level of consistency across a number of different jurisdictions in their findings of 
the potential influence of the race of the victim on charging and sentencing outcomes.  
However, only a few of the death penalty studies have focused on the Federal death 
sentencing system.  In the most recent study of the Fed ral death penalty system, three 
research teams conducted separate analyses which examin d the role of race on decisions by 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office whether or not to seek the death penalty in death-eligible cases.  
Each of the three teams received a copy of the study’  database and was allowed to 
construct its own separate variables and files.  Additionally, each team designed and 
conducted its own analyses and drew individual conclusions regarding the impact of race on 
charging outcomes in the Federal death penalty system.  In a number of preliminary 
analyses, one of the three research teams found the race of the victim to be statistically 
significant on charging decisions by the U.S. Attorneys in capital cases.  However, all three 
research teams concluded that race was not significa t in charging decisions after 
conducting a series of statistical alternative approaches to more traditional logistic 
regression models.   
 C.  Statement of the Issues 
 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Furman and Gregg, a wealth of empirical 
studies have examined the role of race in charging and sentencing outcomes using a number 
of multivariate regression models.  As these methodological approaches became more 
sophisticated, they gained acceptance by the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of their ability to 
demonstrate levels of disparity in sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  Researchers in the 
federal death penalty study conducted a number of multivariate regression analyses which 
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suggested a relationship between the race and charging decisions by federal prosecutors.  
However, a number of the preliminary regression analyses used were either limited in the 
number of variables included in their models or produced unexpected estimates.  In response 
to the methodological approaches conducted by the afor mentioned research teams on the 
Federal death penalty study, the current study will focus on a number of issues: 
1. Does the race of the defendant or victim have a significant impact on the decision 
of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to recommend a death sentence? 
2. Does the race of the defendant or victim have a significant impact on the decision 
of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to recommend the death penalty when controlling 
for legally relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances? 
3. Does the race of the defendant or victim have a significant impact on the decision 
of the Attorney General to recommend the death penalty when controlling for 
legally relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances? 
 The purpose of this study will be to examine the rolof race and its relationship to 
charging outcomes by re-analyzing a data set of a population of cases in the Federal death 
penalty system that was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice.  Following this 
introduction, Chapter I will provide a  legal summary of key decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court which led to the dismantling of the pre-Gregg death sentencing statutes at 
that time and subsequent Court decisions which resulted in the creation of  structured death 
penalty statutes.  Empirical research will also be presented which has examined racial 
disparities at the charging and sentencing phases and attempted to explain such bias by 
controlling for certain legal factors.  These studies will provide an introduction for the data 
and methods of analysis presented in Chapter III.  The results of the analyses on the federal 
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death penalty data set will be outlined in Chapter IV.  The final chapter will offer a summary 
and implications of the findings and a discussion of what role race may play at different 























Race and the Death Penalty 
 Throughout history, critics of capital punishment have expressed concerns over the 
uneven application of the death penalty.  Whether tose concerns were conveyed during the 
earliest period in colonial America13 or post-Reconstruction era14 patterns emerged over 
time that questioned whether capital punishment was fairly applied.  Many of the questions 
of fairness were ultimately answered by the U.S. Supreme Court in several key decisions 
that resulted in a moratorium of the death penalty and a re-emergence thereof with newly 
crafted death sentencing statutes which structured or guided the decision making process of 
juries or judges in capital punishment cases.  Of particular relevance to the issues that the 
Court would eventually grapple with in their decisions regarding the existing death penalty 
statutes at that time, centered on issues raised in Maxwell v. Bishop15.  Although the Court 
eventually vacated and remanded the case back to the U.S. District Court for consideration, 
the issues raised before the Court would serve as the foundation for future Court decisions 
that resulted in existing death sentencing schemes at the time being deemed to be 
inconsistent with the 8th and 14th Amendments under the U.S. Constitution.16 
                                                
 13The administration and application of the death penalty varied across the 13 
colonies with mandatory sentences being imposed for crimes against the state, people, 
and/or property.  
  
 14Blacks were disproportionately executed relative to their representation in the 
population after the turn of the 19th century.  
 
 15398 U.S. 262. 
 
 16The petitioner in Maxwell v. Bishop challenged his sentence of death upon being 
convicted of rape on the grounds that (1) issues of guilt and the related sentence were 
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 A.  Unstructured Jury Discretion 
   1.   McGautha V. California  
 Prior to 1971, opponents of capital punishment mounted attack after attack on state 
death sentencing statutes in existence at that time.  On  point of attack centered on the issue 
of unguided discretion being afforded to judges and juries which resulted in challenges to 
the death penalty in McGautha v. California in 1971.17  The main source of controversy in 
McGautha involved the question of whether unguided discretion given to judges and juries 
amounted to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Specifically, arguments focused on the whether the absence of statutorily defined guidelines 
created a system of sentencing that resulted in discriminatory, capricious and arbitrary  
determinations over who lived or who died.  The Court granted certiorari to the petitioner in 
the case in order to determine whether such standardless death sentencing statutes were 
constitutionally permissible.18   
 The death sentencing statutes in California were drawn up in such a way that they 
allowed for a determination of penalty, based on the evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding the crime, the defendant's background and any facts in mitigation or 
aggravation as received by the court, after a finding of guilt in the trial proceeding.  As was 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
determined in a single proceeding, and (2) the jury was not given any standards for guidance 
during the sentencing part of the proceeding.  
      
 17420 U.S. 183 (1971). 
       
 18The Court also granted certiorari in the case of Crampton v. Ohio to decide the 
same question as that in McGautha as well as a question involving the permissibility of 
deciding guilt and penalty in a single trial proceeding. 
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the case in McGautha, the state's death sentencing statute called for the jury to "consider all 
of the evidence surrounding the crime, of each defendant's background and history, and the 
facts in aggravation and mitigation of the crime."19  The jury was also advised that  
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances was not essential to the 
determination of the appropriate sentence and that they were "entirely free to act according 
to their own judgment, conscience and absolute discret on."20  The absence of statutorily 
defined standards, it was argued, amounted to nothing more than lawless decision making 
on the part of the sentencing body and a direct violation of the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution.21 
 The Court, however, rejected this claim and ruled that such a codification of strict 
legal rules of decision making where the sentencing guidelines were structured would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to create.   Justice Harlan, in writing the majority opinion of the 
Court, reasoned that 
        "Those who have come to grips with the hard t sk  
        of actually attempting to draft means of channeling 
        capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the 
       lesson taught by history...To identify before th  
        fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and 
        their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, 
        and to express these characteristics in language 
                                                
 19402 U.S. 189. 
 
   20Id., at 189-190. 
      
 21The petitioner also contended that a single, unitary trial proceeding, where guilt 
and penalty were determined together, constituted an infringement on his rights under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The single trial was argued to limit his 
right to be heard or right of allocution, since any attempt on his part to exercise this right 
during the guilt phase on why the judgment of death should not be pronounced against him  
would entail a surrender of his right against self incrimination. 
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        which can be fairly understood and applied by the 
        sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are 
        beyond human ability."22     
 
 In reaching the decision, the Court cited certain historical attempts to structure such 
decision making and their ultimate failure to achieve the desired results.  The Court initially 
focused their attention on mandatory death sentencing statutes which imposed death for all 
defendants convicted of murder in the first degree under common law in 1794.23  This 
legislative attempt to structure death sentencing statutes proved to be unsuccessful, in their 
view because of instances where juries failed to convi t a defendant after a finding guilt in 
cases where a sentence of death was mandatory.24  Therefore, the Court believed that it was 
impossible for a legislative body to clearly identify beforehand a class of homicides suitable 
for the sentence of death without increasing the likelihood of reckless jury decision making.  
The better option, in their view, would be to grant juries wide discretion to decide the issue 
of life versus death than to attempt to guide their d cision making at the sentencing stage.25 
 The Court also cited other instances that supported their contention that juries 
                                                
      22402 U.S., at 204. 
      
 23Murder in the first degree at common law was defined as being "willful, deliberate 
and premeditated." 
  
 24The problem of jury nullification existed in cases where juries found defendants 
guilty of murder but failed to impose a death sentence because if felt that such a sentence 
was inappropriate in that particular case. 
  
 25Critics of the Court’s failure to limit the discretion of juries in this decision, point 
to the recommendations of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code which drafted 
written standards to guide the decisions of juries in capital cases.  The Model Penal Code 
also crafted a number of additional procedural safeguards to prevent the imposition of death 
sentences in close cases where there is juror doubt regarding the defendant’s guilty despite 
the fact that the verdict is sustained by the evidence.   
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needed to be free from structured or guided sentenci g statutes that might hinder, rather than 
provide assistance in their final deliberations in capital cases.  In Winston v. U.S.26, the 
Court, for the first time, reviewed jury instructions regarding a recommendation of mercy 
upon a finding of mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase of the proceeding.   
In reversing the conviction, the Court found that te jury instructions “interfered with the 
scheme of the Act to commit the whole question of capital punishment to the judgment and 
the conscience of the jury.27  Additionally, the Court ruled that:  
“how far considerations of age, sex, ignorance, illness or 
intoxication of human passion or weakness, of sympathy or 
clemency, or the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of 
death…is committed by the act of Congress to the sound 
discretion of the jury, and the jury alone”.28  
  
 The Court’s position regarding the need for standardless jury discretion was 
revisited in Andres v. U.S.29 when it confirmed the jury’s power to recommend mercy and 
the result of the jury exercise of their judgment without any defining rules to guide those 
decisions.  The Court would address the issue of standardless jury sentencing in capital 
cases one final time in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).30  Although the key 
issue in this case centered on the exclusion of potential jurors who expressed opinions 
                                                
 26172 U.S. 303 (1899)  
  




 29333 U.S. 740 (1948)   
  
 30Although this issue was raised in other cases heard before the Court, this was the 
last case where a significant discussion of standardless jury discretion was heard prior to the 
Furman decision.   
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against the death penalty, the case was very relevant to the Court’s past rulings that the jury 
decision making process not be controlled by a number of sentencing standards.  Instead, the 
Court focused on the importance that juries “express the conscience of the community” 
when deciding between a sentence of death or life imprisonment.       
   All three cases were instrumental in establishing the constitutionally permissible 
process in capital cases that gave wide latitude to juries to consider a variety of factors prior 
to the pronouncement of sentence in death-eligible cas s.  In taking this position, the Court 
ultimately held that history and experience showed that standardless death sentencing 
statutes could in fact pass constitutional scrutiny a d juries, faced with the responsibility of 
deciding between life or death, would consider the many factors involved and render a fair 
and equitable sentence.31  While the Court expressed apprehensiveness to the idea that death 
sentencing statutes could be codified to structure and guide the jury's discretion, they did not 
view unguided discretion as a potential catalyst for arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory 
sentencing patterns.  Quite the contrary, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, reasoned 
that the juries did use legal and moral criteria when deciding upon the appropriate penalty.32  
But the question that remained unanswered in the cas  w s: What legal and moral criteria 
were being used by these juries?33  Although Justice Harlan never provided an answer to 
this question, he remained very skeptical at any attemp s that would formally structure 
                                                
      31402 U.S., at 208. 
      
 32Id. 
 
 33The dissenting opinion expressed concern that there was no way to determine what 
facts were applied by sentencing authorities in capital cases without some form of 
sentencing guidelines.  
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sentencing in capital cases and allow for a more systematic approach in its application.34 
 Additionally, the Court considered in McGautha whether it was constitutionally 
permissible to decide a defendant’s guilt and penalty in a single proceeding.  A single 
hearing in death penalty cases, it was argued, would be inconsistent with the Due Process 
Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment by forcing the defendant to choose between his 
right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and his right to be heard on the issue of 
punishment during the penalty phase of the trial proceeding.  One potential remedy that the 
Court would consider was whether a bifurcated hearing was required in capital cases.  
Unlike a single hearing, a bifurcated hearing would consist of two separate hearings where 
issues of guilt and penalty would be considered separately.  Such a hearing would eliminate 
the potential conflict of the defendant’s rights that was argued to exist in single hearings 
where guilt and penalty were considered together. 
 However, in pointing to the absence of a formal constitutional right to a bifurcated 
hearing, the Court held, instead, that all that wasrequired under the Constitution was that the 
defendant was afforded due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
McGautha Court concluded that no conflict of rights was created in a singular hearing 
where the defendant was forced to choose between remaining silent during the guilt phase at 
the risk of being impeached at the penalty phase.  Additionally, the Court ruled that it was 
“not inconsistent with an enlightened administration of criminal justice to require a 
defendant to weight such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify”.35  Thus, the Court 
                                                
 34Id. 
 
 35183 U.S. 215 (1971)  
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established, at least for a brief period, that the Constitution did not require structured 
guidelines to assist juries during the decision making process to decide punishment nor did it 
require a bifurcated hearing to decide guilt and punishment separately.  Although the Court 
would reject a number of procedural safeguards that were believed to be critical in the death 
penalty cases, the McGautha opinion did provide the foundation for later rulings that would 
result in a major overhaul of the death sentencing schemes across the United States. 
 
2.   Furman v. Georgia – The Death Penalty as  Cruel and Unusual” 
Punishment 
  
 Unlike the McGautha decision, which failed to touch upon the issues of unguided 
discretion and its potential relationship to race-based discriminatory decision making, 
Furman v. Georgia laid the groundwork for what would result in the demise of the death 
sentencing statutes in the United States at that time.  Rather than challenge these statutes on 
solely due process considerations under the Fourteenth Amendment, the petitioners attacked 
the existing death penalty statutes under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against Cruel 
and Unusual punishment. 
 The opinions critical to the Court's decision in Furman concerning unguided 
discretion and its relationship to possible sentencing disparities involved those written by 
Justices Douglas, Stewart and White.  The opinions of Justices Marshall and Brennan, 
although no less important than the others in the majority, held that the death penalty was, 
per se, unconstitutional in every instance.36   
                                                
 36The fact that Justices Marshall and Brennan believed th  death penalty to be 
unconstitutional in all cases, it is not likely that revisions to death sentencing statutes would 
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 The key objection to the death penalty held by Justice Brennan was his feeling that 
the very nature of the imposition of death ran contrary to the notion of human dignity and 
the amount of respect that should be afforded to every human being.  Implicit in this notion 
of human dignity was Justice Brennan's belief that t e death penalty was so severe, arbitrary 
and excessive that it was unnecessary in a contemporary society.  Although he recognized a 
fundamental right of each state to punish violators of its laws, he reasoned that the 
imposition of death was an awesome punishment, "in its pain, in its finality, and in its 
enormity,"37 and that the infliction of a punishment of that magnitude was, "by its very 
nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity."38   
 Justice Marshall also viewed the death penalty as excessive, severe, unusual and 
deficient of a legitimate legislative purpose.  After considering a number of possible goals 
served by capital punishment,39 Justice Marshall found each to be an insufficient 
justification for the infliction of society's ultimate sanction.  Because of this lack of a 
legitimate legislative purpose, as well as his belief that such purposes could be equally 
achieved by lesser penalties, Marshall concluded that the death penalty was excessive in its 
needless infliction of pain and suffering and that e average citizen would "find it shocking 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have changed their views on the death penalty.   
  
 37Id., at 287, (J. Brennan concurring). 
 
  38Id., at 290. 
      
 39Justice Marshall’s review of potential goals of capital punishment included 
retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas 
and confessions, eugenics and economy. 
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to his conscience and sense of justice."40     
 Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall the aforementioned three justices in the 
plurality did not believe that the imposition of the death penalty was, by its very nature, a 
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Instead, they 
contended the existing death penalty statutes were structured in such a way that they created 
a system of punishment that was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment because of 
the manner in which the sentences were imposed.   
 Justice Douglas based his opinion on a number of points which raised the possibility 
that death sentencing schemes in operation at the time were inconsistent with 8th 
Amendment protections under the U.S. Constitution.  First, Justice Douglas noted that the 
litmus test for the death penalty to be deemed cruel and unusual did not hinge solely on the 
punishments that were “inhumane or barbarous” when t  8th Amendment was 
established.41 Instead, he cited Trop v. Dulles which stated the definition of cruel and 
unusual punishments such as the death penalty had to “draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”.42  In other words, 
Justice Douglas expressed concern that the law as it w s written in theory could differ from 
the manner in which it was applied.  From a historical perspective, Justice Douglas also 
analyzed the purpose of the formation of the Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment and 
concluded that its main objective was to prevent the "selective or irregular" imposition of 
                                                
     40Id., at 369, (J. Marshall concurring). 
 
 41408 U.S. 238, 241.   
  
 42356 U.S. 86, 101.  
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harsh penalties and ensure that such penalties were not ndered in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner.  In his view, the death penalty could be considered “cruel and 
unusual” if it was found to discriminate against a person based on the individual’s race, 
religion, class, or social position, or if it was imposed under such a procedure that allowed 
for the sentencing body to allow prejudices to enter i to the decision making process.  Thus, 
his argument contained the element of fundamental fairness and a notion of equal protection 
under the law which would make the Eighth Amendment applicable to each of the States 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend t.   
 Justice Douglas believed that the system of capital punishment imposed was based 
more on discrimination, rather than equity and fairness.  As support for this position, he 
cited a study of capital cases in Texas from 1924 to 1968 which suggested an uneven 
application of the death penalty that was imposed mostly on defendants who were poor, 
young and uneducated.43  However, his opinion did not suggest that the death penalty was 
discriminatory in its application.  Instead, it was hi  opinion that unstructured discretion 
created a system of penalties that were applied selctively against minorities and other 
groups lacking power.  Further, he found these statutes to be "pregnant with discrimination," 
which was contrary to the idea of equal protection under the law.44 Equal protection under 
the law and penalties that were not cruel and usual required a system of administration that 
prevented the discretion of judges and juries to allow prejudices to influence sentencing 
                                                
 43Although the cited study did not represent proof of discrimination toward 
minorities in capital cases and failed to consider any number of other factors that would 
have explained the disparities, the study did raise the possibility of uneven treatment in the 
application of the death penalty.  
   
 44Id., at 255, (J. Douglas concurring). 
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outcomes in the decision making process.     
 Justice Stewart, citing the number of defendants convi ted of rape and murder in 
1967 and 1968 and the relatively few death sentences imposed, concluded that such 
discretion in the death sentencing statutes demonstrated a system of punishment that was 
randomly applied to a select few defendants.  While agr eing with Justice Douglas and 
Justice White that the death penalty was not, per se, unconstitutional, he expressed concern 
over the rarity in which the death penalty was imposed.  He believed that such a system was 
"wanton and freakish" in its application and compared the imposition of the death penalty as 
similar to being struck by lightning.45  The fact that the death penalty was imposed in sofew 
cases, led Justice White to question the utility of such a punishment that was believed to 
have a deterrent value for the criminal justice system.  In his view, the death penalty, as it 
was administered at the time, had reached a point where questions were raised as to whether 
it was accomplishing social goals.  Additionally, he concluded that any punishment with 
such marginal returns to society would be excessive and cruel and unusual under the 8th 
Amendment.  In raising the issue of discretion granted to judges and juries in capital cases, 
Justice White questioned whether such discretion could be instrumental in muting the 
legislative intent behind the death penalty.  However, it was one of his final points that 
illustrated the potential problem that could result from unstructured discretion in capital 
cases.  By allowing juries and judges wide latitude in the consideration of the death penalty, 
there was no meaningful way, in his view to distinguish the few cases that received death 
                                                
 45Id., at 309-310, (J. Stewart concurring). 
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sentences from the vast number of cases that received sentences of life imprisonment.46   
  While accepting the morality and utility of inflict ng punishment on defendants for 
the purpose of deterring others from violating the law, Justice White also recognized the 
need for such punishments to be imposed with sufficient frequency in order to further the 
legitimate goal of deterrence.  Thus, he saw the constitutionality of capital punishment in its 
ability to further a socially defined goal.  Although he stopped short of viewing these 
statutes as being discriminatory per se, he expressed apprehensiveness about a system of 
punishment that was rarely enforced.  Accordingly, his opposition to the death penalty at 
that time rested on his belief that the lack of frequ ncy with which it was inflicted created a 
system of punishment that involved the "pointless and needless extinction of life with only 
marginal contributions to any discernable public purposes".47  
 
 B.   Post-Furman Revisions 
 The Court's ruling in Furman effectively struck down all of the existing death 
sentencing statutes and concluded these statutes would have to be restructured in such a way 
that they would reduce the likelihood that death sentences would be imposed in an arbitrary, 
capricious or discriminatory manner.48  As a result of the Court's decision in Furman, state 
legislatures either eliminated discretion in the sentencing decision making process and 
replaced them with mandatory sentencing statutes or restructured them with some form of 
                                                
 46408 U.S. 238, 313. 
 
      47Id., at 313, (J. White concurring). 
      
 48After the Court's ruling in Furman, all death sentences of inmates statewide were 
invalidated and commuted to sentences of life imprisonment without parole. 
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guided discretion statutes.  Although the Court struck down the mandatory nature of the new 
changes in the death sentencing statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) and Roberts 
v. Louisiana (1977),49 statutory changes, which structured discretion, were upheld.  In 1976, 
the Court approved three newly created "guided discretion" statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 
Proffitt v. Florida and Jurek v. Texas.  
 1. Structured Discretion Statutes  
   a.   Gregg v. Georgia 
 Unlike the McGautha decision which upheld the manner in which the death penalty 
was administered on procedural grounds, the Furman and Gregg decisions focused on the 
requirement that a number of safeguards be included in death penalty schemes to avoid 
punishments that could be viewed as “cruel and unusual”.  Citing concerns addressed in 
Furman, the Gregg decision placed certain requirements on death penalty st tutes seeking to 
pass constitutional muster.  The Court based their opinion on the definition of what 
amounted to “cruel and unusual” punishments under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  In earlier rulings, the Court determined that punishments that were barbaric or 
inflicted pain ran contrary to the types of punishment that were permissible.  For example, 
the Court’s ruling in Wilkerson v. Utah suggested the constitutionality of a particular method 
of death could be defined by whether those methods were found to involve torture or were 
barbaric in their administration.50  The In re Kemmler Court defined punishments as “cruel” 
                                                
 49Substantive changes in the death sentencing statutes of North Carolina called for a 
mandatory death sentence in all murder cases while statutes in Louisiana made a death 
sentence mandatory for all cases involving the killing a police officer.   
 
 5099 U.S. 130 (1879)  
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if they involved torture or a lingering death.51  Additionally, the Court’s decision in Francis 
v. Resweber found that a second attempt to execute the defendant via the electric chair was 
not cruel because there had been no intent to inflict unnecessary pain during the execution.52 
 However, the Gregg Court took a different path in their explanation of what 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  Instead of focusing on the level of pain involved 
in executions or whether they amounted to torture, the Court turned its attention to the 
emerging societal acceptance of capital punishment.  Citing the Court’s earlier ruling in 
Weems v. U.S, the definition of cruel and unusual punishment was not rooted in the level of 
pain or barbaric treatment involved in executions, but in society’s emerging opinion of what 
constituted a system of humane justice.53  In taking this view, the Gregg Court shifted their 
focus from the types of modes of execution to the manner in which the system administered 
justice.  Thus, the Court sought to require a number of procedural safeguards in death 
sentencing schemes that would prevent the death penalty from being imposed in an 
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner. 
 First, the Court held that juries or judges in capital cases were required to consider 
guilt and punishment in a bifurcated proceeding.  The Court reasoned that such a proceeding 
would allow for a rational decision at each phase of the trial and reduce the concerns 
expressed by the Furman Court.  In such a hearing, defendants would not be forc d to 
choose between their right to be heard on the issueof punishment and their right against 
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 52329 U.S. 459 (1947)  
 
 53217 U.S. 349 (1910)  
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self-incrimination.  The Court also suggested that since juries were usually not skilled in 
matters of sentencing, there was a need to guide the decision making process in order to 
ensure that the proper factors would be considered at the penalty phase prior to the 
imposition of punishment.  This discretion would be guided by certain statutorily defined 
aggravating circumstances which would be considered with a number of mitigating 
circumstances after a finding of guilt at the previous guilt phase hearing.   
 Although the Court noted that such standards were g n ral in their nature, it was 
believed that such a system would reduce the likelihood of decisions being rendered in a 
manner similar to those condemned in Furman v. Georgia. Therefore, the Court reasoned, 
the Constitution required that death sentencing statutes adopt some formal set of guidelines 
to guide the jury’s decision making so that relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances are weighed against each other prior to the imposition of punishment.  This 
requirement would represent an improvement over the McGautha decision that left the issue 
of punishment up to the unfettered discretion of the jury.  Such standards would also, in 
theory, eliminate the likelihood that sentences would be rendered in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.  Finally, the Court held that all death sentences should be subject to 
appellate review to safeguard against capricious or freakish decisions.54 
 The Gregg decision would ultimately evaluate the newly created d ath sentencing 
schemes in Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, a d Louisiana.  Each jurisdiction 
created death penalty statutes that were believed to be sufficient to address the concerns 
cited in Furman and the statutory requirements that were articulated in Gregg.  In its 
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summation, the Court held that concerns of discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious decision 
making in death penalty cases could be addressed by sentencing schemes that provided the 
sentencing authority with all relevant information t  guide their decision to impose death or 
life imprisonment.  This feature, along with a bifurcated hearing and an automatic appellate 
review, the Court reasoned, would create a better system of justice in such cases. 
   In the case of the statute that was upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 10 aggravating 
circumstances were specified in the Georgia statute, of which at least one had to be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the imposition of a death sentence.55  As an additional 
                                                
 55Aggravating circumstances created under the Georgia death penalty sentencing 
scheme included: 
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person 
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense was committed by a 
person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. 
(2)  The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the 
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or 
the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of 
burglary or arson in the first degree. 
(3)  The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, o  kidnapping knowingly created a 
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device 
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of mre than one person. 
(4)  The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of 
receiving money or anything of monetary value. 
(5)  The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or 
former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty. 
(6)  The offender caused or directed another to commit urder or committed murder as an 
agent or employee of another person. 
(7)  The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involed torture, depravity of mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the victim. 
(8)  The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee 
or fireman in the performance of his official duties. 
(9)  The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the 
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement. 
(10)  The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing 
a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.    
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safeguard, the Georgia statute provided automatic appell te review of each death sentence in 
order to determine whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, whether the evidence supported the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance and whether the sentence was disproportionate compared to other sentences 
imposed in similar cases.56     
  b.   Proffitt v. Florida 
 Newly adopted death sentencing statutes in Florida an  Texas were also accepted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court on the same day as the Georgia statute in Proffitt v. Florida and 
Jurek v. Texas, respectively.57 Similar to the newly crafted sentencing scheme in Georgia, 
the death penalty statute in Florida identified eight aggravating circumstances that could be 
considered in capital cases.58  Additionally, the Florida death penalty system, unlike the 
                                                
 56The Court was quick to note that its ruling did notsuggest that Georgia statute 
revisions were the only way to statutorily address the concerns cited in the Furman decision.  
Instead, the Court noted the need to consider each death sentencing scheme on an individual 
basis. 
  
 57The Florida death sentencing statute is slightly different from the Georgia statute in 
that the jury must weigh all relevant factors from a list of eight aggravating circumstances 
and seven mitigating circumstances prior to the imposition of a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment.  The jury's decision to impose death, unlike the jury's decision in Georgia, is 
not binding and may be overridden by the judge.  The exas death sentencing statute also 
differs from the other two by requiring the jury to answer the following three questions in 
the affirmative prior to the imposition of a sentenc  of death: (1) whether the conduct of the 
defendant causing the death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation 
that death would occur; (2) whether it is probable that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society, and; (3) if raised by the evidence, 
whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response to the provocation, if any by 
the deceased.  An answer in the negative to any of the three questions results in the 
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
 58Aggravating circumstances included: 
(1)  The capital felony was committed by a person under  
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Georgia statute, included a number of statutorily defined mitigating circumstances that 
should be considered by the judge or jury prior to the imposition of sentence.59  The Florida 
statute also mandated that the jury’s majority vote on the sentence would only be an 
advisory recommendation to the judge in the case who ould make the final determination 
of the sentence of death or life imprisonment. The Florida revision also allowed for 
automatic appellate review in all sentences of death and it was assumed that the new law 
added an extra protection against the concerns expressed by the Furman Court by giving the 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
sentence of imprisonment. 
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person. 
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. 
(4) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an 
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing  or 
attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or 
the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 
(5) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest or effecting an escape from custody. 
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any 
governmental function or the enforcement of laws. 
(8) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, r cruel.  
  
 59 Mitigating circumstances included: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act. 
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony c mmitted by another person 
and his participation was relatively minor. 
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of 
another person. 
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.  
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final sentencing authority to the trial judge.  
  c.   Jurek v. Texas 
 The Texas death sentencing scheme also crafted a new death penalty law which 
structured the discretion of the jury in capital cases.  Unlike the Georgia and Florida 
schemes which created a number of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances that were 
subject to consideration by the jury and/or judge prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
Texas statute crafted their death sentencing scheme differently in response to the earlier 
Furman decision.  First, the new scheme limited the number of homicides that could 
potentially subject a defendant to a sentence of death.60  By limiting the types of death-
eligible homicides, the new system sought to identify offenses that were the most deserving 
of a death sentence and alleviate many of the concerns that were expressed by the Furman 
Court.  The new statute also required the jury to unanimously answer three questions in the 
affirmative prior to the imposition of a death sentence.61  
 A sentence of death, in this case, could only be imposed after the jury found that 
                                                
 60The new revisions under the Texas Penal Code identified five categories of 
homicides that, if knowingly and intentionally committed, could subject a defendant to a 
death sentence: murder of a peace officer or fireman; urder committed in the course of 
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for remuneration; 
murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and 
murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is an employee.  
  
 61The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 required the jury to 
affirmatively answer the following questions: 
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused th death of the deceased was 
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or 
another would result; 
(2) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; 
(3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the 
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocati n, if any, by the deceased.   
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each of the three statutory questions was proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.  By 
requiring the three questions to be answered prior to the imposition of sentence, the Court 
found the new statute to be constitutionally permissible despite the fact that it failed to create 
any statutorily defined mitigating circumstances that could be considered during the penalty 
phase of the trial proceeding.62  In addition to the procedural safeguards provided for 
defendants in death penalty trials, the Texas system, like the Georgia and Florida systems, 
afforded automatic appellate review to all defendants receiving a sentence of death. 
 
1. Mandatory Sentencing Schemes 
 Although the new statutes in Georgia, Florida and Texas were found to be 
constitutional, the Court struck down statutory changes to death penalty statutes in 
Louisiana and North Carolina63.  Unlike the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes which 
structured the discretion of the jury and imposed a set of guidelines in order to make 
sentencing more rational, the legislatures of Louisiana and North Carolina responded to the 
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia by making the death penalty mandatory for all 
persons convicted of specifically defined categories of first degree murder.64  These 
mandatory death sentencing schemes were put in place under the assumption that mandatory 
                                                
 62The Court reasoned that the second of the three questions allowed the defendant to 
introduce evidence to mitigate the question of whether he would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”.  
 
 63428 U.S. 325, 1976, and 428 U.S. 280, 1976, respectively. 
   
  64Both statutes were similar to those in Georgia, Florida and Texas in requiring the 
finding of any one of several aggravating circumstances that had to accompany the 
commission of the first degree murder prior to the imposition of a death sentence. 
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sentences in certain cases would remove the potential for arbitrary, capricious, and 
discriminatory decision making by the jury though the elimination of their discretion in 
capital cases.  In such a system, the jury would only be required to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was guilty of committing the death-eligible offense. 
   a.   Roberts v. Louisiana 
 In the case of the Louisiana statute, the law was revi ed from a discretionary statute 
to one which mandated a mandatory sentence of deathupon a finding of guilt among a 
select number of first degree murder charges.65  Additionally, the jury could only impose a 
sentence of death in cases where both conditions were found to have existed in the 
commission of one of the statutory definitions of first degree murder: specific intent to kill 
or inflict great bodily harm and the commission or attempted commission of one of the 
statutorily defined offenses.66 
                                                
 65The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure defined First Degree Murder as the 
killing of a human being: 
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is 
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated 
rape, or armed robbery; or 
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a 
fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or  
(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and has 
previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving life sentence; or 
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon 
more than one person; [or] 
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or 
received anything of value for committing the murder.  
 
 66Cases where only one of the two conditions were found resulted in a offense of 
second degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.  The Louisiana 
statute also provided instructions to the jury on fur different verdicts at the guilt phase of 
the trial proceeding: guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of 
manslaughter, and not guilty.  
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 b.   Woodson v. North Carolina 
 The new death sentencing statute in North Carolina a so adopted a mandatory 
sentencing scheme which mandated a sentence of death for defendants found guilty of first 
degree murder.  Unlike the Louisiana law which narrowly defined the number of first degree 
murder offenses that were subject to a death sentence, the North Carolina law was broader 
in its application of death sentences in first degre  murder cases.67    
 The Court ruled that such mandatory systems of sentenci g as those drafted by the 
legislatures of North Carolina and Louisiana ran cotrary to the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.68  It was such a rejection of these mandatory statutes that led states with death 
penalty laws to provide the juries with sentencing discretion which was ultimately structured 
and upheld in the Gregg decision. The Court, while recognizing that mandatory laws could 
lead to more defendants receiving death sentences istead of a relative few, expressed 
concerns that such a system was constitutionally repugnant due to a number of 
shortcomings. 
 First, the Court, in reviewing the history of mandtory death sentencing statutes held 
that such types of sentencing schemes could potentially result in additional problems.  
Specifically, the Court cited instances where mandatory deaths sentencing schemes could 
                                                
 67The North Carolina General Assembly mandated a sentence of death in cases of 
murder which were “perpetrated by means of poison, lyi g in wait, imprisonment, starving, 
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be 
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrat  any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, 
burglary or other felony”.   
 
 68The Court cited the history of mandatory death sentencing statutes at common law 
and the instances of jury nullification where juries often failed to convict offenders of first 
degree murder in cases where the penalty of death was believed to by inappropriate. 
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result in cases of jury nullification.69 Although it was argued that the Louisiana and North 
Carolina statutes corrected deficiencies in death sentencing schemes that were cited in the 
Furman decision, the Court held that mandatory sentences only “papered over the problem 
of unguided and unchecked jury discretion”.70  By taking this approach, the mandatory 
sentencing statutes were viewed as problematic by the Court for their failure to create 
standards to determine who would receive a sentence of d ath or life imprisonment.  The 
Court also found that neither of the mandatory sentencing schemes provided any 
consideration of the character or record of the offnder or other mitigating circumstances 
prior to the imposition of a death sentence.  Such a failure on the part of the new statutes to 
take into account these types of factors only served to “treat those convicted of first degree 
murder as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass of people to be subjected to the 
blind infliction of death” which would be inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments”.71  Finally, the mandatory sentencing schemes were struck down for failing 
to provide for proper appellate review which was one f the staples in the Georgia, Florida, 
and Texas statutes. 
 Despite the Court's ruling in Gregg, the new death sentencing procedures were 
challenged as being merely cosmetic72 and the system under Furman, the petitioner argued, 
                                                
 69The Court noted that mandatory death sentences could lead juror to depart from 
their oaths by finding the defendant guilty of a lesser offense in cases where the felt a death 
sentence was inappropriate.  
 
 70428 U.S. 280, 302.  
   
 71Id 304. 
  
 72428 U.S., at 198. 
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was still in operation.  However, in its opinion, the Court rejected this argument believing 
that, in the absence of supportive scientific evidence, the new death sentencing statutes, by 
focusing on the nature of the crime and the characte istics of the individual, promised to 
adequately channel the jury's discretion in such a way to provide safeguards against the 
arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory sentencing patterns cited in Furman.73  
  
C.  The Federal Death Penalty System 
1.   Brief Overview  
 Similar to death penalty systems, at the state levl, the federal death penalty has a 
history that extends back to the formation of the United States.  After the creation of the 
U.S. Constitution, Congress enacted a mandatory death p nalty for a number of newly 
created federal offenses and proscribed hanging as the new method of execution for those 
found guilty of death-eligible offenses.74  In addition to proscribing the death penalty for a 
select number of offenses, the early federal death penalty statute specified a number of 
related procedures for handling all federal capital cases.  Special procedures included the 
appointment of one or two counsels that were experienced in the rule of law, free access to 
counsel, complete access to potential witnesses, and the right to an advanced copy of the 
                                                
 73Id., at 206-207.   
  
 74The First Congress specified a number of  federal offenses at this time that were 
punishable by death including: murder, treason, piracy, forgery, offenses committed on the 
high seas, if committed within that body of a county; violent acts committed on a ship’s 
commander to hinder defense of the ship or its goods; making revolt in the ship, any act of 
hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high sea under colour of 
authority from any foreign prince or state; aiding and abetting piracy; assisting forgery or 
uttering forged public securities; and, rescuing or freeing of anyone convicted of a federal 
capital offense. 
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jury list at least two days prior to the start of the rial proceeding.    
 As the death penalty moved from its early roots into the 19th century, the 
administration of capital punishment at the federal l vel resulted in unintended 
consequences.  Because of perceptions that mandatory eath sentences were overly harsh, a 
significant number of death sentences imposed during this period ended with convicted 
offenders receiving pardons.75  A number of capital trials also ended in acquittals in cases 
where the jury believed the sentence of death was unju tified.76  At the same time, the 
American Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment was founded in 1845 and by 
1890 a number of state legislatures either moved to abolish their respective death penalty 
statutes or eliminated mandatory death sentences and replaced them with discretionary 
statutes (Bedau, 1982).  Rather than follow the move ent toward the total abolition of its 
death sentencing statutes, the federal government enac ed legislation which limited the death 
penalty to five statutory situations, made all death sentences completely discretionary, and 
substituted life imprisonment for a number of offens s that were previously capital 
offense.77  By 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court would approve the fed ral death sentencing 
statute which granted absolute discretion to juries in capital cases in Winston v. United 
                                                
 75By 1829, 138 federal capital trials had resulted in 118 convictions and 42 
executions.  However, an additional 64 of 118 convictions resulted in pardons because of 
perceptions that mandatory death sentences were too harsh in their administration. 
  
 76A number of acquittals involved cases of jury nullification where sympathetic 
juries freed guilty offenders because of the harshne s of mandatory death sentences.  
 
 77The Federal government limited the administration capital punishment by 
enacting, “An Act To Reduce The Cases In Which The Death Penalty May Be Inflicted” 
Act in 1897.  Juries were granted discretion in recommending a death sentence or life 
imprisonment for offenses involving murder or rape.  
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States and required the jury to use its sound discretion to be lenient in cases that it deemed 
appropriate.78 
 As the Federal death penalty system progressed in to the 20th century, unguided, 
absolute discretion remained the staple of juries in the federal system.  After revisions to the 
statute in 1909 and 1948, the penalty for rape was amended to permit juries to impose a 
sentence of death, life imprisonment or any term of years in prison upon conviction.  
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court would require juries to reach a unanimous decision 
prior to the imposition of a death sentence.  As a consequence of increases in the 
commission of a variety of crimes nationwide, Congress also expanded the list of death-
eligible offenses that would be subject for consideration by the jury in capital cases.79 
 The Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia strike down the federal death penalty for 
being in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments in the same fashion as the death 
sentencing statutes at the state level.  By giving jud es and juries absolute and complete 
discretion in capital cases, the statutes at both levels fell significantly short of providing the 
guidance to sentencing authorities that the Court deemed necessary to produce fair 
sentencing decisions.80  The Court ruled that it was the lack of structured discretion or 
guidance to the sentencing authorities in capital cases that the Court believe could increase 
the likelihood of arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory sentencing outcomes which were 
                                                
 78172 U.S. 303 (1899).  
  
 79Congress expanded to the list of death-eligible offenses included violent 
kidnapping, train-wrecking resulting in the death of its passengers, providing narcotics to a 
minor, espionage under the Atomic Energy Act, bombing, hijacking, killing by use of 
explosives, and non-lethal rapes. 
 
 80408 U.S. 238, (1972)  
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inconsistent with protections under the U.S. Constitution.  In a review of the history of the 
federal death penalty, Little (1999) noted a predictable response to the Furman decision by 
the Federal government and a number of state legislatures.81 In response to the Court’s 
rejection of death sentencing statutes which gave judges and juries unguided discretion, 
many jurisdictions replaced unguided discretion sentencing schemes with mandatory death 
penalty statutes.  Now, juries and judges were requir d to impose a death sentence in capital 
cases after finding relevant facts in the case beyond a reasonable doubt.  In such cases, 
mandatory sentences would presumably reduce the likelihood of arbitrary, capricious, and 
discriminatory sentencing practices by focusing solely on whether the death-eligible offense 
was committed.  Two years after the Furman decision, the Federal government created a 
federal death sentencing statute that it believed would address many of the Court’s concerns.  
Following recommendations contained in the Model Penal Code that was previously 
proposed by the American Law Institute, the Antihijacking Act was created in 1974 to make 
the death penalty an option in cases where air piracy resulted in the death of the victim.82   
 The new procedural process under the new law provided a bifurcated sentencing 
hearing and created a list of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors for consideration at 
the charging and sentencing phases.  Also, the new law authorized a mandatory sentence of 
death in cases where at least one aggravating circumstance was found without any 
mitigating present.  However, the Court would eventually strike down early attempts by 
                                                
 81Little, R. (1999).  The Federal Death Penalty:  History and Some Thoughts about 
the Department of Justice’s Role.  Fordham Urban Law Journal, 26, 347-508. 
  
 82The Model Penal Code was developed in 1962 to assist legi latures in creating 
standards to structure the discretion of the judges and juries on capital cases.  
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North Carolina and Louisiana to adopt mandatory death sentencing statutes in their 
respective jurisdictions.83  This ruling would ultimately render the federal death penalty law 
unconstitutional.  
 
2.  Revisions to the Federal Death Penalty Statutes  
a. The 1988 Continuing Criminal Enterprise “CCE” statute. 
   In his analysis of the Federal death penalty system, Little also noted a series of 
substantive and procedural changes in the law that were designed to address the Court’s 
earlier rulings on death sentencing statutes that either guided discretion or required 
mandatory death sentences in capital cases.  In 1970, in response to an increasing problem 
of drug use and distribution in the United States, Congress enacted the Comprehensive and 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which created the crime of engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise.84  By creating the new offense, Congress sought to target 
drug kingpins and deter potential traffickers with penalties that included mandatory 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole.  By 1988, penalties for committing a 
continuing criminal enterprise offense would be expanded to include the possibility of the 
                                                
 83Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976).   
 
 84The continuing criminal enterprise offense consists of five elements: 
(1) A felony violation of the narcotics laws; 
(2) As “part of a continuing series of violations” of the narcotics laws; 
(3) Undertaken in concert with five or more other persons; 
(4) “With respect to whom” the defendant is an organizer or supervisor; and, 
(5) The defendant obtains substantial income from the activities.  In order to secure a 
conviction, federal prosecutors are required to establi h conspiratorial conduct among the 
third and fourth elements. 
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death penalty.  Since the Furman decision, several legislative measures were taken by the 
U.S. Congress between 1972 and 1988 to revise the fderal death penalty and how it would 
be administered.  After going through a period of failed legislative efforts and a lack of 
consensus over the parameters to be included in thenew law, Congress successfully created 
new procedures to be implemented in cases under the 1988 Continuing Criminal Enterprise 
or “CCE” offense.85  Similar to the state death penalty laws, the federal statute provided a 
bifurcated hearing which separated guilt and penalti s phases in capital cases, required 
aggravating circumstances to be unanimously found by the jury, permitted non-unanimous 
findings of mitigating circumstances, and removed any requirement that the jury impose a 
death sentence in certain circumstances.86  The new law also provided a number of 
additional protections to offenders in capital cases including reasonable advanced notice by 
the government of its intent to seek the death penalty, appointment of defense lawyers 
competent in capital cases for defendants, investigative, expert or other reasonable personnel 
for the defendants, and a list to defense counsel regarding the specific aggravating 
circumstances that federal prosecutors would seek to prove.  Finally, the law required trial 
judges, as an additional safeguard prior to jury deliberations, to specifically instruct the jury 
in capital cases that it: 
 “Shall not consider the race, color,  
 religious beliefs, national origin,  
 or sex of the defendant or victim,  
                                                
 85The new federal death penalty law would be limited to individuals who 
intentionally killed or caused the intentional killing of another individual. 
   
 86The new law also significantly narrowed the class of death-eligible cases by 
specifying four different levels of intent as aggravating circumstances that were required to 
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the imposition of a death sentence.   
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 and that the jury is not to recommend  
 a sentence of death unless it has concluded  
 that it would recommend a sentence of death  
 for the crime in question no matter what such  
 characteristics of the defendant may be.”87  
 
 After the guilt phase of the trial, the jury was al o required to unanimously conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating circumstances were present, permit 
non-unanimous consideration of mitigating circumstances, and was not required to impose a 
sentence of death in cases where aggravating circumstances were found to “outweigh” 
mitigating circumstances.88  Finally, the federal death penalty statute was created with the 
expressed prohibition of being carried out on mentally retarded individuals, the insane, or 
persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense. 
b. The 1994 Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”).  
 Although the CCE procedures would survive a number of constitutional challenges, 
Congress eventually expanded the federal death penalty to include additional death-eligible 
offenses.  Congress also added a number of procedural safeguards similar to those found in 
several death penalty statutes at the state level to address concerns cited in the Furman 
opinion which were assumed to reduce the likelihood f arbitrary, capricious, or 
discriminatory sentencing outcomes.  The enactment of the FDPA was also followed by the 
implementation of a number of protocols which required United States Attorney to follow 
                                                
 87Little (1991) noted in his analysis that the jury instruction was note required by 
past rulings on federal or state death sentencing schemes but was added as an extra 
protection to defendants in capital cases.  
 
 88The jury would not be constitutionally precluded from granting the defendant 
mercy in cases where aggravating circumstances were found to outweigh mitigating 
circumstances.   
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specific guidelines in cases where the death penalty w s sought in federal cases.89     
 Additionally, the revisions to the FDPA included many of the procedural protections 
approved by the Gregg decision.  Death penalty cases in the federal system would be  
subject to a separate, bifurcated hearing to determin  the penalty after a finding of guilt and 
prosecutors are required to provide written notice to defendants of their intent to seek the 
death penalty within a reasonable time before the trial proceeding.90  Federal prosecutors 
were also required to specify which statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances 
they intended to prove at trial and are limited to th se identified circumstances unless 
amended and approved by the court.91  The statute also provides defendants with two 
lawyers in all capital cases.92  Finally, in capital cases that result in a death sentence, a 
review of the case is conducted by the court of appels upon appeal by the defendant to 
determine, among other things, “whether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
                                                
 89Although United States Attorneys were required under th  FDPA to follow strict 
protocols in gaining approval from the U.S. Attorney General to seek the death penalty, they 
continued to have wide latitude overall in choosing which cases would be subjected to the 
approval process.   
 
 90The enactment of the FDPA resulted in forty federal offenses that could be subject 
to the death penalty.  The Antiterrorism and Effectiv  Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
added four additional death-eligible offenses to the federal death penalty system.  
  
 91Non-statutory aggravating circumstances may include: th  defendant’s history of 
violence, likelihood of future dangerousness, prior guilty pleas to violent offenses, or, prison 
records indicating bad conduct. Also, 18 U.S.C 3592 defines twenty-seven aggravating 
circumstances separately for offenses involving homicide (16); espionage and treason (3); 
and, drug offenses (8).  
 
 92This statutory protection exceeded many previous constitutional requirements of 
court-appointed counsel and required at least one of the assigned attorneys to have 
experience in capital cases.  
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influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.”93  Also, cases that received 
death sentences were entitled to appellate review upon appeal by the defendant.94  
 The passage of the FDPA also resulted in the creation of a number of procedural 
requirements in capital cases that were assumed to address many of the concerns expressed 
in the Furman opinion.  Juries in capital cases are required, upon a finding of guilt, to 
consider three separate criteria prior to the imposition of the death penalty: (1) whether the 
defendant acted with a requisite mens rea making him eligible for a sentence of death; 2) 
whether other aggravating and mitigating circumstances were present; and, (3) whether a 
sentence of death was justified.   
 The first criteria under the FDPA requires capital juries to determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt if the defendant is eligible for a de th sentence by establishing whether the 
defendant’s conduct was consistent with any one of four specific statutorily defined mental 
states or “mens rea” which is considered a necessary element of the death-eligible offense.95  
                                                
 9318 U.S.C. Sec §3595.  
  
 94Cases at the state level that result in death sentences are subject to automatic 
appellate review.  However, appellate review of federal cases resulting in death sentences 
are not automatic and are conducted only upon request by the defendant.  
 
 95Under 18 U.S.C. §3591(a)(2), a defendant found guilty of a death-eligible offense 
can be sentenced to death by the jury if it finds that t e defendant: 
(1) Intentionally killed the victim; 
(2) Intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of the victim; 
(3) Intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be 
taken or intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than 
one of the participants in the offense, and the victim dies as a result of the act; or, 
(4) Intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of vi lence, knowing that the act 
created grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such 
that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim 
died as a result of the act.    
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The statute established a range of “mens rea” categories from “clear intent” to “reckless 
disregard” to prohibit defendants who were negligent in their actions from being sentenced 
to death in cases where their victims died. 
 After the mental state of the defendant in the commission of the offense was 
established, the jury is required to determine whether a statutorily defined aggravating 
circumstance advanced by federal prosecutors at trial was present.96  The FDPA also 
provides an added protection in federal capital cases, by giving defendants wide latitude to 
present any relevant mitigating circumstances to the jury during the penalty phase without 
requiring them to provide any advanced notice of this information to federal prosecutors.97  
However, federal prosecutors are required to notify defendants of their decision to seek the 
                                                
 96Aggravating circumstances were required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
by federal prosecutors and unanimously agreed upon by the jury.  Defendants are required to 
prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.     
 
 97Statutory mitigating circumstances under 18 U.S.C. ec. §3592 include: 
(1) Impaired capacity – The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct or to conform to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, 
regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired s to constitute a defense to the charge. 
(2) Duress – The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, regardless of 
whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge. 
(3) Minor participation – The defendant is punishable as a principal in the offense, 
which was committed by another, but the defendant’s participation was relatively minor, 
regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a defense to the charge. 
(4) Equally culpable defendants – Another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in 
the crime, will not be punished by death. 
(5) No prior criminal record – The defendant did not have  significant prior history of 
other criminal conduct. 
(6) Disturbance – The defendant committed the offense under severe mental or 
emotional disturbance. 
(7) Victim’s consent – The victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the 
victim’s death. 
(8) Other factors – Other factors in the defendant’s background, record, or character or 
any other circumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence. 
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death penalty and must provide advanced notice to dfense counsel regarding which specific 
aggravating circumstances will be presented and proven at trial.98   
 The final stage of the federal capital sentencing phase process involves a “weighing” 
process of all relevant aggravating circumstances that are proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
and any mitigating circumstances submitted by defendants for consideration by the jury.  
Under federal law, the weighing process is more qualitative than quantitative, and is not 
based on whether aggravating circumstances are found t  outweigh mitigating 
circumstances.99  Rather, the final sentence of death or life imprisonment is based on the 
jury’s final determination of whether the sentence is justified.  In reaching this 
                                                
 98Aggravating circumstances for homicide under 18 U.S.C. ec. §3592 include: 
(1) Death during the commission of another crime. 
(2) Previous conviction of a violent felony involving a firearm. 
(3) Previous conviction of an offense for which a sentence of dath or life imprisonment 
was authorized. 
(4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses. 
(5) Grave risk of death to additional persons. 
(6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing offense. 
(7) Procurement of offense by payment. 
(8) Pecuniary Gain – The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the 
receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. 
(9) Substantial planning and premeditation. 
(10) Conviction of two felony drug offenses. 
(11) Vulnerability of the victim – The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, 
youth, or infirmity. 
(12) Conviction for serious federal drug offenses. 
(13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors. 
(14) Crime committed against high public officials. 
(15) Prior conviction of sexual assault or child molestation. 
(16) Multiple killings or attempted killings. 
(for complete statute information, see Table 1).    
 
 99At this point in the decision process, the DFPA does not provide any guidance to 
the jury regarding how aggravating and mitigating circumstances should be weighed against 
each other.  
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determination, jury’s are required to enter the final sentence of “death” or “no death” on a 
special verdict form.  Additionally, juries are require to record all aggravating circumstances 
that are found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether more aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances were determined to exist after the final deliberations.100 The 
jury is then required to determine, after the weighin  process, whether a death sentence is 
justified.  As an added precaution, the FDPA clearly p ovides for instructions to the jury 
which state that death sentences are not mandatory in cases where aggravating 
circumstances are found without any mitigating circumstances.  Rather, juries are required 
to determine whether the presence of aggravating circumstances in the absence of mitigating 
circumstances is sufficient to justify a sentence of death.  Finally, the jury is instructed not to 
consider race, gender, religious beliefs or other inappropriate factors into the jury 
deliberations and required to sign a certificate to this fact after the final decisions has been 
determined.   
3. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federal Capital Case Review  
protocols. 
 At the time that the FDPA was enacted, procedures and protocols were also put in 
place at the charging phase of the death penalty process to ensure consistency in the 
administration of the death penalty at the federal l vel.101  All cases involving the death 
penalty routinely begin with the decision by federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty in 
                                                
 100Although non-statutory aggravating circumstances maybe considered by the jury, 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance must be found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt prior to the imposition of a death sentence.  
 
 101The U.S. Department of Justice’s Capital Case Protocols, commonly referred to 
within the department as the “Death Penalty Protocol, was issued by the U.S. Attorney 
General on January 27, 1995.  
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cases deemed to be eligible.  In Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed 
concern that unguided discretion in the sentencing process could result in arbitrary, 
capricious, or discriminatory outcomes by juries in capital cases.102  To address those 
concerns, the Gregg v. Georgia approved death sentencing statutes which provided 
guidelines to the juries in capital cases to prevent the influence of extra-legal or other 
inappropriate factors on sentencing outcomes.103  However, no such concerns were raised by 
the Court with respect to the significant latitude available to prosecutors in their decisions to 
seek the death penalty among eligible cases.   
 Prosecutorial discretion is a constant fixture in the criminal justice system.  As a 
result of this longstanding tradition, prosecutors are entrusted with considerable power over 
exercising their judgment and conscience in decisions involving the filing or dismissal of 
charges, the number and types of charges filed, as well as potential plea bargains with 
defendants.  In an overview of prosecutorial discretion, Cox (1975) noted the structure of 
statutes and criminal codes in many American jurisdictions may explain the wide degree of 
latitude that is often given to prosecutors.104  First, the broad range of criminalized behaviors 
such as offenses that are “victimless crimes” often result in a degree of discretion on the part 
of prosecutors to decide which offenses will be prosecuted and how those prosecutions will 
be pursued.  Second, many criminal statutes often ovrlap and duplicate one another, which 
provides opportunities to prosecutor to charge defendant’s with criminal offenses that may 
                                                
 102408 U.S. 238, (1972).  
 
 103428 U.S. 153, (1976).  
 
 104Cox, S. (1975).  Prosecutorial Discretion:  An Overview.  American Criminal 
Law Review. 13, 383-434.  
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produce the desired conviction and penalties.  Third, a number of criminal statutes often 
reflect the moral sentiments of the citizens in a given jurisdiction.  For example, violent 
offenses against children may invite selective enforcement of the law since these types of 
violations are more likely to evoke the moral outrage of the public and influence charging 
decisions by the prosecutor.  Fourth, a number of statutes often attempt to apply criminal 
sanctions as mechanisms of social control to behaviors that may be more appropriate for 
disposition though other means.105  Finally, prosecutorial discretion often results from 
antiquated or outdated laws that remain on the books s  long that prosecutors often have the 
power to choose which laws will be enforced.   
 In addition identifying the nature of criminal statutes and codes as sources of 
prosecutorial discretion, Cox noted a number of extra-legal factors that may result in 
disparities from such discretion.  First, a prosecutor’s caseload and existing resources could 
have an impact on charging decisions.  Prosecutors, as a way of reducing existing caseloads, 
could shift the responsibility of prosecuting cases to other state or federal agencies.  Second, 
the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system may breed the prosecutor’s desire to 
maintain or increase his or her conviction rate.  Prosecutorial discretion, in such instances, 
may influence the manner in which certain cases are creened, pursued or settled via plea 
bargain prior to or during trial.  Third, discretion may result in charging disparities in cases 
where the prosecutor may bargain with certain defendants as a way to gain valuable 
                                                
 105Cox noted that social problems such as child nonsupport, intra-family conflicts, 
and other victimless crimes may be disposed of more effectively by agencies outside of the 
criminal court system.  
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information or testimony concerning other suspected criminals or criminal offenses.106  
Finally, the pressure of public opinion may influenc  charging decision on the part of the 
prosecutor.  Additionally, political pressures, the ne d to maintain the public’s respect for 
the criminal justice system, and negative press coverage may also influence how prosecutors 
exercise their discretion in charging outcomes. 
 Despite the fact that the Furman court raised concerns over the potential impact of 
unguided discretion of capital juries on sentencing outcomes, no such concerns were raised 
regarding the unfettered discretionary power of prosecutors.  Rather, the Court recognized 
the importance of prosecutorial discretion is cases involving the death penalty.  The Gregg 
court, in their approval of the revised Georgia death sentencing statute, rejected the claims 
that the “unfettered authority” of the prosecutor was constitutionally impermissible.107  
Thus, in the view of the Court, prosecutor discretion did not render the state’s death penalty 
statute unconstitutional.   
 The Court’s ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp, would also influence how the federal 
death penalty procedures and protocols were adopted in he federal system.  In that case, the 
petitioner raised concerns that the race of the victim influenced whether the death penalty 
was imposed and, in turn, suggested that the death p nalty in the State of Georgia was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.108  Specifically, 
                                                
 106Cox pointed to a number of negative consequences that can result in instances 
where the prosecutor uses discretion to obtain information or testimony: decisions not to 
charge, decisions to dismiss charges already brought, or a reduction in existing charges.  
 
 107428 U.S. 153, at 199 (1976).  
 
 108The petitioner also raised the issue that the death penalty in Georgia was 
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the petitioner in McCleskey focused on statistical data submitted to the Court which found 
that killers of white victims were 4.3 times more like y to have the death penalty imposed in 
their cases than killers whose victims were black.109  Additionally, the race effects found in 
the Georgia sentencing system remained significant after considering 230 non-racial 
variables that could have influenced sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  Based on these 
findings, the petitioner concluded that the State of Georgia placed a higher value on the lives 
its white citizens than its black citizens.  Although the Court would ultimately reject the 
petitioner’s claims of racial bias in the Georgia sentencing system, the Court’s ruling would 
lead to the eventual creation and adoption of several procedural safeguards in the federal 
death penalty system which attempted to address the impact of racial bias in capital cases.110  
As a result of the Gregg and McCleskey rulings, as well as subsequent revisions to the 
federal death penalty statutes, measures would eventually be adopted by 1994 with the 
intent of addressing threats of racial bias in the fed ral death penalty system.  
 After the enactment of the FDPA, the U.S. Department of Justice (hereafter referred 
to as “DOJ”) adopted procedures and protocols for death penalty cases to remove the 
potential influence of extra-legal factors, such as race, from the decisions of U.S. Attorneys 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause. 
  
 109Although race-of-the victim effects were found in several analyses, the race-of-
the-defendant effects were not found to be statistically significant.   
 
 110The Court would reject the petitioner’s claim that racial discrimination influenced 
the outcome in his case case due to his failure to demonstrate “purposeful discrimination” in 
the Georgia death penalty system.  That is, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the 
Georgia legislature passed the death statutes with prior knowledge that the administration of 
the death penalty would result in it be unfairly applied to certain racial groups over others.  
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seeking to charge defendants with death-eligible offenses.  Little’s review of the federal 
death penalty protocols describes a fairly complex decision making process at several levels 
in the federal death penalty system that differs substantially from charging procedures 
typically found at the state level.111  At each of these levels, which begin with the charging 
decisions of the U.S. Attorneys with additional oversight by the Capital Review Committee, 
the Deputy Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General, a number of procedural 
protections have been adopted to address the potential influence racial bias in charging 
outcomes in federal capital cases.     
 Although the DOJ protocols and procedures do not create any substantive or 
procedural rights for defendants charged with capital crimes, a number of governing 
standards were adopted with the federal charging protocols and procedures to address 
previous concerns of racial bias in capital cases and assist decision makers at each level in 
the charging process.112  First, the charging process required all authorities with decision 
making power to consider each case on its own merits.  This requirement would promote 
fairness in the charging process by preventing extra-leg l characteristics such as race or 
ethnicity from influencing the charging recommendations by U.S. Attorneys and/or charging 
decisions by the U.S. Attorney General.  Second, decision makers were required to treat 
cases with similar characteristics in a similar fashion.  Although each federal district was 
                                                
 111 Little, R. (1999).  The Federal Death Penalty:  History and Some Thoughts about 
the Department of Justice’s Role.  Fordham Urban Law Journal, 26, 347-508.   
 
 112In United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478 (1996), two district courts ruled 
that the decision to seek the death penalty is solely a function of prosecutorial discretion and 
defendants are not entitled to due process protectins that are typically afforded in 
adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative government proceedings.  
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viewed as being distinctive in terms of its respectiv  State and local practices, federal 
prosecutors were required to adopt charging practices hat would result in more consistency 
across the nation.  By requiring oversight at multiple levels, this requirement would reduce 
charging disparities across federal districts.  Third, the charging process required the 
decision makers at each level in the review process to determine whether the applicable 
statutory aggravating factors and any relevant non-statutory aggravating factors sufficiently 
outweighed the applicable mitigating factors or whether aggravating factors existed in the 
absence of mitigating factors to justify a sentence of death.  Finally, the U.S. Attorneys, the 
Capital Review Committee, the Deputy Attorney General, and the U.S. Attorney General 
were are required to consider whether any legitimate law enforcement or prosecutorial 
reasons existed prior to the decision to seek or not to seek the death penalty.  
a. The United States Attorneys 
 At the federal level, the charging process begins with an internal assessment by 
prosecutors of eligibility of the offense for the dath penalty.113  All death-eligible cases are 
generally required to meet three criteria: (1) the defendant is charged with an offense that is 
statutorily authorized to receive a death sentence; (2) the defendant intended or had a high 
degree of culpability with respect to the death of the victim; and, (3) one or more statutory 
aggravating circumstances must be present in the case.114  Additionally, the decision to seek 
                                                
 113 Generally, federal cases for which a death sentence may result require the killing 
of the victim as a necessary element of the crime.  However, a number of non-homicide 
offenses such as treason, espionage and drug distribution offenses under certain 
circumstances are statutorily eligible to receive the death penalty. 
 
 114Prosecutors seeking the death penalty are also required to provide a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty to defense counsel and must specify which aggravating 
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the death penalty in federal capital cases is also influenced by whether it is in the interest of 
the Federal government to pursue the case over the inter st of the state in which the offense 
initially occurred.  The “substantial federal interest” provision requires U.S. Attorneys to 
consider whether the Federal interest to pursue prosecution outweighs the interests of other 
State or local jurisdictions.  In such cases involving “dual jurisdiction”, it is generally 
recognized that the federal death-eligible offense may also be prosecuted under state law.115  
According to the United States Attorney’s Manual, “substantial federal interest” to prosecute 
a criminal case over the interests of the specific state can be demonstrated if: (1) the Federal 
government’s case is found to be stronger than that of the state’s case; (2) the criminal 
activity involved in the case was found to extend beyond the borders of the respective state; 
and, (3) there is a higher likelihood of effective prosecution in the federal court versus the 
state court.116    
 Additional safeguards were also added to the adopte  protocols to promote fairness 
and consistency in charging decisions by federal prosecutors. Cases involving the decision 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
circumstances the government will propose to prove as a justification for seeking the death 
penalty.   
 
 115According to the “substantial federal interest” provision, U.S. Attorneys can 
assume jurisdiction over the case and request the death penalty in state jurisdiction that do 
not have the death penalty as a charging and sentenci g option.  However, federal 
prosecutors cannot claim “substantial federal interest” in a non-death penalty state solely as 
a means to obtain the death penalty. 
  
 116According to DOJ policy, federal authorities will often defer to state officials in 
homicide prosecutions to avoid duplicate prosecutions f cases where the federal and state 
governments hold dual jurisdiction.  In such cases, f deral authorities will not prosecute 
offenses if the state chooses to do so.   
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by U.S. Attorneys to seek the death penalty advance through a number of levels prior to the 
final authorization by the U.S. Attorney General to seek the death penalty in capital cases.  
After eligibility requirements have been met and charging decisions have been finalized, all 
U.S. Attorneys are required to submit any pending cases for which the death penalty is 
authorized regardless of whether or not the death penalty is being recommended.117  
Although the U.S. Attorneys are not required to consult with the authorities in DOJ with 
final decision making power over cases that receive authorization to continue in the process 
as death-eligible cases, they are required to prepare a “Death Penalty Evaluation” form for 
all potential capital cases. Similar to cases filings at the state level, prosecutor are provided 
considerable discretion in their decisions regarding the death penalty.  Although senior staff 
at DOJ will often defer to the decisions by U.S. Attorneys to not seek the death penalty in 
many cases, all indictments which may result in a death sentence are regarded as “trigger 
cases” and are heavily scrutinized during the charging process.118    
 The current charging system also gives wide latitude to U.S. Attorneys in plea 
bargains with defendants in capital cases.  Althoug DOJ protocols and procedures prevent 
federal prosecutors from seeking the death penalty in order to gain a more favorable plea 
bargaining position, they are free to use their discretion to approve any plea bargains in a 
capital cases as a means of disposing with the case prior to the trial proceeding.119  After the 
                                                
 117All U.S. Attorneys must obtain written approval from the U.S. Attorney General 
in order to formally seek the death penalty.  
 
 118Any federal case that is potentially eligible for the death penalty is considered a 
“trigger” case and is sent to DOJ for review regardless of whether or not the death penalty is 
being sought.  
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plea bargain is approved, federal prosecutors are required to report any plea agreement to 
senior-level officials at DOJ with an explanation fr the agreement.120 
 Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), U.S. Attorneys are required 
to provide notice to defense counsel that they intend o seek the death penalty and all 
statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances that will be proven at trial must be 
clearly specified.  The capital case protocols and procedures also require that proper notice 
of intent to seek the death penalty be given to defense counsel at the time of the indictment 
of a death-eligible offense or prior to the time that the U.S. Attorney decides to obtain 
approval from the Attorney General to seek the death penalty.121  Additionally, U.S. 
Attorneys are also encouraged to consult with defens  counsel before the case is submitted 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 119Under section 9-10.000 of the United States Attorneys Manual, the U.S. Attorneys 
may not seek, or threaten to seek the death penalty for the purpose of gaining a more 
favorable negotiating position with defendants in capital cases.  Additionally, the U.S. 
Attorneys, unless approved by the Attorney General, a e prevented from entering into any 
binding plea agreements which may preclude the Attorney General from seeking the death 
penalty.  Accordingly, the U.S. Attorneys are required to inform all parties that any plea 
agreements reached are not binding and are conditioned on the authorization of the Attorney 
General. 
 
 120U.S. Attorneys are not required to seek approval from the U.S. Attorney General 
prior to the decision to enter into a plea agreement with defendants in capital cases.  
However, the withdrawal of the death penalty in a case that was not part of a plea bargain 
and was previously approved by the U.S. Attorney General requires a review by the capital 
case review committee and final approval by the U.S. Attorney General.   
 
 121The requirement of notice of intent to seek the death penalty is intended to 
provide defense counsel with the opportunity to present mitigating facts to the U.S. 
Attorneys that may influence the decision or not to seek the death penalty in death-eligible 
cases. 
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to the Attorney General in cases where the death penalty is being recommended.122  After 
notice has been given or approval has been sought, the U.S. Attorneys are required to 
prepare the evaluation form with the required information for submission to the Capital Case 
Review Committee, which has nationwide jurisdiction. Upon submission, the capital case 
review committee, which consists of the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney 
General of the Criminal Division, and other senior Justice Department lawyers who are 
designated by the U.S. Attorney General, reviews the information prior to making a final 
recommendation to the U.S. Attorney General.  Per DOJ protocol, all death-eligible cases, 
regardless of whether the death penalty is being sou ht, are submitted by the U.S. Attorneys 
to the capital case review committee.  After the case has been submitted for review, counsel 
for the defense is afforded the opportunity to submit a presentation to the committee prior to 
the final decision made by the U.S. Attorney General to seek the death penalty.  In response 
to concerns raised in McCleskey of potential racial bias in the Georgia death penalty scheme, 
defense counsel’s presentation may also include any vidence of racial bias against the 
defendant, as well as any additional evidence of a systematic pattern of racial discrimination 
by DOJ in the administration of the death penalty in the Federal system.  Concerns of racial 
bias in the Federal death penalty scheme were presumably addressed by the creation of a 
“race-blind” charging system that attempts to remove race or ethnicity from the 
consideration in the final charging process.  Thus, U.S. Attorneys are prevented from 
including any information regarding the race or ethnicity of the defendant or victim in the 
                                                
 122Meetings with defense counsel often provide an opportunity for the U.S. 
Attorneys to explain the position of the defense and provide any relevant rebuttal 
information to DOJ authorities who have decision making power in the charging process.   
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case file that goes to the U.S. Attorney General.123 
 Prior to the submission of the charging recommendations to the U.S. Attorney 
General, federal prosecutors are required to articula e a moral rationale which provides a 
justification for the decision to seek the death penalty under the applicable federal statute.  
Additionally, federal prosecutors are required to use similar standards as those typically used 
by juries in capital cases to justify their decision to seek the death penalty.  Thus, the 
justification to seek the death penalty is based, in part, on the requirement that federal 
prosecutors determine which aggravating and mitigatin  circumstances exist AND whether 
the aggravating circumstances are found to “outweigh” the mitigating circumstances.124  
b. The Capital Case Unit (“CCU”) 
 After the preliminary decision making process has been completed with respect to 
the request by the U.S. Attorneys to seek the death penalty, all capital case submissions are 
submitted with all required documentation to the Capital Case Unit for review.125  The 
                                                
 123By removing all information of race or ethnicity from the case file that goes 
before the U.S. Attorney General, it is assumed that this requirement provides a safeguard 
against racially biased charging decisions being made at a conscious or unconscious level.  
 
 124The charging process is considered by some to be favorable to defendants in 
capital cases in view of the fact that the aggravating factors submitted by federal prosecutors 
must be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the mitigating 
circumstances submitted for consideration are held to a lower standard and generally consist 
of any such circumstances that may be reasonably raised from the existing evidence. 
  
 125All capital case submissions must include a death penalty evaluation form for 
each defendant charged with a capital offense, a detailed prosecution memorandum, copies 
of the indictments, written documentations from defense counsel which express opposition 
to the death penalty, and any additional relevant documentation and/or evidence.  As an 
added precaution, prosecutors seeking the death penalty do not submit any information to 
the review committee regarding the defendant(s) racial or ethnic background.  However, 
defense counsels have shared their client’s race and/or ethnicity in past cases.    
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Capital Case Unit (hereafter referred to as the CCU) was created to add an additional layer 
of review oversight to the capital case decision making process.  Although there is no formal 
requirement, U.S. Attorneys are strongly encouraged to consult with the CCU prior to 
seeking a capital indictment. In 1998, the CCU was established within the Criminal Division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice in response to an increase in capital cases in the federal 
system with the intent of serving as an advisory comp nent for federal prosecutors.   One of 
the primary functions of the CCU, which is staffed with prosecutors with extensive 
experience in prosecuting capital cases at the state level, is to ensure that all information 
related the race of the defendants and victims has been removed from the case files before 
that are submitted to the U.S. Attorney General.126  Thus, the removal of all direct racial 
                                                
 126According to § 9-10.080 of the United States Attorneys’ Manual, charging 
documents submitted for review must include: 
(A) A prosecution memorandum detailed information regarding the basis for the 
recommendation by the U.S. Attorney including: 
1.  Any unusual circumstances in the case such as: 
a. The case is being submitted for expedited review. 
b. The case involves the extradition of the defendant from a country 
where a waiver of the authority of the United States to eek the death 
penalty is necessary for extradition. 
c. The case presents a significant law enforcement reason for not 
seeking the death penalty (such as the defendant’s willingness to 
cooperate in a difficult prosecution. 
d. The case has been submitted for pre-indictment review. 
2.  Any deadline established by the Court for the     
 filing of a notice of intent to seek the death   
 penalty, trial dates, or other time considerations   
 that could affect the timing of the review  
 process. 
3.  A narrative statement of the facts and supporting    
 evidence. 
4.  A discussion of relevant prosecutorial                            
 considerations. 
5.  A death penalty analysis which identifies intent,  
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information addresses concerns of racial bias in capital cases which was raised in McCleskey 
and creates a “race blind” charging process.127   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 and applicable aggravating and mitigating   
 circumstances.  Additionally, the U.S. Attorney  
 should note whether the aggravating circumstances   
 outweigh the mitigating circumstances to justify a   
 sentence of death or whether aggravating  
 circumstances exist in the absence of mitigating   
 circumstances to justify a sentence of death. 
6.  All background and criminal records of the  
 defendant (with the exception of information on  
 race or ethnicity of the defendant). 
7.  All background and criminal records of the victim  
 (with the exception of information on race or   
             ethnicity of the victim). 
8. Victim impact statements from the victim’s family  
 on seeking the death penalty as well as other    
 victim impact evidence. 
9.  Discussion of the federal interest in prosecuting  
 the case. 
10. Any discussion on whether the defendant(s) are citizens of foreign countries, 
and if so, whether the requirements of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations have been satisfied. 
11. A recommendation of the United States Attorney on whether the death 
penalty should be sought. 
(B) A death penalty evaluation form for each defendant charged with a death-eligible 
offense. 
(C) A non-decisional information form. 
(D) Copies of all existing and proposed superseding indictments. 
(E) A draft notice of intention to seek the death penalty. 
(F) Any materials submitted by defense counsel. 
(G) The name of the assigned U.S. Attorney who is responsible for communicating with 
the Capital Case Unit. 
(H) Any relevant court decisions which highlight court orders and deadlines. 
 
127Although direct racial information of the defendant and victim is removed prior to 
charging authorizations made by the U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys are aware of 
those racial characteristics when their charging decisions are determined.  However, all 
racial information is retained by DOJ for research purposes. 
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 The CCU also provides a level of oversight to the c arging decisions made by the 
U.S. Attorneys by evaluating whether all cases submitted are eligible under the capital 
statutes in the United States Code.  Under DOJ’s Capital Resource Manual, all capital 
eligible cases are assigned to crime-specific sections within DOJ.128 Upon receipt of the 
required documentation from the U.S. Attorneys, the CCU assesses the death eligibility of 
all cases submitted by cross-referencing those cases to the list of capital eligible statutes 
contained in the DOJ’s Criminal Resource Manual. 
c.   The U.S. Attorney General’s Review Committee (“AGRC”)  
 The U.S. Attorney General’s Review Committee (hereafter referred to as the Review 
Committee) represents a critical oversight authority in the federal charging process.  The 
Review committee is appointed at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney General and is 
comprised of the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division, and a number of other high-ranking attorneys in the Department of 
Justice.129  Cases submitted to the Review Committee include those with all of the required 
documentation and cases requiring an immediate decision by the Attorney General because 
of a deadline set by the court.  In cases requiring an immediate decision, the Review 
Committee is required to respond court-ordered deadlines at the risk of losing the decision 
                                                
 128Capital cases are currently assigned one of the following sections in DOJ: 
Terrorism and Violent Crimes, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Organized Crime and 
Racketeering, Office of Special Investigations, Child Exploitation and Obscenity, or the 
Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division.  
 
 129Due to the lack of a formal review process for capital cases in the federal system, 
then-Attorney General Janet Reno created the Review Committee in 1995 to provide an 
advisory body to the Attorney General in cases involving the decision to seek or not to seek 
the death penalty in capital-eligible cases. 
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making authority of the Attorney General to seek the death penalty in those cases.  All cases 
submitted to the Review Committee are required to include a Death Evaluation form, other 
supporting documents forwarded by the U.S. Attorneys and a memo which summarizes any 
other issues that have been flagged for consideration pr or to the decision by the Attorney to 
seek the death penalty.  Additionally, U.S. Attorneys are required to provide a 
recommendation to the Attorney General whether the death penalty should or shouldn’t be 
sought as well as an explanation for that decision.130   
 Similar to the charging decision making process which is initiated by the U.S. 
Attorneys, the Review Committee evaluates all capital-eligible cases by determining which 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present in each case and whether the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating crcumstances.  The Review Committee, 
in determining whether the death penalty should be authorized, is also required to determine 
whether the aggravating circumstances are supported by a missible evidence that can be 
sustained on appeal.131  In an effort to achieve national uniformity in charging decisions, 
cases where the death penalty is recommended receive an extra level of scrutiny by the 
Review Committee.  In such cases, the Review Committee is required to address two issues 
in their charging recommendation process to the Attorney General.  First, the Review 
                                                
 130U.S. Attorneys are given significant deference by the Attorney General in “no 
death penalty” recommendations under the presumption that they are most familiar with the 
dynamics of their local federal districts such as the judges, juror pools and attitudes for and 
against the death penalty, and the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. 
 
 131The federal charging process is viewed as being in the defendant’s favor by 
requiring that only those aggravating circumstances supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt may be submitted to the Attorney Gneral for authorization to seek the 
death penalty.  
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Committee examines each case to determine whether the xisting facts and circumstances 
justify the request for the death penalty.  Second, a comparative analysis is conducted to 
examine how the case under considerations compares to other cases in which the death 
penalty was previously recommended by the U.S. Attorney, but not authorized by the 
Attorney General.  After careful consideration of whether the death penalty is justified and 
how the case compares to other comparable cases, the Review Committee begins 
preliminary discussion in preparation to make its final recommendation to the Attorney 
General.   
 During the preliminary decision making phase of the c arging recommendation 
process, the defense counsel is afforded the opportunity o present arguments to the Review 
Committee prior to the official recommendation to the Attorney General of whether or not 
the death penalty should be sought.132  Although no formal record of the presentations is 
maintained, defense counsel is given wide latitude regarding the nature of the presentation 
and often responds to a series of legal, factual, or philosophical questions from the Review 
Committee.133  The defense is also allowed to present any evidence of racial bias against the 
defendant in his or her case as well as any evidence of a pattern or practice of racial 
                                                
 132These meetings between the Review Committee and the defense counsel are often 
strategic in nature as the each side attempts to gauge the other’s possible course of action 
once the case moves to the trial phase.  However, defense counsel presentations tend to be 
more serious in nature in cases where a death-eligibl  case is filed, but a death 
recommendation is either unlikely or can be realistically avoided.    
 
 133Questions from the Review Committee often include issues of culpability among 
co-defendants, the level of heinousness present in a homicide, or the likelihood that the 
death penalty will be recommended in a given case.   
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discrimination on the part of the Department of Justice.134  The defense may present 
previously unknown facts in the case such as psychological evaluations records of the 
defendant which may indicate some form of mental illness and result in an additional 
investigation on the part of the Review Committee. 
 After the conclusion of the presentation by defense counsel, all relevant case 
documentation is reviewed and the Review Committee initiates charging recommendation 
deliberations.  Although the Review Committee must clearly articulate its rationale for the 
charging recommendation, neither the rationale nor the final decision is required to be 
unanimous.  Thus, it is possible that members of the Review Committee may recommend 
that the death penalty be sought for different reasons.135  Once the memorandum is deemed 
satisfactory by the Review Committee, a meeting is scheduled with the Attorney General for 
the final charging discussions.  Unless further information is need, the Attorney General, at 
the conclusion of the discussion, makes the final decision whether or not to authorize the 
U.S. Attorney in the case to seek the death penalty.   
 
 D.   Empirical Research 
  1.  The Pre-Furman Studies  
                                                
 134Similar to the function performed by the Capital Case Unit, the Review 
Committee also reviews the case documents to verify that all references to the race of the 
defendant(s) and victim(s) have been removed from the case file before it is forwarded to 
the Attorney General.  
 
 135For example, one member may reach the conclusion that one aggravating 
circumstances wasn’t proven and another member may conclude that the aggravating 
circumstances present do not significantly outweigh the mitigating circumstances present in 
the case.  
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 In addition to the concerns addressed by the Court regarding the application of the 
death penalty, researchers over time have grappled with the best way to evaluate the 
potential effect of racial characteristics on sentencing outcomes in capital cases.   One of the 
key criticisms by opponents of capital punishment involves the notion that the death penalty 
is administered in a discriminatory manner.  This argument resulted in a body of research 
prior to the Court’s ruling in Furman v. Georgia which appeared to establish a relationship 
between the racial characteristics of the offender and/or victim and whether a sentence of 
death or life imprisonment was imposed by the sentencing authority.  The key challenges to 
researchers seeking to establish such a relationship centers on the how to measure these 
relationships and how to interpret the research findings. Since the turn of the 20th century, 
numerous studies have attempted to capture this relationship using different research 
approaches. 
 One of the earliest studies (Mangum, 1940) analyzed th  administration of the death 
penalty in nine Southern states during a period from 1909 to 1938 and found black offenders 
had a higher likelihood being executed than white off nders. Additional studies (Johnson, 
1941; Garfinkel, 1949) which focused on the interracial relationships between the offender 
and victim also found what was believed to be influences of the race of the offender and 
victim on whether a death sentence was imposed.  By comparing the race of both the 
offender and the victim, these studies found a higher likelihood of the death sentence 
resulting in cases where the offender was black and the victim was white.  A series of 
studies that followed which examined the same racial rel tionship between the offender and 
victim confirmed earlier findings that cases where the offender was black and the victim 
was white were sentenced to death at a higher rate th n in cases with the other three 
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offender/victim categories (Florida Civil Liberties Union, 1964; Howard, 1967; Southern 
Regional Council, 1969; Wolfgang and Reidel, 1973; Zimring et al., 1976).136    
 Despite these findings, many of the pre-Furman studies were characterized by poor 
or limited methodological approaches which made it ifficult to draw conclusions of the 
effect of race on charging or sentencing outcomes.  Kleck’s (1981) review of a number of 
capital punishment sentencing studies pointed to a number of statistical weaknesses of this 
body of work which questioned the validity of the find ngs.137 For example, many of the 
studies failed to control for key legal variables such as the prior criminal record of the 
offender or included very crude measures of the defen ant’s prior record. Additionally, 
many of the studies that examined the role of offender/victim interracial relationships on 
sentencing outcomes failed to consider the prior record of the offender or produced findings 
that were called into question by a series of later studies.  Kleck (1981) also pointed to a 
number of studies that found felony killings were punished more severely than other 
homicides when considering race and that black offender/black victims homicides were 
more likely to involve some level of precipitation by the victim than in homicides where the 
offender was black and the victim was white (Wolfgan , 1958; Wolfgang et al., 1962; 
Bedau, 1964; Wolf, 1964;).138  Finally, many of the studies did not focus on sentencing 
                                                
 136These studies suggested the possibility of a discriminatory effect involving the 
imposition of sentences of death in rape cases where t  offender was black and the victim 
was white.  
 
 137Kleck, G. (1981).  Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing:  A Critical 
Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty.  American 
Sociological Review, 46, December: 783-805.  
 
 138A review of many of the pre-Furman studies also revealed a weaker effect of race 
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outcomes at the trial stage.  Instead, many of the studies were found to focus on comparisons 
of sentences that were executed or commuted, or death s n ences receiving appeals at higher 
levels in the legal process.  Because of these limitations, Kleck (1981:799) found no 
evidence among the studies reviewed of a significant effect of race on death penalty 
sentencing outcomes. 
  2.  The Post-Furman Studies 
 After the Court's rulings in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, the revisions 
in the Georgia statute were thought to have adequatly ddressed and corrected the potential 
for lawless decision.  Although empirical evidence was either lacking or found to be flawed 
during this period of time, the Court believed that t e new death sentencing statutes would 
administer death sentences in a manner that was rational, structured and more likely to 
produce sentencing outcomes that would be free from p tentially arbitrary, capricious, and 
discriminatory practices of the pre-Furman era.  However, a number of empirical studies 
have cited the existence of race as a possible influe ce in determining the recommendation 
and imposition of the death penalty at the sentencing phase of trial even after the procedural 
guidelines in Gregg were put into operation.  
 Unlike the earlier studies which examined the role of race on sentencing outcomes in 
capital cases in the pre-Furman era, studies that were conducted after the Gr gg decision 
were more sophisticated in their methodological approaches.  In 1990, the United States 
General Accounting Office examined 28 studies on patterns of racial disparities in death 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
on sentencing outcomes when the prior record of the offender was considered.  
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penalty sentencing that were conducted after the Furman decision.139  The report evaluated 
the research quality of each study and found them to be superior to earlier studies that were 
conducted prior to Furman v. Georgia.140 A review of the 28 studies under evaluation 
indicated a pattern of racial disparities at several stages in the death penalty process after the 
Furman decision.141  The GAO report noted that 82 percent of the death penalty studies 
reviewed revealed that the race of the victim was found to have a significant impact on 
whether the offender was charged with a death-eligible offense or received a sentence of 
death.142  Specifically, cases involving white victims were found to have a higher likelihood 
of being charged or sentenced in death penalty cases.  Although these findings supported 
earlier pre-Furman studies on race and the death penalty, the results from analyses after the 
Gregg ruling were strengthened by their consideration of variables such as the prior record 
of the offender and the number of aggravating circumstances present during the commission 
                                                
 139 United States General Accounting Office. (1990).  Death Penalty Sentencing:  
Research Indicates Patterns of Racial Disparities.  Washington, DC:  United States 
Congress. 
 
 140Each study was rated by five criteria: (1) study design, (2) sampling, (3) 
measurement, (4) data collection, and (5) analysis.  Studies were judged to be of high quality 
if they: (a) had a sound design that analyzed homicide ases throughout the sentencing 
process; (b)controlled for legally relevant variables such as aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; and, (c) incorporated analytical techniques to control variables that were 
correlated with race or sentencing.  Other studies were characterized as of medium quality if 
they did not meet one of the previous three quality ra ing measures and weak studies were 
defined as having flawed designs and were too basic in their final data interpretations.    
 
 141Racial disparities were found at the charging, sentencing, and the imposition of 
sentence stages.   
 
 142Although the majority of the studies reviewed found race-of-the-victim effects on 
charging and sentencing outcomes, the race of the offender has been found in a small 
number of studies to have an impact on such outcomes as well. 
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of the offense.  A review of studies deemed to be of high or medium quality by the GAO 
report found that the inclusion of legal variables into several of the analyses did not 
completely explain the racial disparities cited.  That is, after legal factors such as the number 
of aggravating circumstances, prior record of the off nder, level of culpability, and 
heinousness of the crime were considered, cases involvi g white victims still were found to 
have a higher likelihood of receiving a death sentence.  A number of these studies at the 
charging and sentencing phases using multivariate analyses will be discussed below. 
   3.   Studies at the State Level 
 Bowers and Pierce143 analyzed the effect of race on the outcomes of sentenci g in 
several states with death sentencing statutes.  Since it was determined that approximately 
70% of all death sentences handed down at that time wer  imposed in Florida, Georgia, 
Texas and Ohio, Bowers and Pierce sought to examine, among other factors, whether or not 
possible sentencing disparities existed in these stat s according to the race of the defendant 
and victim.  By using the Supplemental Homicide Reports from 1973 to 1976, demographic 
variables such as the race, sex and age of the defendant and victim as well as other legal 
factors such as the number of aggravating and mitigatin  circumstances, the analysis was 
constructed to examine the effect of race on sentenci g among four defendant/victim 
categories.  After considering each of these categories--black defendant-white victim, white 
defendant-white victim, black defendant-black-victim and white defendant-black victim--
Bowers and Pierce were able to determine that black defendants whose victims were white 
                                                
 143Bowers, W.J. & Pierce, G.L., (1980).  Arbitrariness and Discrimination under 
Post-Furman Capital Statutes. Crime and Delinquency, 26, October: 563-575. 
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had the greatest likelihood of receiving a death sentence.  In Florida, defendants whose 
victims were white were forty times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants 
whose victims were black.  When the race of the defndant was considered along with the 
race of the victim, black defendants who killed whites were five times more likely to receive 
a death sentence than white defendants whose victims were also white.  Similar patterns, 
though slightly lower in magnitude in Georgia and Texas and higher overall in Ohio, were 
noted as well. 
 Bowers and Pierce also examined the influence of other legal factors as a possible 
explanation for racial disparities in sentencing by dividing the homicides into felony and 
non-felony murders.144  Felony type murders were defined as those murders which were 
committed in the commission of another felony such as a case where a homicide was 
committed in the course of a robbery.  Non-felony murder, on the other hand, were 
homicides which were often typical in cases involving black victims--domestic fights, fights 
among acquaintances or friends, etc.  If such legal factors accounted for sentencing 
disparities, disparities found in the previous analysis according to the race of the defendant 
and victim should disappear.  However, a pattern of sentencing disparity similar to the initial 
analysis was noted in the felony and non-felony murder categories of the analysis.  Although 
the disparities were less pronounced in the non-felony category,145 the addition of legal 
                                                
      144Id., at 597-600.  Felony homicides consisted of those cas s that were eligible to 
receive a death sentence whereas non-felony homicides may or may not have been eligible.  
      145A death sentence was more than five to ten times more likely in a felony murder 
case than a non-felony murder case among each of thefour defendant-victim categories in 
Florida, Georgia and Texas.  Ohio was not considered in this part of the analysis due to the 
fact that its death statutes were struck down by the Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
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factors into the analysis still did not adequately account for racial disparities in sentencing 
noted in each of the four categories.  The probability of receiving a death sentence for felony 
and non-felony convictions was still highest in cases where the victim was white. 
 Zeisel conducted a study in 1981 using Florida’s Supplemental Homicide Reports to 
examine the influence of race among cases involving 114 inmates on Florida’s death row.146 
The purpose of the study was to conduct a comparative nalysis of the race defendants and 
victims among the men on Florida’s death row to race distributions of 189 Florida arrestees 
from January, 1976 to September, 1977.  Of the 114 death row inmates, 75% of the inmates 
committed murders during the commission of a felony such as rape, robbery, or burglary.  
Zeisel noted in his results that 94% of the death row inmates were convicted of killing 
involving white victims.  Only 2% of the death sentces resulted in multiple victim cases 
involving white and black victims, and 4% of the inmates were sentenced to death in cases 
where the victim was black.  Final results that showed a ratio of death row to arrestees for 
murder during a felony was 31% for offenders whose victims were white compared to 1% 
for offenders whose victims were black.  Zeisel’s study also examined offender/victim racial 
combinations and found that cases involving black offenders and white victims represented 
47% of arrestees on death row compared to 24% of arrestees where the offender and victim 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. 586 (1978) because of its quasi-mandatory nature. 
 146Zeisel, H. (1981).  Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty:  The 
Florida Experience. Harvard Law Review, 95, 456-468. 
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were white.147    
 Radelet conducted a study in Florida which examined 637 homicide indictments in 
twenty Florida counties in 1976 and 1977.148  In his analysis, he focused his examination on 
defendant/victim distributions among homicide indictments among 326 “non primary 
homicides”.149  Among the non-primary homicides, Radelet found defendants who killed  
white victims had a higher probability of being indicted for first degree murder and 
receiving a death sentence than defendants whose victims were black. 
 A series of studies in South Carolina examined death- ligible homicides and the 
charging practices of state prosecutors.  In the first study, Jacoby and Paternoster reviewed 
death-eligible cases taken from the Supplemental Homicide Reports and identified 205 
murder cases that met the statutory requirements necessary to receive a death sentence.150  
Findings from their analysis suggested that prosecutors were 3.2 times more likely to seek 
the death penalty in cases involving white victims, regardless of the race of the defendant.  
A second analysis estimated interaction effects between the race of defendant and victim 
and found that prosecutors 4 times more likely to seek the death penalty when blacks were 
                                                
 147Cases involving black offenders/black victims and white offenders/black victims 
together represented less than 2% of arrestees on Florida’s death row. 
 
 148Radelet, M. (1981).  Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death 
Penalty.  American Sociological Review, 46, 918-927.  
  
 149Primary homicides, which represented 1% of cases resulting in a death sentence, 
consisted of offenses involving family members, friends, or acquaintances, and usually 
involve acts of passion.  Non-primary homicides are typically instrumental, occur in the 
commission of another felony and are more likely to result in a capital indictment and a 
death sentence. 
 
 150Jacoby, J. & Paternoster, R. (1982).  Sentencing Disparity and jury packing:  
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty.  Journal of Criminal Law, 73, 379-387.    
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accused of killing whites compared to cases where blacks were accused of killing other 
blacks. 
 Paternoster examined charging decisions by prosecutors in South Carolina in a more 
extensive analysis of 1,805 non-negligent homicides recorded from June 8, 1977 to 
December 31, 1981.151  Data was compiled from the Supplemental Homicide Reports, 
police and investigation reports, and records from the State Office of the Attorney General, 
and a list of known characteristics of the victim and suspect were included in a series of 
analyses.  After reviewing cases from the three data sources, a number of analyses were 
conducted on a sample of 1,686 homicides with known ffenders and a sample of 321 cases 
that met the statutory qualifications to receive a de th.  Additionally, two homicide 
seriousness scales were created to record the level of aggravating circumstances among the 
homicide cases in the analyses.  Included in the first scale were aggravating circumstances 
such as whether the victim and offender know each other, whether there were multiple 
victims or multiple offenders, or whether the victim was a female.  The second scale 
included a fifth aggravating factor which included aggravating circumstances such as the 
past violent criminal history of the offender, the level of brutality involved in the present 
offense, whether the victim was shot multiple times, or if the offender tried to hide the body.  
The purpose of the study was to determine if race emrged as a significant factor in charging 
decisions made by prosecutors in capital cases.  
 A preliminary analysis which examined the probability of the prosecutor seeking the 
                                                
 151Paternoster, R. (1983).  Race of the Victim and Locati n of Crime:  The Decision 
to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina.  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
74(3), 754-785.   
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death penalty for all homicides with known offenders showed no significant disparities 
when the race of the offender is considered.  However, when the race of the offender and 
victim were considered together, a different pattern emerged.  Paternoster found that black 
offenders whose victims were white were 40 times more likely to be charged with a death-
eligible offense than cases involving black killers and black victims.  For white offenders, an 
opposite effect of race on charging decisions was found.  White offenders who killed black 
victims were only 1.6 times more likely to have thedeath penalty sought by prosecutors 
than cases involving white offenders and white victims.  A similar pattern was found when 
the smaller number of death-eligible offenses was ex mined.  Although there were no 
significant differences in the decision of the prosecutor to seek the death penalty when the 
race of the offender was considered, black offenders who killed white victims were 4.5 
times more likely to have the death penalty requested than cases where the defendant’s 
victim was black.  Also, whites who killed blacks were only 1.1 times more likely to have 
the death penalty sought compared to cases involving white offenders and white victims.152 
 Paternoster also conducted a number of analyses on two aggravation scales to 
examine the impact of non-statutory aggravating factors on the prosecutor’s decision to seek 
the death penalty.  By using the aggravation scales,  comparative analysis was conducted to 
examine the charging decisions by prosecutors for cases with similar levels of aggravation 
by the race of the victim.  Paternoster found that whi e victim cases at each level of 
aggravation were more likely to have a death penalty requested by prosecutors than cases 
                                                
 152Paternoster noted that the disparities found could have been the result of a 
significant relationship between non-statutory aggrvating factors and prosecutor charging 
decisions. 
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with black victims. 
 A final analysis was conducted via a logit model to examine the simultaneous effect 
of the race of the victim, victim-offenders relationship, and the number of victims on the 
decision by the prosecutor to seek the death penalty.  The logit analysis showed that of the 
three significant variables included in the model, the race of the victim had a stronger impact 
on the prosecutor’s decision to request a death senence than the number of victims or the 
offender-victim relationship.  Consistent with the finding in the previous analyses, cases 
involving white victims were found to have a significant effect on the changing decisions of 
the prosecutor.   
 Baldus et al.153 conducted one of the most comprehensive examinations (hereafter 
referred to as the Baldus study) of the influence of race in the capital sentencing system in 
the state of Georgia.  The Baldus study analyzed a universe of cases which included 2,484 
offenders who were arrested and charged with homicide and later convicted of murder or 
involuntary manslaughter between 1973 and 1979.  Of these cases, 127 of the defendants 
were sentenced to death.  Information collected on each case contained over 230 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well as other non-legal factors such as the 
defendant's race, age and socioeconomic status.  After controlling for several non-racial 
factors through the use of an ordinary least squares regression analysis, a number of separate 
linear and logistic regression models were developed to examine the role of race on a 
number of outcomes including indictment decisions, plea-bargaining decisions, guilt-trial 
                                                
 153Baldus, D.C., Pulaski, C.A. & Woodworth, G.G. (1983).  Comparative Review of 
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience.  Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 74(3), 661-751. 
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decisions, prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty, and jury penalty-trial decisions. 
 When the models were constructed to control for all of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, mitigating circumstances and the race of the defendant, the effect of the 
victim's race was found to be statistically significant.  From this finding, the Baldus study 
concluded that a dual system operated in the Georgia death sentencing system where the 
killers of whites were 4.3 times more likely to receiving a death sentence than the killers of 
blacks.  Also, the findings suggested that Georgia jur es tended to impose a sentence of 
death at a higher level of aggravation in cases involving black victims than white victims. 
 Bowers154 sought to examine possible operating factors which influenced the 
decision at the sentencing phase to impose a sentenc  of death upon conviction.  Using a 
multiple regression analysis, Bowers sampled twenty Florida counties and analyzed 191 
cases from a combined sample of 1973-1977 first degree murder convictions considering a 
number of legal155 and extralegal156 factors.  If extralegal factors were in fact operating in 
the decision-making process, Bowers argued that these factors would be evident at the 
sentencing stage of capital cases.  Among the legally relevant factors, only murders 
accompanied by a felony circumstance were found to be statistically significant at the .01 
                                                
     154Bowers, W.J., (1983). The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination 
under Post-Furman Capital Statutes.  The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
74(Fall): 1067-1100. 
      155Legal factors in the analysis included: murders accompanied by a felony 
circumstance, number of offenders, number of victims, sex of victim, age of victim, gun as a 
murder weapon, age of defendant, accessories involved with the defendant and whether a 
quarrel precipitated the killing.  
 156Extralegal factors included: race of the defendant and victim, region of the state 
and type of attorney representing the offender. 
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level.157  Also, after including three different race variables in the analysis--black 
offender/white victim, white offender/white victim and white offender/black victim158--
Bowers noted a race-of-the-victim effect at the sentencing stage.  Cases involving white 
victims and offenders who were black were more likely to result in death sentence than 
those cases where the offender and victim were black.  It was also noted that cases involving 
a white offender and black victim were less likely to result in a sentence of death than in 
cases where the offender and victim were both black.159 
 Paternoster conducted a similar analysis on the South Carolina data to examine the 
impact of a number of statutory felonies, non-statutory felonies, and non-felony aggravating 
factors on the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty.160  In a preliminary analysis of 
a sample of 1,800 non-negligent homicides committed from June 8, 1977 to December 31, 
1981, 300 offenses were identified as potential capital cases and were committed with an 
additional felony offense.  Capital murders were analyzed in three groups: (1) all homicides 
committed with an additional felony offense, (2) a subgroup of homicides committed with a 
single felony, and, (3) a subgroup of homicides committed with multiple felonies.  The 
analyses investigated the effect of the race of the victim on prosecutorial discretion to seek 
                                                
      157Id., at 1084.  
      158The black offender/black victim variable was omitted from the analysis in order to 
be compared to the other three offender/victim categori s in assessing the effect of race on 
sentencing outcome. 
     159The white offender/white victim and black offender/white victim variables 
yielded .13 coefficients test and the white offender/black victim yielded a -.17 coefficient.         
 160Paternoster, R. (1984).  Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty:  
A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination.  Law nd Society Review, 18 (3), 437-478.  
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the death penalty in: (1) all murders involving statutory aggravating felonies, (2) murders 
involving armed robbery-larceny as the sole aggravating circumstance, (3) murders 
involving one non-robbery felony as the sole aggravating circumstance, and, (4) murders 
involving multiple statutory felonies.161 
 The analysis of all 300 homicides produced findings which showed racial disparities 
in charging decisions of the prosecutor by the race of the victim.  Cases involving white 
victims were two and a half times more likely to have  death penalty sought by the 
prosecutor than cases involving black victims.162  A second analysis of homicides with 
robbery as the only aggravating circumstance produce  similar effects of the race of the 
victim on charging decisions of the prosecutor.  Cases involving white victims were three 
times more likely to have the death penalty requested than cases involving black victims.  A 
similar pattern of racial disparities in charging decisions was found among homicides 
committed with a non-robbery felony.  White victim cases were found to be three times 
more likely to have a death sentence requested by the prosecutor than cases involving black 
victims.  The fourth analysis which examined charging decisions by the prosecutor in cases 
involving homicides committed with other multiple flonies showed weaker effects of the 
race of the victim on charging decisions.  Finally, a series of multivariate analyses were 
conducted simultaneous effects of a number of variables on charging decisions by the 
prosecutor.163  Results from the probit analysis confirmed earlier findings with respect to the 
                                                
 161Id., at 450.  
 
 162The race of the offender was not found to have a significant on charging decisions 
by the prosecutor.   
 163Variables used in the probit analysis included:  number of statutory felonies, 
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race of the victim and charging decisions of the prosecutor.  Although the number of 
statutory felonies emerged as the strongest predictor of charging decision in capital cases, 
offenses involving white victims also were found to have a significant effect on those 
decisions as well.  Interaction effects calculated b tween the race of the offender and the 
race of the victim among all homicides involving felonies also found that black offenders 
who killed white victims were significantly more likely to result in the prosecutor requesting 
the death penalty than cases where the offender and victim were white.  A second probit 
analysis of the subgroup of homicides committed with a single felony found that black 
killers whose victims were black had a significantly lower probability of having a death 
penalty sought by prosecutors than cases where the offender and victim were white.164  
 Gross and Mauro165 analyzed post-Furman death penalty laws in several states 
including Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Missi sippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma and 
Virginia  in order to examine racial patterns in sentencing between January 1, 1976 and 
December 31, 1980.  Data were collected from the Supplemental Homicide Reports which 
were filed by local police agencies with the Uniform Crime Reporting section of the FBI.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of non-statutory felonies, number of non-statutory aggravating factors, number of 
victims, number of offenders, sex of victim, weapon used, victim-offender relationship, and 
the race of the victim.  
 
 164The third probit analysis which examined race effect among the second subgroup 
of cases involving the commission of homicides with multiple felonies found insignificant 
effects of the race of the victim on the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty. 
 
 165Gross, S.R., & Mauro, R. (1984).  Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization.  Stanford Law Review, 
37,(November): 27-153.  
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Variables included in the reports consisted of the sex, age and race of the offender and 
victim, the date and place of the homicide, the weapon used, felony circumstances 
accompanying the homicide and the relationship between the victim(s) and the offender(s).  
By examining each of these factors, Gross and Mauro we e able to determine the existence 
of certain racial patterns within each state.  In an analysis of Georgia, Florida and Illinois, a 
large proportion of homicide victims were found to be black and the risk of receiving a 
death sentence was far lower for those who killed backs as opposed to those who killed 
whites.166  Also, despite the fact that white homicide offendrs were found to have a slightly 
higher risk of receiving a death sentence, the disparity cited was largely due to the fact that 
black offenders were more likely to kill black victims while white offenders were more 
likely to kill white victims.  However, when the race of the offender was controlled, black 
offenders with white victims were found to have a greater likelihood of receiving a death 
sentence than white offenders with white victims.167  Offenders whose victims were white 
were ten times more likely to receive a death sentence in Georgia, eight times more likely in 
Florida and six times more likely in Illinois than offenders whose victims were black.   
 After concluding that three additional non-racial factors were found to have a strong 
effect on the likelihood of receiving a death sentence, an analysis was conducted in order to 
determine whether racial disparities could be explained by those factors.  Felony 
circumstances were found to exist in the majority of cases receiving death sentences.  
However, when the felony circumstances were controlled for, white victim cases were more 
                                                
      166Id., at 55. 
      167Id., at 55. 
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likely to result in death sentences for both felony a d non-felony homicides in each state.  
The relationship of the victim to the suspect was also n influential factor in determining the 
likelihood of a sentence of death in each of the thr e states.  Strangers were ten times more 
likely to be sentenced to death in Georgia, four times more likely in Florida and six times 
more likely in Illinois.168  However, when the relationship of the suspect to the victim was 
controlled for, those whose victims were white were still more likely to receive a death 
sentence than those whose victims were black.169  When that category was broken down 
further by stranger versus non-stranger homicides and the race of the offender, the pattern of 
disparity in sentencing remained the same.  Finally, the number of victims involved was 
found to increase the likelihood of a death sentence.  Defendants with multiple victims were 
six times more likely to receive a death sentence in Georgia and Florida, while defendants in 
Illinois with multiple victims were eighteen times more likely to receive a death sentence.170  
Additionally, when the level of aggravation was contr lled for by the use of a multivariate 
regression analysis, disparities in death sentencing cited in the previous analysis remained 
strong and consistent.  Similar effects of the raceof the victim on the likelihood of receiving 
a death sentence were found to be statistically significant using a logistic regression model 
in Oklahoma, North Carolina and Mississippi, but sta i ically insignificant in Virginia and 
                                                
      168Id., at 58. 
      169Id., at 59. 
     170Although multiple homicides were relative low Illinois from 1976 through 1980, 
44% of the case in this category received a death sentence. 
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Arkansas.171 
 In a reexamination of the death sentencing system in Georgia, Baldus et al.172 
analyzed 606 murder cases according to the culpability level of each case in order to identify 
determining factors that led to a death sentence.   An arbitrary system would operate in such 
a manner that cases that would normally call for a period of incarceration would result in a 
death sentence.  Similarly, a system that demonstrated a higher probability of a death 
sentence based on a factor such as race would be discriminatory in its application of the 
death sentencing laws.  By employing a multiple regression analysis, this study sought to 
identify which factors best explained death sentencing decisions.  After collecting over 200 
variables which were thought to have some influence i  s ntencing decisions, each case was 
given a culpability level or weight according to the facts of that case.  Cases were then 
separated into subgroups to measure racial effects.  Although no race-of-the-defendant effect 
was found, the race of the victim was found to have some effect on the likelihood of 
receiving a death sentence.173  Overall, cases involving white victims were found to be four 
times more likely to result in a death sentence than cases involving black victims.  However, 
                                                
      171The authors viewed the findings in these five state with some skepticism due to 
the fact that the small number of cases receiving death sentences made sentencing patterns 
difficult.  Additionally, the use of FBI’s data on homicide left researchers a small number of 
data points to analyze in their comparative analyses.  Nonetheless, the researchers were 
confident in the finding of racial disparities in a number of the jurisdictions since those 
results were consistent with finding produced by other researchers in a number of different 
jurisdictions. 
      172Baldus, D.C., Woodworth, G.G. & Pulaski, C.A. (1985).  Monitoring and 
Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems:  Lessons from Georgia.  University of 
California-Davis, 18(4), 1375-1408. 
      173Id., at 1401. 
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the most pronounced effects of the race of the victim were found in the moderate culpability 
levels.174   
 The importance of this finding is twofold.  On one hand, it indicates that there is 
apparent sentencing consistency among cases of low culpability where life imprisonment 
was frequently imposed and in the cases of high culpability where death was imposed in the 
majority of those cases.  However, the findings in the moderate level of cases are even more 
significant since they show an inconsistency in sentencing among cases of similar 
culpability and raise the possibility that a race-of-the-victim effect exists in the disposition 
of those cases. 
 Smith175 examined 504 homicides reported to the FBI through the Supplemental 
Homicide Reports for a period covering October 1, 1976 to December 31, 1982 in order to 
determine distinguishable factors among cases which resulted in death sentences.  By 
analyzing certain demographic and legal information, homicide cases taken from the reports 
were selected where death was an option in sentencig under Louisiana law.176  After 
arranging the homicides cases according to the race of th  defendant and victim, Smith 
                                                
      174Culpability levels were assigned a numerical number of 1 to 6 with a level of 1 
being the least culpable and a level of 6 being most culpable.  Levels in the moderate range 
were determined to occur between levels 2 through 4. 
      175Smith, M.D., (1987).  Patterns of Discrimination in Assessments of the Death 
Penalty: The Case of Louisiana.  Journal of Criminal Justice,15, 279-286. 
     176Death penalty statutes allowed for a capital murder cha ges under one or more of 
the following conditions: (1) a homicide committed in the course of another felony; (2) an 
offender kills or endangers the life of others while murdering another person; (3) the victim 
is an on-duty law enforcement officer or elected official; or (4) the homicide was committed 
for financial compensation. 
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noted that 53 cases eventually received death sentences.  Of the total number of cases 
receiving death sentences 84.9% involved white victims.177  However, unlike previous 
studies which noted discrimination against black offenders, Smith's findings cited evidence 
of bias towards white offenders.  Although white offenders were charged with 34.9% of all 
homicides, they made up 50.9% of the total number of offenders on death row at that time 
whose victims were white.  However, despite the fact that sentencing bias was found to exist 
against white offenders rather than black offenders, ca es involving white victims resulted in 
a higher number of death sentences than cases involving black victims.  Also, none of the 13 
cases involving white offenders and black victims re ulted in a death sentence.  Of the 26 
black offenders on death row, 18 of their victims were white and 8 were black.  Smith used 
a logistic model which analyzed the race of the offnder and victim, sex of victim, type of 
weapon, victim-offender relationship, number of victims and location of the homicide.  
From the analysis, he found that the only statistically significant effects were the race and 
sex of the victim.  A homicide involving a white victim was two times more likely to result 
in a death sentence than a black victim case.  Also, a case involving a female was one and 
one half more likely to receive a death sentence than a male victim case.  
 Paternoster and Kazyaka178 examined sentencing outcomes over a three year period 
in the state of South Carolina after its death penalty statute went into effect in 1977.  Unlike 
prior studies that found the race of the victim to be significant in whether a defendant was 
                                                
      177Id., at 282. 
 178Paternoster, R. & A.M. Kazyaka (1988). Racial Considerations in Capital 
Punishment: The Failure of Evenhanded Justice. In K.C. Haas and J.A. Inciardi (Eds.).  
Challenging Capital Punishment, 24. California: Sage Publications.   
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sentenced to death, their study found a different effect on sentencing outcomes.  After 
controlling for legally relevant factors such as the otal number of aggravating 
circumstances, the number of felony offenses committed n addition to the murder, the prior 
violent record, and the number of mitigating circumstances, race of the offender emerged in 
the analysis as a significant predictor in the sentencing outcome.  This finding represented 
somewhat of a departure from a significant number of studies in different jurisdictions that 
found the race of the victim to be significant in sentencing outcomes.  Additionally, the 
findings suggested an opposite race effect in the cas s where the offender was sentenced to 
death.  In this study, white offenders found to be four times more likely to receive a sentence 
of death than black offenders after legal circumstances and the race of the victim were 
considered.179  The findings also differed from other death penalty studies by finding no 
significant effect of the race of the victim on whether the defendant was sentenced to 
death.180   
 Keil and Vito examined the role of the victim’s race on the probability of the 
defendant being charged with a capital crime and being sentenced to death in the state of 
Kentucky.181  Although their analysis did not include a large number of variables that 
normally could have been extracted from court case files, the researchers reviewed 
                                                
 179The authors took this finding with a measure of caution and suggested no definite 
conclusions could be drawn because of the small overall number of death sentences (26) and 
the small number of black defendants who received sentences of death (7).   
 
 180Defendants who killed whites were found to be half as likely to be sentenced to 
death as defendants who killed blacks. 
 
 181Keil, T.J., & Vito, G.F., (1990).  Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder 
Trials:  An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes.  Justice Quarterly, 7, (1), 189-207. 
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institutional files from Kentucky Corrections Cabinet and examined the impact of a number 
of aggravating circumstances on the decision of juries to impose a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment in 401 cases.182  Their multivariate analyses found that cases involving black 
offenders and white victims were more likely to be charged with a capital crime and 
sentenced to death when controlling for the seriousnes  of the crime, prior criminal record, 
and the personal relationship between the offender and the victim. 
 In a comparative analysis of neighboring jurisdictions, Paternoster examined 
charging and sentencing practices in North Carolina and South Carolina.183  Data for the 
South Carolina study was collected from a series of pri r analyses conducted by Paternoster 
and consisted of 302 homicides identified as “death ligible” by the researcher.184  Data for 
the North Carolina study was previous collected for analysis of sentencing practices in 
North Carolina and consisted of a sample of 438 homicides (Nakell, 1987).  In the South 
Carolina study, a maximum likelihood logit analysis was conducted on two separate models.  
The first model consisted of a number of variables that could influence the decision of the 
prosecutor to seek the death penalty.185  The second model excluded a number of variables 
                                                
 182The findings produced from the study were limited by their inability to include 
any consideration of mitigating circumstances in their analyses.  
  
 183 Paternoster, R. (1991).  Prosecutorial Discretion and Capital Sentencing in North 
Carolina and South Carolina.  In R.M. Bohn (ed.)  The Death Penalty in America:  Current 
Research, pp.39-52.  Cincinnati, OH:  Anderson Publishing Co.   
 
 184Data for the South Carolina study was collected from the Supplemental Homicide 
reports, police reports and related investigation repo ts, trial and court information, and 
records from the state department of corrections.  
 
 185Variables in the full model included the number of victims, number of offenders, 
type of weapon, victim/offender relationship, the race of victim, the race of offender, total 
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that were found to be statistically insignificant i the first model.  Consistent with previous 
studies, the race of the victim emerged as a significa t predictor of whether the prosecutor 
sought the death penalty.  Cases involving the killing of white victims were more likely to 
have a death penalty sought than cases involving the killing of black victims.  The second 
model, which analyzed the race of the offender and victim together, also found a similar 
pattern of racial disparities in the charging patterns of state prosecutors.  After legal factors 
were considered, prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in cases where the 
offender was black and the victim was white compared to the other racial combinations.  
Additionally, compared to the other racial combinations, black offenders who killed black 
victims were significantly less likely to have the prosecutor seek a death penalty in their 
cases.  Although legally relevant factors explained th  charging decisions of prosecutors in 
capital cases, the race of the victim also emerged to xplain those decisions as well.  Finally, 
Paternoster’s geographical analysis suggested the possibility that charging decisions by 
prosecutors in South Carolina may have varied by region.  Prosecutors were more likely to 
seek the death penalty against white offenders while rural prosecutors were more likely to 
seek the death penalty against black offenders.186  In the North Carolina study, neither the 
race of the offender nor the race of the victim wasfound to significantly influence the 
charging decisions of the state prosecutors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of aggravating circumstances, number of statutory felony offenses, general factors 
in aggravation, factors in mitigation, sex of victim, age of victim, use of torture, and use of 
personal weapon.  
 
 186The charging disparity found toward black offenders by rural prosecutors was 
small.  
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 In one of the few death penalty studies in a non-southern state, researchers examined 
the role of race on the decision to impose death sentences in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.187  The study identified a universe of 425 death-eligible cases from the city of 
Philadelphia and conducted a number of logistic regression analyses to examine the impact 
of legitimate, illegitimate and case characteristics deemed suspect on capital sentencing 
decisions.188  Data points were obtained from court records, files from the Administrative 
Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC), appellate reco ds, opinions of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, briefs from the Commonwealth and direct nterviews of the defendant.  In a 
series of logistic multiple regression analyses, the researchers in that study included all 
aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and other relevant variables that 
would be expected to have an impact of sentencing outcomes in 425 death-eligible cases.189  
Similar to findings produced in prior death penalty studies, the race of the victim was found 
to be statistically significant in cases where at le st one aggravating circumstance was found 
by the jury without any mitigating circumstances present.190  Additionally, the race of the 
                                                
 187Baldus, D.C., Woodworth, G., Zuckerman, D., Weiner, N.A., & Broffitt, B. 
(1997).  Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:  An 
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia. Cornell Law 
Review, 83, 1638-1770. 
 
 188The Pennsylvania study also analyzed the impact of a number of variables on 
capital charging outcomes as well.  
 
 189After examining the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances on case 
outcomes in earlier models, additional variables such as the race and SES of the offenders 
and victims were considered in later models. 
 
 190The race of the victim was found to be marginally significant when cases that 
resulted in a hung jury were included in the logistic regression model.   The inclusion of 
these cases in the analysis, which were mostly black-victim cases, resulted in higher 
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defendant was found to have a statistically significant effect on the jury’s decision to impose 
a death sentence at the penalty phase of the trial.  Bl ck defendants were found to be three 
times more likely to receive a death sentence than non-black defendants.191 
 In a 2001 study, researchers in North Carolina examined the role of race at several 
stages in the death penalty process.  The study examined death-eligible homicides over a 
five-year period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997.192  Using data collected from 
several sources, the researchers collected over one hundred and thirteen cases characteristics 
to examine whether race had an impact at decision points in the death penalty process.  The 
analyses were conducted in a core of 502 cases and a model was constructed to include 
thirty six variables considered to be relevant to factors believed to have an impact on 
decision outcomes.  By using a logistic regression approach, several findings were produced 
that were consistent with prior death penalty studies in a number of jurisdictions.  Among all 
homicide cases in the analysis, the odds of cases involv ng white victims receiving a death 
sentence were 3.4 times higher than cases involving black victims.  Similar findings were 
produced in analyses which examined the role of race in s ntencing outcome among death-
eligible homicides.  Homicides involving white victims were 3.5 times more likely to result 
in the defendant receiving a death sentence than in cases where the victim was black.  Also, 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
likelihood that more cases involving non-white victims would receive a death sentence. 
 
 191The death sentencing model reflected the decisions of the prosecution and the jury 
in the logistic estimates.  The race-of-the-offender eff cts also held up when cases involving 
hung juries were included in the model. 
   
 192Unah, I., & Boger, J.C., (2001). Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina:  
An Empirical Analysis – 1993-1997.  
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cases were the prosecutor sought the death penalty were 3.0 times more likely to result in a 
death sentence in cases where the victim was white than in cases where the victim was 
black.  Finally, cases that came to trail and reachd t e penalty phase were 2.8 times more 
likely to result in a death sentence in cases involving white victims than in cases where the 
victim was black.193 
 Researchers in the state of Maryland also examined the influence of race at four 
stages in the death penalty charging and sentencing process:  (1) the formal notification of 
intent to seek the death penalty; (2) the decision by the prosecutor to not withdraw a death 
penalty request upon notification; (3) the decision by the prosecutor to advance a death-
eligible offense to the penalty phase upon conviction; and, (4) the decision by the jury or 
judge to impose a death sentence.194  In their review of a pool of 1,311 death eligible cases 
over an 11-year period from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999, 180 cases were found to 
have advanced to the penalty phase of the trial proceedings and 76 cases received death 
sentences.  Consistent with the findings from many of the previous analyses on death 
penalty studies in other states, researchers in the Maryland study found no evidence to 
suggest that the defendant’ race played a significat role at any point in the death penalty 
decision making process.  No significant differences w re found in the handling of black or 
non-black offenders as their cases progressed throug  each stage of the capital case process. 
                                                
 193Similar to a number of prior studies, the race of the defendant was found to have 
an insignificant impact on whether the defendant received a death sentence.  Additionally, 
the race of the victim was statistically significant t each decision point in the death penalty 
process and rose above the .05 level of significance t the decision point of homicide cases 
that came to trial and reached the penalty phase (.07).
 
 194Paternoster, R. & Brame, R., (2002).  An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death 
Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction.  
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 However, an analysis of the unadjusted estimates of the effect of race of the victim 
on each of the decision points produced different findings.195  The race of the victim was 
found to have a statistically significant effect on three of the four decision points in the death 
penalty process.  First, the decision by the prosecutor to file a notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty was more likely in cases where at leas one victim was white than in cases 
with no white victims (.43 v. .19).  Additionally, the prosecutor was more likely to retain the 
death penalty notification after it was filed in cases involving white victims compared to 
cases with black victims (.70 v. .46).  Finally, cases involving white victims were more 
likely to advance to the penalty trail compared to cases involving black victims (.88 v. 
.75).196  A second analysis which examined the race of the offender and victim in 
combination also found several disparities at each of t e decision points in the death penalty 
process.  Cases involving black offenders and white vic ims were more likely to progress 
through each successive stage of the decision points than other cases involving the other 
offender/victim race combinations.    
 The adjusted analysis, which controlled for a number of legally relevant case factors, 
appeared to confirm earlier findings produced in the unadjusted analyses.   Similar to the 
earlier estimates, the race of the offender was not found to have an effect on any of the 
decision points in the death penalty process.  However, the race of the victim was found to 
                                                
 195The unadjusted analysis consisted of basic descriptive estimates which looked at 
racial disparities at each of the four decision points n the death penalty process. 
 
 196The effect of the race of the victim on the decision t  impose a sentence of death 
was found to be statistically insignificant.  However, the overall finding that death-eligible 
cases involving white victims was .093 times more lik ly to result in a death sentence than 
cases involving black victims was statistically significant.  
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have an influence at two of the four decision points af er controlling for legally relevant case 
characteristics.  Prosecutors were 1.6 times more likely to file a notification to seek the death 
penalty and 1.5 times more likely to retain that notification as the case moved forward in 
cases with white victims compared with cases with black victims.197  Also, the researchers 
controlled for legally relevant case characteristics and the jurisdiction in which the offense 
occurred by conducting a multiple regression analysis on all death-eligible cases and found 
that offenders who killed white victims were more like y to be sentenced to death compared 
to offenders who killed non-white victims.198 An additional analysis using a stepwise 
logistic regression model, the earlier findings of a race-of-the-victim effect on the sentencing 
outcomes were confirmed.199  Finally, the predicted probabilities of the race of the offender 
and victim in combination on the four decision points i  the death penalty process were 
examined.  Prosecutors were most likely to file a notification of intent to seek the death 
penalty in cases where a black offender killed a white victim compared to the other racial 
combinations.  Also, prosecutors were most likely to retain the death notification after it was 
files in cases where the offender and victim were white compared to the other racial 
                                                
 197The decisions to advance a capital case to the penalty tri l and to impose a death 
sentence after the penalty trial were not found to have been influenced by the race of the 
victim.  
 
 198In addition to the four decision points examined in the study, researchers in the 
Maryland study also focused on geographical variation and its potential influence on 
outcomes at the four data points.  Those geographicl areas included the City of Baltimore, 
Baltimore County, Harford County, Prince George’s County, Anne Arundel County, 
Montgomery County, and a number of other reference counties. 
 
 199The researchers noted the use of the stepwise logistic regression model resulted in 
a weaker, but significant race-of-the-victim effect on whether the case received a death 
sentence (.07 level).  Cases involving whites in ths analysis were two times more likely to 
receive death sentences than cases involving non-white.   
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combinations.  Among all death-eligible cases, blacks who killed white victims were two 
and one-half times more likely to be sentenced to death than white offenders who killed 
white victims, three and one-half times more likely to be sentenced to death than black 
offenders who killed black victims, and approximately eleven times more likely to be 
sentenced to death than all of the other racial offender/victim combinations. 
   4.   Studies at the Federal Level 
 Although a wealth of death penalty research has been conducted at the state level 
since the Court’s ruling in Furman, very few studies have examined the role of race in 
charging or sentencing decisions at the federal leve .  Shortly after the Court’s landmark 
decision in 1972, a number of state jurisdictions began to address the Court’s concerns of 
unstructured death penalty laws by creating new statutory requirements which structured the 
death penalty process by providing guidance to juries in capital cases.  As a result, a number 
of newly created guided discretion statutes passed constitutional scrutiny in the Gregg 
decision at the same time than mandatory sentencing statutes were struck down as 
unconstitutional.  However, the creation of federal death sentencing statutes which would 
conform to the Court’s decision in Gregg would take a longer period of time to develop.   
 By 1974, the federal government passed the Antihijacking Act which provided a 
number of procedural protections similar to several state death sentencing statutes that 
passed constitutional scrutiny by the Court in 1976.  However, given the Court’s rulings in 
the Woodson and Roberts decisions, the mandatory sentencing component of the new 
federal death sentencing statute rendered it unconstitutional.  Eventually, the federal death 
penalty would become operational with the passage of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise 
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statute in 1988 and the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994.200  On September 20, 2000, the 
U.S. Department of Justice released a statistical survey of the federal death system which 
examined several variables related to death-eligible cas s including the race of the 
defendants and victims.201  Although the report did not include more sophisticated 
multivariate regression analyses, it did report a number of unadjusted statistical findings on 
the issue of race, ethnicity, and charging decisions by the United States Attorneys and the 
Attorney General. 
 A population of 682 defendants from 1995 to 2000 whose cases were submitted by 
the United States Attorneys to the U.S. Department of Justice for review under the 
department’s death penalty procedures found that 134 were White (20%), 324 were Black 
(48%), and 195 were Hispanic (29%).  Additionally, U.S. Attorneys were more likely to 
seek the death penalty and the Attorney General was more likely to approve 
recommendations by U.S. Attorneys in cases involving White defendants (38%) than in 
cases which involved Black (25%) or Hispanic defendants (20%).202  Although the findings 
did not result in the conclusion that racial or ethnic bias influenced charging decisions in the 
federal death penalty system, an additional analysis was conducted to examine charging 
                                                
 200The passage of the two laws would result in over 60 federal offenses becoming 
eligible for the death penalty.  The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) would add four additional offenses to the list of capital crimes.    
 
 201The Federal Death Penalty System:  A Statistical Survey. (U.S. Department of 
Justice, September 12, 2000).  
 
 202The report also noted that in cases considered by the A torney General, similar 
lower rates for seeking the death penalty for Black nd Hispanic defendants than White 
defendants was found in cases involving defendants d victims from the same race or 
ethnicity as well as in cases involving defendants and victims from different races or 
ethnicities.    
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decisions by U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General.203  A supplemental statistical survey, 
which included an additional 231 cases to the original pool of 682 cases, was conducted to 
examine any evidence of disparity in charging decision on the part of the U.S. Attorneys.204  
The survey from the larger pool of 973 cases found that 134 out of 166 cases submitted for 
review to the capital case review committee involved White defendants (81%), 324 out of 
408 cases submitted involved Black defendants (79%), and 195 out of 350 cases submitted 
involved Hispanic defendants.  Overall, the Attorney General approved the death penalty for 
27% of White defendants (44 out of 166 cases submitted), 17% of Black defendants (71 out 
of 408 cases submitted), and 9% of Hispanic defendants (32 out of 350 cases submitted).   
 In response to the findings of the federal surveys and continuing concerns over the 
possibility of disparities in charging decisions in the federal death penalty system, an 
independent study using more sophisticated methodological approaches was commissioned 
by the U.S. Department of Justice.205  The study consisted of a population of 312 cases from 
January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2000 and involved 652 defendants in which decisions of 
whether or not to request the death penalty were made by the U.S. Attorneys.  The cases 
                                                
 203Calls for a moratorium on the federal death penalty would be rejected for a 
number of reasons: (1) competent counsel provided for defendants in capital cases; (2) a 
lack of evidence of innocent defendants being sentenced to death in federal cases; (3) the 
procedural safeguards included in the federal death penalty process; and, (4) a lack of proof 
of bias demonstrated in the study’s findings.  
  
 204The additional 231 cases were submitted to the pool of 682 cases if: (1) any of the 
cases should have been, but were not, submitted to the department for capital case review; 
(2) the cases were exempted from submission for capital case review because the defendant 
pled guilty to a non-capital offense; or (3) cases could have been submitted as death-eligible, 
but were not.  
 
 205Klein, S.P., Berk, R.A., & Hickman, L.J., (2006).  Race and the Decision to Seek 
the Death Penalty in Federal Cases.   
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also involved 600 defendants where decisions were made by the Attorney General to seek or 
not to seek the death penalty over that same period of time.206  The research strategy 
consisted of three independent teams of researchers onducting separate analyses which 
examined whether racial differences in capital cases could be explained by differences in the 
“heinousness” of the crimes.  Each research team was provided with a copy of the federal 
death penalty data set and was allowed to construct and design their own analyses and drew 
separate conclusions as to effects of race on charging decisions of the U.S. Attorneys and 
Attorney General.207   
 In the first analysis, researchers attempted to build a model from over 100 possible 
explanatory factors which might have an influence on charging outcomes.208  After 
reporting difficulty with fitting an appropriate explanatory model with so many aggravating 
and mitigating factors, the researchers created an “aggr” score, which represented the total 
sum of aggravating factors for each defendant, and a “mitg” score, which represented the 
total sum of mitigating factors for each defendant.209  From this coding procedure, the 
                                                
 206Of the total number 652 defendants charged with capital cases, the 94 U.S. 
Attorneys sought the death penalty for 23% of the 652 defendants and the Attorney General 
made the decision to seek the death penalty for 25% of a total number of 600 defendants (a 
number of defendants pled guilty prior to the final decision by the Attorney General).  
 
 207The final set of preliminary analyses that were conducted by the third research 
team which compared propensity scores of White victim ases to those of Non-White cases 
did not find any evidence that race influences charging decision in federal capital cases.  
 
 208Klein, S.P., Freedman, D.A., & Bolus, R.E. (2006).   A Statistical Analysis of 
charging Decisions in Death-Eligible Federal Cases: 1995-2000.  In Race and the Decision 
to Seek the Death Penalty in Federal Cases.    
 
 209The approach of creating the “aggv” and “mitg” variables as the total of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, respectively, departed from methodological approaches 
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analysis examined whether the mean heinousness score, rather than race, might explain the 
outcomes of charging decisions by the Attorney General in cases involving combinations of 
white and non-white defendants and victims.  In the unadjusted calculations of the mean 
differences of aggravating and mitigating scores for defendants in charging decisions by the 
Attorney General, cases involving white defendants d white victims had the highest mean 
average score (5.3), while cases involving non-white defendants and non-white victims had 
the lowest mean score (3.2).   Additionally, cases involving non-white defendants and white 
victims had mean scores of 5.0, while cases involving white defendants and non-white 
victims reported mean scores of 3.3.  After conducting several logistic regression analyses 
which explained charging decisions by the U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General, the 
race of the victim was found to be statistically significant in one model.  In the U.S. 
Attorneys charging model, U.S Attorneys were .51 times more likely to seek the death 
penalty than in cases involving black victims.210  
    In the second analysis, the next team of research rs in the study conducted two 
preliminary logistic regression models which examined the role of race in charging decision 
of the U.S. Attorneys in capital cases.211  Using the same data set discussed in the previous 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
found in studies at the state-level which typically analyze the effects of individual 
aggravating and mitigating variables on outcome decisions in multivariate models.  
 
 210This finding was reported in a three-variable model which only included the race 
of the victim and the two other variables which represented the sum total of aggravating 
factors and sum total of mitigating factors for defendants in capital cases.  
 
 211Berk, R.A. & He, Y. (2006).  Race and the Federal Death Penalty.  In Race and 
the Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Federal Cases.    
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analysis and building on the study that was conducte in the state of Maryland, the second 
analysis explored the role of race and ethnicity in federal capital cases in a number of 
preliminary analyses.  First, the research team examined charging decisions of the U.S. 
Attorneys by comparing cases involving defendants from several racial or ethnic groups.  
The unadjusted estimates suggested that the death penalty was recommended by U.S. 
Attorneys in 32 percent of the cases involving White defendants compared to 23 percent for 
Black defendants, 17 percent for Hispanic defendants d 36 percent of defendants of other 
racial or ethnic groups.212  In cases involving at least one White victim, U.S. Attorneys 
sought the death penalty in 34 percent of those cass compared to 18% of cases involving 
victims of other racial or ethnic groups.  In cases involving at least one Black victim, U.S. 
Attorneys sought the death penalty in 19 percent of those cases compared to 26 percent of 
cases involving victims of other racial or ethnic groups.  Finally, in cases involving at least 
one Hispanic victim, U.S. Attorney sought the death penalty in 17 percent of those cases 
compared to 25 percent of cases involving victims from other racial or ethnic groups.213  
Despite the findings produced in the unadjusted analyses, the role of race in charging 
decisions was still unclear at that point since none f the earlier cross-tabulations accounted 
for other factors that might explain charging decision by the U.S. Attorneys.  In order to 
examine the role of race on charging decisions, the res archers analyzed a number of case 
                                                
 212Members in the final comparison group consisted of individuals of Asian, Pacific 
Islander, Native American, Aleut, Indian, or unknown descent and represented nine cases 
(36 percent) in which the U.S. Attorneys sought the death penalty.   
 
 213The unadjusted estimates led the second research tem to conclude that the race of 
the defendant and the race of the victim were associated with charging decisions in federal 
capital cases.  However, the precise nature of the relationship could not be determined in the 
unadjusted estimates.  
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characteristics including the number of aggravating a d mitigating circumstances present in 
addition to the race of the defendant and victim.  The two preliminary logistic regression 
models, controlling for a number of legal factors, found the race of the victim to be 
statistically significant in the charging decisions of the U.S. Attorneys.  Cases involving 
White victims were found to be .87 times more likely to have the death penalty requested 
compared to cases involving non-White victims.  However, the race of the defendant was 
not found to be statistically significant in chargin  decisions.214 
 In assessing previous the empirical studies and findings at the state and federal level, 
it is important to note what inferences can and cannot be drawn from this body of research.  
The findings from the death penalty studies do not pr vide definitive proof that racial 
discrimination operates at different stages in a number of jurisdictions to influence whether 
death-eligible indictments and charges are sought by prosecutors or death sentences are 
imposed by judges and juries.  Nor do the results conclude that prosecutors, judges, and 
juries “favor” the race of the victim if he or she is a member of a specific racial group.  
However, the consistency across several studies, particul rly in cases where the race of the 
offender or victim emerges as a significant factor in sentencing outcomes, does raise 
questions as to whether the concerns expressed by the Furman court were adequately 
addressed by revisions to death sentencing statutes that were constitutionally approved by 
the Gregg court four years later. The Court believed that a bifurcated trial, statutory 
                                                
 214The first logistic regression model included the race of the defendant and the race 
of the victim as separate variables.  The second logistic regression model excluded the race 
of the defendant.  In both models, the regression coeffi ients for the race of the victim were 
.87 and .86 at the .05 level, respectively. However, when an alternative model, random 
forests, was applied to the data, race was not found to be statistically significant in charging 
decisions of the U.S. Attorneys in capital cases. 
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guidelines to assist the jury in decision-making, and utomatic appellate review could, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, effectively eliminate or at least reduce the likelihood of 
racially discriminatory practices in the application f the death penalty.  However, as the 
states revised their death sentencing statutes, empirical studies examining their effectiveness 
in achieving the Court's concerns in Furman began to accumulate as well.  Although the 
race of the defendant has been found to have little or no effect in influencing the sentencing 
disposition in capital cases, a race-of-the-victim effect has consistently emerged in the 
majority of studies cited in the literature.  Specifically, a number of studies have suggested 
that offenders whose victims were white had the greatest likelihood of receiving death 
sentences.  A similar effect has also been cited in studies examining different levels of 
culpability in death eligible cases.  In such cases, ntencing was found to be somewhat 
consistent among low levels of culpability where thmajority of cases ended in life 
imprisonment sentences and high levels of culpability where death was frequently imposed.  
However, the race of the victim has been cited in moderate levels of culpability cases where 
the sentencing outcomes have been found to be inconsiste t.  This consistency across a 
number of the more methodologically sophisticated analyses would eventually in these 
questions by addressed by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp. 
 
 E.   The Role of Race and the McCleskey decision  
 Although the new revisions in death penalty legislat on were believed to be the 
appropriate solution to the problems of capital sentencing in terms of reducing disparities, 
McCleskey v. Kemp offered a different perspective on this assumption.  It may be recalled in 
the Gregg decision that the Court, lacking evidence to the contrary, assumed that the new 
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revisions in death sentencing statutes were such that the likelihood of arbitrary, capricious 
and discriminatory sentencing decisions condemned i Furman and similarly crafted 
sentencing statutes with procedural safeguards would now be sufficient enough to pass 
constitutional scrutiny.215   
 Rather than focus on the facts of his particular case, the petitioner in McCleskey 
attacked the racial disparities in sentencing in the entire Georgia system, which he 
contended, was a violation of his rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.216  
In order to substantiate his claim, the petitioner offered a statistical study as evidence of the 
existence of racial disparities in death sentences in the state of Georgia.  To date, the Baldus 
study continues to be one of the most comprehensive analyses which examined the role of 
race in sentencing outcomes.217  After initial analyses suggested a correlation betwe n the 
race of the victim and sentencing outcomes, subsequent analyses found significant and 
consistent race effects after considering over 200 non-racial variables which were also likely 
to influence sentencing outcomes.218   The race of the victim findings were also found i  a
                                                
   215107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987). 
 
 216The petitioner, a black man, was convicted in the 1978 killing of a white police 
officer during the robbery of a store.  Consistent with Georgia law, the jury imposed a death 
sentence after it found the following aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: 
the murder was committed during the course of an armed robbery and was committed upon 
a peace officer in the performance of his duties. 
 
 217 Baldus, D.C., Pulaski, C.A. & Woodworth, G.G. (1983).  Comparative Review 
of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience.  Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology, 74(3), 661-751. 
  
 218The study consisted of over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970's and 
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smaller model which analyzed 39 variables thought to influence sentencing outcomes.  
Specifically, the study concluded that black defendants whose victims were white were 
substantially more likely to receive a death sentence than cases involving black victims, 
even after racially neutral factors were controlled.219   The analyses also found that the racial 
disparities in sentencing outcomes were most likely to be found in capital cases in the 
middle range of aggravation.220   However, while accepting the validity of the study, the 
Court held that such evidence was not sufficient to prove the existence of a systematic 
defect in the way that death sentences were being rnde ed by the courts in the state of 
Georgia. 
 1.  General Statistics and Racial Discrimination  
 Despite the rejection of the Baldus study findings as proof of racial discrimination in 
the State of Georgia death penalty scheme, the Court cited a limited number of previous 
cases in which statistical data was accepted to establish patterns of racial discrimination.  In 
each instance, statistical data was offered in court proceedings to demonstrate racial 
disparities involving the selection of juror and alleged Civil Rights violations under Title VII 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
involved a 230-variable model which included data such as race of the defendant and the 
victim as well as other aspects of the offense.                             
  
 219Cases involving white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death 
sentence than cases involving black victims.  
 
 220Cases in the low level of aggravation consist of cases involving few relevant 
aggravating factors which may make the death penalty less likely to be imposed.  Cases in 
the high level of aggravation consist of cases involving greater numbers of aggravating 
factors which may make a death sentence more likely.  However, cases in the middle range 
of aggravation involve those cases where the outcome is less clear and the decision of 
impose a sentence of death could go either way. 
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cases, which the Court ruled were violations under th  Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In a case of employment discrimination, petitioners in Bazemore v. 
Friday, introduced a series of multiple regression analyses which compared salaries for 
black and white employees across a series of time periods.221  While controlling for race, 
education, tenure, and job title, the analyses found that black employees on average were 
paid less than white employees in two out of three tim periods that were analyzed.  After a 
review of the evidence, the Court accepted the data as proof of a pattern of discrimination 
towards black employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The 
Court also accepted statistical data submitted in several cases involving racial disparities in 
jury selection practices which the Court determined to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.222   
 Additionally, the Court has previously accepted general statistics as proof of racial 
discrimination in cases involving the racial compositi ns of grand and petit juries in their 
criminal proceedings.  In Whitus v. Georgia, the petitioners challenged their convictions on 
the basis of racial discrimination because of the composition of juror selections conducted in 
Mitchell County in the State of Georgia.223  Specifically, the petitioners challenged their 
convictions based on the exclusion of Black juries from grand and petit juries despite the 
fact that potential jurors of the race made up approximately 45% of the population in 
                                                
 221478 U.S. 385 (1986)  
 
 222The Court also ruled that multivariate regression analyses submitted to establish 
racial discrimination were not required to include “all measurable variables” in their 
statistical models.   
 
 223385 U.S. 545 (1967).  
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Mitchell County.  Under Georgia law, commissioners appointed to the Superior Court were 
required to select “upright and intelligent” citizens from the county’s tax receiver to serve as 
potential jurors in criminal court proceedings.  The petitioners submitted general census data 
which indicated  in 1960, 27.1% of the taxpayers in the county were Black, that the county 
had a population of 10,206 people over the age of 21, of which 4,706 were male, and 2,004 
(42.6%) were Black.  However, juror selection data showed that only 3 of the 33 prospective 
grand jurors were Black and only one was eventually picked to serve on the grand jury.  In 
the case of juror selection for petit case, only 7 of the 90 persons selected for consideration 
were Black, but none were accepted to serve on the jury. 
 The Court also ruled on a similar challenge to the jury and school board selection 
practices in a number of other counties in the State of Georgia.  In Turner v. Fouche, the 
Court reviewed statistical data submitted by the petitioners in the case which suggested that 
the selection practices in Taliaferro County, as well as a number of other surrounding 
counties, systematically excluded Blacks as potential candidates to serve on grand juries and 
county school boards because of their race.224  To support their contention of racial 
discrimination, the statistical data submitted showed that grand jury members were 
predominately White despite a 60% representation of Blacks in Taliaferro County.  In the 
case of grand jury selection procedures, the state up rior court judge selected “discreet” 
candidates for appointment to the jury commission as commissioners, who were given 
discretion, in the absence of statutory or other guidelines, to exclude any potential 
candidates from grand jury service that were not found to be “upright” and “intelligent”.  
                                                
 224396 U.S 346 (1970).  
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The data submitted also indicated that of the 608 eligible names selected for consideration 
for grand jury service, 96% of the potential jurors who were eliminated as “unintelligent” or 
not “upright” were Black.  Additionally, a reconstituted list of potential candidates by race 
found that Blacks only accounted for 37% of the Taliaferro County citizens on the list of 
304 members despite a 60% representation in the county population.    
 The Court also considered statistical data submitted to support charges of racial 
discrimination towards Mexican-Americans in Cantaneda V. Partida.225  In that case, the 
petitioners challenged the grand jury selection procedures in the State of Texas based on 
statistics taken from census figures and grand jury records taken from Hidalgo County.  
Although census data collected for 1970 showed that 79.1% of the population in Hidalgo 
County was Mexican-American, grand jury records compiled from 1962 to 1972 indicated 
that the average percentage of participation on grad juries by Hispanic-surnamed 
individuals was estimated at 39%.  Additionally, the average participation rate of Hispanic-
surnamed individuals during the time period when the defendant was indicted was 45%.   
 In each of the aforementioned Title VII and grand jury selection cases, the Court 
allowed the submission of statistical data as proof of prima facie evidence of racial 
discrimination.226  These cases also represent a general acceptance of statistical data by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in prior cases aimed at proving racially discriminatory practices that 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
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 226The Court would accept the statistical data submitted by the parties in each case as 
prima facie or evidence “at first view” that the employment practices or grand juror 
selection procedures were racially discriminatory against minorities. 
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By allowing such data, the Court’s guiding rationale consisted of the requirement that the 
employment or juror selection procedures resulted in substantial underrepresentation of 
members of an identifiable racial group.  
2.    McCleskey and “Purposeful Discrimination”  
 Although the Court had previously accepted general statistical studies as proof of 
discrimination in Title VII and grand juror selection cases, it held that the nature of the 
capital sentencing system was fundamentally different when considering statistical data 
which attempted to establish racially discriminatory p actices.  One major difference rested 
on the Court's belief that capital cases required judges and juries to consider a multitude of 
various factors involving the character of the defendant and the facts of the offense prior to 
the imposition of sentence.  Such a task also involved the requirement that actors in the 
criminal justice process be allowed a certain amount f discretion at different stages in the 
criminal justice decision making process.  Because of this uniqueness of capital cases and 
the Court's prior decisions in Gregg and its companion cases regarding the structuring of 
such discretion, the Court ruled that exceptionally clear proof had to be established by the 
statistical data before a conclusion could be made that such discretion had been abused.  
Thus, given the number of safeguards contained in the Georgia death sentencing statute to 
reduce the taint of racial bias in sentencing, a defendant alleging equal protection violations 
had to show that “purposeful discrimination” existed in his or her case and that the death 
sentencing statutes were enacted by the state legislature in anticipation of a discriminatory 
effect on certain racial groups of defendants.227   
                                                
 227Id., at 1766. 
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 The Baldus study, the Court held, offered no proof that race played any part in the 
Georgia jury's decision to impose the sentence of death in McCleskey's particular case.  That 
is, the data was required to demonstrate that the judge or jurors acted with a discriminatory 
intent or purpose in his case.  In reviewing the data, the Court noted that the Baldus analysis 
was extensive in its approach in analyzing factors which were likely to have an impact on 
sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  After conducting several analyses, the Baldus data 
introduced evidence to the Court which found that defendants who killed white victims were 
4.3 times more likely to receive a sentence of death than defendants whose victims were 
black.  
 The Court would rule that there were fundamental differences between cases 
involving employment or juror selection practices and capital cases.  In the case of the 
former, the Court noted its prior acceptance of statistics submitted in limited cases in a few 
classes of cases.  In such cases, the data, to pass the scrutiny of the Court, was required to 
present a “stark” pattern to be accepted as the sole pr of of racial discrimination in a 
particular case.  However, capital cases were distinguishable from Title VII or juror 
selection cases because of a number of unique characteristics.  The Court ruled that capital 
cases were characterized by separate and unique qualities such as the composition of each 
jury, the characteristics of each defendant and the individual facts of each case.  The Court 
also reasoned that factors related to juror selections are typically limited and set by state 
statutes and the factors related to employment practices were objectively verifiable and had 
a reasonable relationship to job qualifications.  Alternatively, capital juries are allowed to 
consider a wide array of factors relevant to the def ndant’s background, character, and the 
offense.  By drawing this distinction, the Court ruled that there were no commonly set 
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standards to evaluate all defendants who did or did not receive the death penalty. 
 The Court also noted that cases involving Title VII violations or discriminatory jury 
selection practices afforded defendants in those cas with the opportunity to explain 
possible reasons for the racial disparities establihed by the statistical data.  In each case 
where such violations were alleged to have occurred, state officials were given the 
opportunity to rebut charges of discriminatory practices by providing alternative 
explanations for the racial disparities cited in the statistical evidence.  Violations of equal 
protection laws were only found by the courts after those alternative explanations were 
found in the court proceedings to be invalid.  However, capital cases, the Court held, offered 
no such opportunities to the state to rebut claims of racial discrimination found in statistical 
data submitted to the court.  Thus, jurors could not be called to rebut charges that 
discriminatory motives or influences guided their decisions which resulted in the final 
verdict.  Similarly, prosecutors involved in decisions to charge defendants with death-
eligible offenses were not able to explain whether tose decisions were influenced by racial 
factors. 
 Finally, the Court would rule that the Baldus study failed to prove that the Georgia 
capital sentencing statute was implemented with a “discriminatory purpose”.  In the view of 
the Court, such a purpose could be demonstrated if he evidence established that the state 
legislature selected and enacted a particular statute with the knowledge that it would have an 
adverse effect on an “identifiable group”.228  Thus, for a claim of racial discrimination to 
prevail, McCleskey had to demonstrate that the death penalty statute was administered with 
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prior knowledge by the State of Georgia that it would have a racially discriminatory effect.    
 Although the Court recognized the likelihood of disparities in Georgia sentencing 
statute as being an inevitable part of the criminal justice system, it believed that the 
disparities demonstrated by the Baldus study were insuff cient to indicate a "constitutionally 
unacceptable risk of racial prejudice in the capital sentencing decisions”.229  Additionally, 
the Court ruled that the sophisticated analysis submitted by the Baldus study merely 
demonstrated  a “risk” that race could have entered into some of the capital sentencing 
outcomes in the state of Georgia.   Thus, in light of the fact that the Court noted that certain 
discrepancies cited in the statistical evidence that appeared to correlate with race could not 
be fully explained, they declined to "assume that what as unexplained was invidious”.230 
3. Interpreting “Race” Effects in Death Penalty Studies 
 In view of the Court’s ruling in McCleskey regarding the findings in statistical 
analyses which indicated an influence of race on charging or sentencing outcomes in capital 
cases, what interpretations can be made regarding the nature of those race effects?  That is, 
if race effects are found in death penalty studies, how should they be interpreted?  Prior 
findings in death penalty studies examining the role of race in charging or sentencing 
outcomes have led to speculation as to how those findings could be interpreted.  For 
example, are the race effects on death penalty case outcomes the result of racial animus of 
one group towards another in criminal proceedings?  Are the charging or sentencing 
outcomes the result of earlier selective practices by law enforcement practices of the police?  
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Are prosecutors more likely to be indifferent towards intra-racial crimes committed in cases 
where the offender and victim are black?  Or, do race effects simply estimate the impact of 
race variables on the potential risk or likelihood of being charged with a death-eligible 
offense or being sentenced to death?  These questions w ll be examined below. 
a. Racial Animus and Discrimination  
 In reviewing the body of death penalty research, the role of race has been 
consistently noted across a number of those studies.  Fir t, cases involving White victims, 
either by themselves or in combination with the race of the defendant, are more likely to 
result in the defendant being charged with a death-ligible offense or sentenced to death.   
One possible interpretation for this race effect is that it may be the result of a legacy or 
pattern of racial animus and/or indifference towards Blacks and members of other minority 
groups.  Paternoster (1991) reviewed a history of discriminatory treatment towards Blacks 
that may explain the relationship between race and outcomes in death penalty cases.231  
From the Slave Codes of the 1660s in the American colonies to the Black Codes enacted in 
the South in the 1800s, patterns of differential treatment would emerge and influence how 
the criminal laws were codified and selectively applied to different members of society.  
One consistent pattern that would emerge from these laws was the unequal application of 
the death penalty for blacks charged with criminal offenses.  The penalties for blacks, 
whether they were free or slaves, were significantly higher in terms of severity compared to 
the penalties for similar offenses committed by whites.  The crime of rape, particularly when 
committed by black offenders, provides a good illustration of the discriminatory practices 
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found during this period.  Typically, the criminal l w was written and implemented in a 
fashion that provided significantly different penalties according to the race of the defendant.  
While blacks were automatically put to death or castrated for the rape of a white woman, no 
mandatory penalty existed for white defendants and very few states, if any, carried criminal 
penalties for the rape of a black woman.  In addition to the crime of rape, black defendants 
were subject to the death penalty for a wide variety of criminal offenses compared to the 
significantly lesser penalties committed by white defendants for comparable offense. 
 Kennedy also reviewed the history of differential trea ment of criminal offenders 
according to race and suggested that this legacy also h s resulted in an indifference to 
criminal offending when the offender and victim were black.232  Because of the Slave 
Codes, the Black Codes, the Jim Crow era, and othersimilarly crafted laws over time, 
Kennedy suggested that such laws led to a general indifference over time by the criminal 
justice system to black-on-black crime and a failure by the system to adequately protect the 
lives and property of black citizens.  While criminal offenses involving black offenders and 
white victims tended to result in harsh criminal penalties, intra-racial crimes involving 
blacks were often downplayed.  Kennedy also noted that harsh penalties related to the 
crimes involving black offenders and victims were more likely to result from some type of 
aggravating factor present in the particular offense.  Myrdal’s analysis of attitudes towards 
black-on-black crime in the South suggested that such views resulted in the creation of laws, 
customs, and other sentiments that would set the ground rules for social interactions between 
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members of different racial groups.233  In his analysis of outcomes in criminal offenses 
involving rape, LaFree linked the response by the criminal justice system toward offenders 
and victims to longstanding views of rape that implemented punishment according to the 
race of the victim and the offender.234  His findings suggested that cases that received the 
most severe criminal penalties involved sexual assaults where the victim was white and the 
offender was black.  Additionally, cases involving black victims and black offenders 
received, on average, the least severe penalties.  In attempting to explain the disparity in 
treatment of sexual assault cases, suggested the possibility that “racial distance” often 
inhibited jurors in criminal trials from completely identifying with certain victims, 
particularly if the victim’s race differed from the race of jury members.  
b. Selective Law Enforcement Practices and Discrimination 
 Prior to the charging and sentencing processes in the criminal justice system, 
behaviors that are subject to criminal sanctions are initially handled by law enforcement 
officials.   Because of the uneven history of police/minority citizen encounters over time, 
there has been speculation that racial bias on the part of the police may influence later 
charging and sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  Wilbanks noted that the charges of 
racial discrimination are most likely to be directed at the police than at any other officials in 
the criminal justice process such as prosecutors, judges, probation officers or parole 
officers.235  Wilbanks also suggested that many of the charges of racism directed towards 
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the police include charges that the police are more likely to focus their deployment and 
investigative resources in predominately black communities, are more likely to arrest black 
citizens compared to white citizens who may involve in criminal activity at comparable rates 
of offending, are more likely to engage in acts of p lice brutality towards blacks, and are 
more likely to use deadly force against blacks.  Whether these claims are based on 
experience, statistical data, perceptions, or vicarious negative experiences with the police of 
others, they have emerged as plausible factors in the discussion of the influence of race on 
charging and sentencing outcomes in criminal cases.      
 In his review of the practices of law enforcement over time, Kennedy suggested that 
race, from a historical standpoint, has been used a a l w enforcement strategy over time as 
a signal that certain groups possessed a higher “risk of criminality”.  Thus, certain minority 
groups, Kennedy argued, were more likely to be subjected to “reasonable” racial 
discrimination by the police.236  One of the more widely cited examples involved the mass 
detentions of persons of Japanese ancestry during World ar II after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor.  During that period, federal authorities focused their efforts on persons of Japanese 
ancestry who were subjected to curfew, removed fromtheir homes and detained in prison 
camps.237  Despite a lack of evidence suggesting that the Japanese detainees posed a threat 
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to the United States, Kennedy characterized the detentions as nothing more than racial 
hatred toward Japanese individuals.238   
 Also cited in his analysis were similar law enforcement operations which focused on 
the threats posed by several black individuals or grups.  Kennedy noted that these incidents 
of targeted enforcement were particularly noteworthy because they involved the 
enforcement efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on black political activists who 
were thought to pose a threat to the national security of the United States of America.  In 
many of these instances, resources of the agency were us d to target activists such as 
Marcus Garvey, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Black Panther Party.  In each case, the FBI 
used a variety of tactics including wiretaps, informants, unsubstantiated charges of criminal 
activity, the dissemination of potentially embarrassing information, police surveillance, and 
the FBI’s counter-intelligence program, COINTELPRO. 
 Tonry also points to the War on Drugs and other crime policies since 1980 that he 
argues have been disastrous because of their impact on black Americans.239  Tonry cites a 
number of racial disparities that have resulted from policies that, he argues, should have 
foreseen the problems that they eventually caused.  First, because of a number of these 
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policies, blacks are six to seven times more likely than white to be in jail or prison and a 
significantly high number of blacks under the contrl of the criminal justice system are 
young black males under the age of 24.  Second, blacks are far more likely than their white 
counterparts to be in prison despite making up 13 percent of the general U.S. population.  
Tonry notes that urban black Americans bore the brunt of the War on Drugs policies, in part, 
because of the institutional nature of urban police departments that are found in 
disadvantaged minority communities.  Unlike the drug activities in working class and 
middle class communities that often occur indoors, the bulk of drug dealing activities in 
lower class neighborhoods tends to be conducted outdo rs.  Therefore, the police are more 
likely to focus their resources in lower class neighborhoods and arrests for such activities are 
more likely to occur in lower class neighborhoods de pite the fact that overall rates of 
offending may be similar in working and middle class neighborhoods.  Also, the nature of 
drug dealing in lower class, disadvantaged neighborhoods made it easier for undercover 
narcotics officers to penetrate the social networks f friends and family members in lower 
class neighborhoods compared to the more stable networks that are found in middle and 
working class neighborhoods.  Thus, the focus on arrests, which often serve as measures for 
police productivity and effectiveness, are more likly to take place in lower class, 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.  This focus of law enforcement resources in disorganized, 
minority neighborhoods, Toney argues, has and will continue to produce racial proportions 
in arrests that do not correspond to racial proportions in drug use. 
c. Prosecutorial Discretion, Indifference and Discrimination  
 Discretion is given to various entities in the criminal justice system that possess 
decision making powers that may influence arrest, charging, or sentencing outcomes.  
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However, prosecutorial discretion is commonly regarded as the most unlimited and 
uncontrolled.  As previously noted in Chapter II, prosecutorial discretion is a constant and 
necessary fixture in the criminal justice system and prosecutors are entrusted with 
considerable, and often unfettered, power over exercising their judgment and conscience in 
decisions involving the filing or dismissal of charges, the number and types of charges filed, 
as well as potential plea bargains with defendants.   
 Although such discretion is vital to the administration of justice, it does not come 
without potential hazards.  Prosecutors, who are often elected or appointed officials, have to 
be sensitive to the local conditions of the communities in which they serve.  Additionally, 
the power of prosecutorial discretion is often exercis d in response to reactions to the 
particular crime from citizens, the media, family me bers of the victim, the police, local 
politicians and other community leaders.  To maintain community support and to win 
reelection or reappointment, prosecutors must often w igh community sentiment against the 
aggravating and mitigating factors present in the giv n case.  Horowitz also noted that the 
continued focus on the community and reelection to office could, in certain instances, cause 
some prosecutors to treat a defendant harshly or leniently for political gain.240  This 
highlights concerns that such unchecked discretion can result in abuse though racial 
discrimination in determining how a case proceeds through the system. 
 Wilbanks (1987) noted that perceptions of many minority groups suggest that 
prosecutors often abuse the powers of their office are heightened by two additional factors.  
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First, discretionary decisions made by prosecutors, unlike those made by the police or 
judges, typically take place outside of the public’s view.  Decisions made whether to 
prosecute, charge, or plea bargain, are rarely subject to independent review.  Second, 
Wilbanks noted that prosecutors are less likely to be drawn from different minority groups 
and, therefore, are more likely to be white.  Given the fact that prosecutorial decisions, at 
least in part, are a function of the sentiments of the community, it could be possible that 
those decisions also reflect racial bias on the part of the prosecutor.  One additional factor 
that could influence the decisions made by prosecutors involves the history of racial 
discrimination in the United States that was previously discussed above in sections A & B.     
 Prosecutors have often been accused of racial discrim nation in their charging 
decisions, at least in part, because of a racial anmus in the United States and past selective 
law enforcement practices by the police.  Wilbanks noted that many of the charges of racial 
bias directed towards prosecutors include commonly held perceptions that they are more 
likely argue for no bail in cases involving black defendants, less likely to recommend 
deferred prosecution for black defendants, less likely to approve more attractive plea 
agreements for black defendants, more likely to systematically exclude blacks from juries, 
more likely to prosecute black defendants resulting in a higher conviction rate compared to 
whites.  
d. Making Sense of “Race” Effects  
 Early studies in the pre-Furman era suggested that race figured prominently in 
charging and sentencing outcomes.  That is, studies on charging and sentencing rates in the 
early 20th century found that defendants who killed whites were more likely to have the 
death penalty requested in their cases and more likely to receive a sentence of death and less 
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likely to have those sentences commuted than defendants who killed blacks. Consistent 
with pre-Furman research in the area of racial disparities in sentencing, several more recent 
studies have concluded that defendants whose victims were white had the greatest likelihood 
of having the death penalty requested in their cases nd were more likely to receive a death 
sentence (Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Jacoby and Paternost r, 1982; Baldus, Pulaski and 
Woodworth, 1983, 1985; Bowers, 1983; Gross and Mauro, 1984; Smith, 1987; Paternoster 
and Kazyaka, 1988; Vito and Keill, 1988; Paternoster and Brame, 2003; Pierce and Radelet, 
2005;).  However, the question that remains unanswered is how should these findings be 
interpreted?  Are the race effects the product of racial animus, selective law enforcement 
policies focused on minorities, or racial bias on the part of prosecutors?  A review of the 
findings in the current body of death penalty research suggests that the relationship between 
these factors and the race effects cited in the curr nt body of death penalty research may be 
speculative, at best. 
 However, answers regarding the relationship between race and charging or 
sentencing outcomes may be found, at least in part, in the Furman and McCleskey decisions.  
In Furman, Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, noted that the manner in which the death 
penalty was administered at the time, left him with the conclusion that it was 
discriminatorily imposed against “certain identifiable classes of people.  Justice Marshall’s 
opinion would note: 
 “Regarding discrimination, it has been said that it is the 
usually poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member 
of the minority group – the man without means, and is 
defended by a court-appointed attorney _ who becomes 
society’s sacrificial lamb….Indeed, a look at the bare 
statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of 
the discrimination.  A total of 3,859 persons have be n 
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executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 
were Negro.  Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 
1,664 of the executed murderers were white, 1,630 were
Negro: 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negros 
were executed for rape.  It is immediately apparent that 
Negroes were executed far more often than whites in 
proportion to their percentage of the population.  Studies 
indicate that while the higher rate of execution is partially 
due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial 
discrimination.  Racial or other discriminations should not be 
surprising. In McGautha v. California, this Court held that 
committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the 
power to pronounce life or death in capital cases i [not] 
offensive to anything in the Constitution.  This was an open 
invitation to discrimination.”241  
  
 Justice Marshall’s link between the statistical data on race that he cited in his opinion 
serves as an illustration of the difficulty in drawing conclusions from the race effects found 
in the early pre-Furman studies.  Although a number of the earlier studies cited a 
relationship between either the race of the defendant or victim and charging or sentencing 
outcomes, many of the pre-Furman studies were characterized by poor or limited 
methodological approaches which made it difficult to draw conclusions of the effect of race 
on charging or sentencing outcomes.  For example, many of the studies failed to include and 
control for key legal factors that would likely influence charging or sentencing outcomes.  
The main criticism being that the inclusion of other legal variables could reduce or eliminate 
the race found in a number of these studies.  However, the post-Gregg studies significantly 
improved their methodological approaches to examine the role of race on outcomes in 
capital cases.  Unlike the earlier studies, the more s phisticated approaches included a 
combination of legal, neutral, and suspect case chara teristics in their analyses that could be 
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considered in the charging or sentencing process.   
 Legal case characteristics were defined by the death penalty statutes and included 
factors such as the number of aggravating and mitigatin  circumstances present in a given 
case, the age of the victim, or whether the victim was a police officer or federal judge.  
Neutral case characteristics typically don’t have an obvious link to charging or sentencing 
decisions, but may, nonetheless, influence those outcomes.  Neutral characteristics may 
include the military status of the defendant or the relationship between the defendant and the 
victim.  Finally, suspect characteristics include those factors that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has ruled to be in violation of the Constitution if they are found to have influenced charging 
or sentencing outcomes.  Factors in this category include race of the defendant or victim, 
socioeconomic status of the victim, or the gender of the defendant or the victim.   
 As a result of the improvements in the methodological designs and increases in the 
number of variables collected, several of the studies that were conducted after the Gregg 
indicated a continued pattern of racial disparities at everal stages in the death penalty 
process after the Furman decision and the post-Gregg statutory revisions to a number of 
death penalty statutes.  The race effects that were assumed by the Gregg Court to have been 
reduced to insignificant level or eliminated continued to demonstrate significant influences 
on charging and sentencing outcomes.  For example, cas s involving white victims were 
found to have a higher likelihood of being charged or sentenced in death penalty cases.  
However, the McCleskey Court would rule that the statistical data submitted to the Court 
was insufficient to demonstrate that race influenced s ntencing outcomes in capital cases.  In 
their view, the Baldus study, which was submitted to the Court to demonstrate racial bias in 
the Georgia death penalty system, was deemed insufficient to prove that race played any 
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part in the Georgia jury's decision to impose the sentence of death in McCleskey's particular 
case.  Although the Court would also require evidence to demonstrate “purposeful 
discrimination” on the part of the legislature, theCourt also appeared to raise the issue that 
might be relevant to the issue of how to interpret th  influence of race on charging and 
sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  In its consideration of the Baldus data, which found 
that defendants who killed white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a sentence of 
death than defendants whose victims were black, the Court ruled that the results failed to 
demonstrate that the Georgia statute put the defendant at a constitutionally unacceptable 


















 The present analysis will examine the role of race in charging decisions to seek the 
death penalty by the U.S. Attorneys and Attorney General in federal capital cases.  Since the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Furman and Gregg, a body of empirical studies in a 
number of state jurisdictions has found the role of race to be statistically significant in 
charging and sentencing decisions.  Although the rac  of the defendant was not found to be 
significant in the majority of these studies, the race of the victim has consistently emerged in 
the majority of these studies as an important predictor n decisions to seek the death penalty 
by prosecutors and in decision by sentencing authorities to impose the death penalty.  At the 
same time that these analyses were conducted at state level, very few studies examined the 
role of race on charging or sentencing decisions at the federal level.  
 
A. Empirical Analysis 
1. The Data 
 This study will consist of a secondary analysis of data analyzed by the Rand 
Corporation to explore the role of race in charging decisions by U.S. Attorney and the 
Attorney General in the federal death penalty system.  Data for the study was originally 
collected from several sources.  Files from the Attorney General’s Review Committee 
(AGRC) were reviewed for all cases received from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 
2000.242  The U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) is required to make a recommendation 
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whether or not to seek the death penalty for every d fendant who is charged with a federal 
crime that is punishable by death.   All recommendations and related information is 
forwarded to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Capital Case Unit (CCU) for review by the 
Attorney General’s Review Committee (AGRC).  Materials from the USAO include a 
memorandum which provides details of the case, the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s evaluation of 
the case and charging recommendation regarding whether or not to seek the death penalty, 
as well as a Factors Evaluation Form which provides nformation on all aggravating and 
mitigating factors present in each case.  The CCU’s database contains case information 
which included the federal judicial district where th  case was filed, the date the case was 
received by the CCU, case number identification, names, genders and races of the defendant 
and victim, the death-eligible charge, and the Attorney General’s decision.  Disposition 
information on a number of cases was obtained the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ criminal master file.  All cases submitted to the 
AGRC involved all death-eligible cases regardless of whether the death penalty was being 
sought by U.S. Attorneys.  Two cases containing ten defendants were removed from the 
data set because of missing seek/no-seek recommendations by the U.S. Attorneys.243  The 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(AGRC) include all death-eligible cases includes those where the death penalty was not 
being sought by U.S. Attorneys.  
 
 243Cases in this category that were removed included cases where the defendant was 
either a fugitive or awaiting extradition from another country.  Three additional espionage 
cases containing five defendants were also removed because no information could be coded 
for the race of the victims. 
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data collection process yielded two separate populations of cases with information on 
charging requests made by the U.S. Attorneys and final charging recommendations made 
the Attorney General.  The first group consisted of 312 cases involving 652 defendants and 
488 victims where U.S. Attorneys decided whether or not to seek the death penalty.  The 
second group consisted of 294 cases involving 600 defen ants and 469 victims where the 
Attorney General decided whether or not to charge the defendant with a death-eligible 
offense.  In addition to the racial characteristics that were collected on each defendant and 
victim, researchers also collected an extensive number of variables believed to influence 
charging decisions of prosecutors in capital cases.  Data collected on the defendants and 
victims in each case included age, employment, education, the defendant/victim 
relationship, the place and nature of the killing, co-defendants involved, weapons used, 
witnesses to the offense, and the availability of forensic or other evidence.244  Variables 
were also coded to analyze a number of aggravating, non-statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors involved in each case which are typically instrumental in charging 
decisions by prosecutors.245 
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 245Aggravating factors for homicides cases included: 
a. Death during the commission of a crime. 
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b. Prior conviction of a violent felony involving a firearm. 
c. Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment 
was authorized. 
d. Previous conviction of other serious offenses. 
e. Grave risk of death to additional persons. 
f. Heinous, cruel or depraved manner of committing the offense. 
g. Procurement of the offense by payment. 
h. Commission of the offense for pecuniary gain. 
i. Substantial planning and premeditation. 
j. Previous conviction of two felony drug offenses. 
k. Vulnerability of the victim. 
l. Previous conviction of serious Federal Drug offense. 
m. CCE involving distribution to minors. 
n. Offense against high public officials. 
o. Previous conviction of sexual assault of child molestation. 
p. Multiple killings or attempted killings. 
 
Aggravating factors for Drug Offenses included: 
a. Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment 
was authorized. 
b. Previous conviction of other serious offenses. 
c. Previous serious felony drug offenses. 
d. Use of a firearm in the offense or furtherance of CCE. 
e. Distribution to persons under twenty-one. 
f. Distribution near schools. 
g. Using minors in drug trafficking. 
h. Lethal adulterant. 
 
Non-Statutory Aggravating factors included: 
a. Participation in additional uncharged murders. 
b. Obstruction of justice. 
c. Contemporaneous convictions. 
d. Future dangerousness. 
e. Victim impact evidence. 
f. Vileness of crime. 
g. Murder of two persons. 
h. Felonious cruelty to children. 
i. Other (specify) 
 
Mitigating factors included: 
a. Impaired capacity. 
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   Additionally, all cases collected consisted of one r more defendants who were 
charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office with one or more ffenses that carried the death 
penalty.  More than half of the cases collected involved two or more defendants, multiple 
victims, and almost 80% of the cases overall included multiple defendants.246  Finally, data 
was collected on the geographic distribution of cases in six regions which represented the 94 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.247  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
b. Duress. 
c. Minor Participation. 
d. Equally culpable defendants. 
e. No prior criminal record. 
f. Disturbance. 
g. Victim’s consent. 
h. Youth. 
i. Victim’s family against death penalty. 
j. Positive institutional adjustment. 
k. Provoked by victim. 
l. Other. 
  
 246Data collected on the victims in the federal capital case data set excluded events 
where individual-level information could not be obtained on the victims.  These events 
included the first World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, Dar es Salaam, and Narobi 
bombings.  
 
 247The South region which included 31% of cases where U.S Attorneys 
recommended the death penalty and 32% of the cases wh re the Attorney General sought 
the death penalty consisted of Alabama, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missis ippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  The Northeast which 
included 13% of cases where U.S Attorneys recommended the death penalty and 15% of the 
cases where the Attorney General sought the death penalty consisted of Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.  The Midwest region which included 25% of cases where U.S Attorneys 
recommended the death penalty and 28% of the cases where the  Attorney General sought 
the death penalty consisted of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.  The West region which included 27% 
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Overall, over 100 explanatory variables were collected through the data collection efforts of 
the researchers. 
 2.  Decision Points to be Analyzed.   
The current study will focus on charging decisions made by the U.S. Attorneys and 
the Attorney General in federal capital cases.  Specifically, the current analysis will examine 
the impact of the race of the defendant and the race of the victim on the charging requests 
made by the U.S. Attorneys and the final charging recommendations made by the U.S. 
Attorney General in federal capital cases.  Under current federal death penalty protocols, 
cases involving the decision by U.S. Attorneys to seek the death penalty advance through a 
number of levels prior to the final authorization or denial to seek the death penalty.  After 
eligibility requirements have been met and charging decisions have been finalized, all U.S. 
Attorneys are required to submit any pending cases for which the death penalty is authorized 
regardless of whether or not the death penalty is being recommended. All cases are then 
forwarded the capital case review committee which consists of group of senior Justice 
Department lawyers designated by the Attorney General.  After reviewing the case and 
meeting with several parties, the review committee presents its recommendation to the 
Attorney General who makes the final decision whether a capital case should be sought in 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of cases where U.S Attorneys recommended the death p nalty and 27% of the cases where  
the Attorney General sought the death penalty consisted of Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming.  U.S. Attorneys on Puerto Rico recommended th  death penalty on 14% of the 
cases and the Attorney General sought the death penalty o  17 of the case.  No cases were 
recommended for the death penalty by U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General did not seek 
the death penalty in any cases in the Virgin Islands.    
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the case. 
 Since the Gregg decision, a body of research has examined the role of race in 
charging and sentencing decisions in several jurisdict ons.  Chapter I cites several studies 
conducted primarily at the state level using a number of multivariate approaches which have 
explored the role of  race on charging and sentencing outcomes while controlling for other 
variables believed to have factored into those decisions as well.  Although there is the 
danger of overfitting models with too many variables, standard regression models typically 
analyze a number of  aggravating, non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
as individual factors in the analyses along with variables such race, sex, age, other non-
statutory factors, and relevant case characteristics. 
 In 2002, one independent study was conducted to examine the role of race in the 
federal death penalty system. Similar to previous st dies conducted at the state level, a series 
of multivariate analyses were conducted to examine the impact of several independent 
variables on charging decisions by U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Attorney General in cases 
where the death penalty was an option. However, a number of these analyses departed from 
the methodological approaches cited in Chapter I.   
 For example, Klein, Freedman and Bolus collected over 100 explanatory variables to 
examine the impact on charging decisions in federal capital cases.  Because they “saw no 
satisfactory way of choosing explanatory variables”, they totaled the number of aggravating 
factors for each defendant to create an “aggr” variable and totaled the number of mitigating 
factors for each defendant to create a “mitg” variable.  The model that was constructed from 
this approach examined the role of race on charging decisions in an initial thirteen-variable 
regression model with several regional variables, the race of the victim, the race of the 
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defendant, a variable which represented a total sum of all aggravating variables in each case, 
and a variable which represented a total sum of all mitigating variables in each case.248  
However, unlike many analyses conducted in the past,including those that have been 
recognized in terms of their validity by the U.S. Supreme Court, the analyses in the federal 
death penalty study did not include other variables that are more likely to influence charging 
decisions.  The limited number of variables included in subsequent models failed to 
demonstrate any race effects on charging decisions.249  One plausible reason for the findings 
may be that race did not influence charging decisions of prosecutors in the cases under 
analysis.  An alternative reason may be that the selection of variables in each of the models 
may have explained the lack of race effects on charging decision.   
 In the second of three analyses in the federal death penalty study, Berk and He also 
conducted a few preliminary conventional logistic regression models.  Unlike the first set of 
regression models, Berk and He’s models demonstrated evidence of the influence of race on 
charging decisions by U.S. Attorneys.  However, there were a few items in the analysis that 
could be considered interesting and unexpected.  First, a number of the variables that 
represented counts of mitigating factors, aggravating factors and non-statutory factors in the 
model emerged as statistically insignificant predictors on charging decisions by the U.S. 
Attorneys, but the role of race of the victim was stati tically significant.  Additionally, other 
                                                
 248The researchers did note that although the majority f their models showed not 
race effects, some, in fact did demonstrate race effects on charging decisions.  
 
 249Their analyses included an three-variable model (aggr, mitg, and the race of the 
victim) an eleven variable model (aggr, mitg, the race of the victim, and several regional 
variables) and a five variable model (aggr, mitr, race of the victim, the race of the defendant, 
and an interaction variable between white victims and non-white defendants).  
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aggravating circumstances were found to be insignificant while factors such as whether the 
victim had a skilled job or whose arm or hand was injured during the crime were statistically 
significant in charging decisions.250 
  3.   Analytical Approach   
 The current study would extend the previous analysis conducted on the federal death 
penalty cases by focusing on more traditional logistic regression approaches conducted in 
many of the state studies cited in Chapter I.  The analyses will focus on the recommend/no-
recommend decisions of the U.S. Attorneys and the seek/no-seek decisions of the Attorney 
General after cases have been reviewed by the Attorney General’s Review Committee.251  
The data would be fitted to several multivariate regression models to examine the role of 
race while controlling for relevant legal factors on charging decisions in the federal death 
penalty system.  In conducting the present analyses, th re are a number of points that have to 
be addressed. 
 First, the starting approach in the current study will be to examine the relationship 
between the race of the defendant and/or victim and the charging decisions by federal 
prosecutors.  Hanushek and Jackson note that fitting models to a given data set begins with 
                                                
 250Berk and He conducted a random forest analysis on the federal data set and 
concluded that it provided a better fit for the data than traditional logistic regression models.  
However, their selection of this model came with two caveats.  First, that the better fit did 
not necessarily mean less bias because the use of a predictor that should not be in the model 
could result in the association of race and charging outcomes being adjusted upward and 
downward inappropriately.  Second, the random forest approach cannot compensate for 
predictors that are not included in the model.  
 
 251A report released by the U.S. Department of Justice found that Attorney General’s 
Review Committee and the Attorney General agreed with the charging recommendations of 
U.S. Attorneys in 88% of death-eligible cases.  
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the assumption that common causal relationships exists in theoretical and empirical 
models.252  Assuming that this is the case, the analysis will examine statistical significance 
and empirical significance.  In focusing on the role f race on charging decisions, an 
examination of the statistical significance will allow for a determination to be made as to 
whether the data appear to be consistent with each of the models constructed. Additionally, 
the assessment of the empirical significance will provide vital information related to the 
strength or magnitude of the coefficients.  That is, the analysis will estimate the strength of 
the relationship between race characteristics in a given case and how that offense is 
ultimately charged.  If race effects are found, subsequent analyses will be conducted to 
determine whether race effects are reduced after the in roduction of legally relevant factors 
such as the number of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances present. 
 Second, the variables that will be used in the analysis will have to be “fitted” to the 
selected models.  In a bivariate analysis, a single variable is fitted to a model to explain its 
effect on the dependent variable.  However, this is not typically useful in death penalty (or 
other) studies since there are several known variables that may effect outcomes in capital 
cases.  Thus, the multivariate analytical approach becomes a more useful, and ultimately, 
preferred method to determine the strength of several independent variables on the 
dependent variable.  Because of the high number of aggravating factors, mitigating factors, 
non-statutory aggravating factors, as well a significant number of case characteristics that 
were previously collected, the number of variables in each model will need to be reduced.   
 With so many variables in the analysis to choose from, one approach could be to 
                                                
 252Hanushek, E. and J. Jackson (1977).  Statistical Methods for Social Scientists.  
New York: Academic Press.  
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“throw” large numbers of the variables into the multivariate analyses in order to control for 
every possible independent variable on charging decisions.  For example, all of the known 
legal factors and other case characteristics could be analyzed in several models estimate 
their effects on the U.S. Attorney’s charging decision .  However, Hosemer and Lemeshow 
note that analyses examining a large number of independent variables on a relatively small 
sample of cases can run the risk of producing estimates that may be numerically unstable.253  
Therefore, the present study will reduce the number of xplanatory factors to a more 
manageable level. 
 Finally, all of the data in the analysis have been re-coded into dichotomous variables 
with values of 0 or 1.  In this instance, each dichotomous response variable with outcomes 
can be thought of as an event or non-event.  In the present study the event will be the 
decision to charge a death-eligible offense with the death penalty and the non-event will 
consist of the decision by the prosecutor to not charge the defendant with the death penalty.  
Accordingly, a logistic regression analysis will be employed to provide several coefficients 
that will estimate the effects of several of the independent variables selected on the 
dependent variable.  This approach will provide statistical controls for a number of variables 




                                                
 253Hosmer, D. and S. Lemeshow.  (1989).  Applied Logistic Regression.  New York: 
John Wiley & Sons.    
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Chapter IV.   
 
Empirical Results 
 The current chapter will address and discuss a number of points related to several 
analyses that were conducted to analyze the role of race in charging decisions by the U.S. 
Attorneys and the final charging decisions of the Attorney General.  Section A will discuss 
how variables were selected and analyzed in several of the logistic regression models and 
section B will report results from two exploratory analyses.  Additionally, section C will 
report preliminary, unadjusted estimates and section D will report the final, adjusted 
estimates from several logistic regression analyses which will examine the charging 
decisions of the U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General.  The final section will briefly 
discuss limitations related to the study. 
A. Variable Selection 
 The starting point in the analytical process begins with the selection of independent 
variables thought to have an influence on the charging decisions of the U.S. Attorneys and 
the Attorney General.  One of the common criticisms of early death penalty research studies 
stems from the lack of variables included in the models to adequately estimate charging or 
sentencing decisions made in capital cases.  However, as statistical models became more 
sophisticated over time, efforts have been made to collect large number of case 
characteristics in addition to aggravating and mitigating factors in order to control for their 
influence when considering the impact of race on charging or sentencing outcomes.  
Although the collection of additional variables may be preferable from a preliminary 
standpoint, the selection of variables for inclusion in the analytical models can present 
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challenges to the researcher.  In the current study, over 100 variables were considered for the 
analyses that will be discussed in the later sections.254  With so many potential independent 
variables relative to the sample of cases, the list of variables had to be pared down to a more 
manageable number. 
 Table 1 presents the initial variables that were considered for inclusion in the 
analyses.  Hosmer and Lemeshow note that some type of univariate analysis may be 
employed to examine the relationship of each individual variable on the dependent variable.  
They also emphasized the importance of considering how variables are selected to build 
models to examine the role between different variables.  In their view, too many variables 
into a regression model, also known as “overfitting he model”, can produce unrealistically 
large estimated coefficients and/or estimated standard errors.  Therefore, part of the model-
building process includes minimizing the number of variables in the model in order to 
produce results that are more likely to be numerically stable and generalizable.    
 In the current analysis, each independent variable was examined separately to 
estimate its relationship to the dependent variable.  After the initial analysis, the choice of 
variables was reduced from 102 to 38.255  Table 2 presents a reduced list of covariates that 
were considered for the analyses.  Many of the individual case characteristics were dropped 
                                                
254Variables initially considered for the analysis were reviewed and selected if it 
appeared that they could be properly coded into dichotomous categories for the logistic 
regression analyses.  
 
 255The Rand Corporation study also analyzed a similar number of variables in their 
regression models.  However, many of their variables selected were related to various case 
characteristics that were not include in the present tudy.  It is important to note that the 
analyses in both studies produced similar race of the victim and race of the defendant 
coefficients at similar levels of statistical significance.   
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from consideration in the analysis due to weak associati ns to charging decisions in the 
federal process.  Additionally, a number of the independent variables under consideration 
were found to have missing data, which produced coeffi ients that may not have reflected 
the true relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. 
 To address this problem with the data, the variables in the initial analysis were also 
screened for significant amounts of missing data and substantive relationships to the 
charging process.  For example, a number of the variables were found to have 30 or more 
cases with missing data.  Thus, the inclusion of these variables would have resulted in a loss 
of a number of cases in the logistic models examining the role of race on charging decisions. 
The concern of the potential loss of cases from the current sample of cases resulted in the 
decision to drop a number of variables with missing data.  Many of the variables that were 
collected which reflected case characteristics related to the location of a gunshot or stab 
wounds to the victim had large amounts of missing data.  This was also found in a number 
of case characteristics related to personal information related to the defendant (e.g., 
iq/intelligence level, history of serious head injury, history of mental illness or emotional 
problems, history of drug abuse, etc.).  Additionally, a number of independent variables 
reflecting the manner in which the victim was killed (e.g., burning, bombing or explosion, 
drowning, suffocation, strangulation, etc.) had large amounts of missing data.256  Also, a 
                                                
 256The missing data from case files is a common problem in many instances where 
the information is not recorded by prosecutors or other staff in a systematic manner.  It is 
also possible that variables which reflect case chara teristics may not be collected in a 
consistent manner since the most important variables that influence charging decisions, by 
statute, are the aggravating circumstances submitted by the U.S. Attorneys that they believe 
can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in court. Given this requirement, it is likely that 
charging decisions are based largely on this legal requirement rather than the presence of 
 134
number of variables were dropped from consideration if they were described with generic 
variable labels terms that would have made substantive i terpretations between the 
independent and dependent variables difficult.  Forexample, a number of the variables were 
defined with generic variables labels such as “before killing-any conditions reported” or “at 
crime scene-any conditions reported.”  Variables with generic terms such as these were also 
dropped from the analyses due to a lack of clarity s to their substantive relationship to the 
charging decisions.  Key variables with coding information may found in Table 3.   
 
 B.   Exploratory Analyses 
 As previously discussed, prosecutorial discretion is one of the most constant fixtures 
in the criminal justice system.  As a result of this tradition, prosecutors are entrusted with 
considerable, and often unfettered, power over exercising their judgment and conscience in 
decisions involving the filing or dismissal of charges, the number and types of charges filed, 
declination of charges, as well as potential plea bargains with defendants.  At the state level, 
such discretion is often exercised in a broad nature and typically not subject to scrutiny in 
the public domain.  This lack of visibility is in contrast to the scrutiny focused on other 
phases of the criminal justice system.  The police often make arrests or stops which are 
required to be based on some legal definition such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
and justifications are often required to substantiate hose actions.  Also, judicial actions are 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
other case characteristics relevant to the offense.  Not surprisingly, a large number of 
aggravating and mitigating factors were included an considered for inclusion in the logistic 
regression models. 
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typically subject to the review by other judicial boards at the appellate level. 
 However, the discretion afforded to prosecutors is often less visible and not subject 
to the scrutiny of other authoritative bodies.  Additionally, charging decisions are not often 
based on formal guidelines created to structure the decision making process by prosecutors, 
nor are prosecutors required to follow any such charging guidelines. However, a lack of 
available guidelines can raise concerns that prosecutorial discretion can result in the 
consideration of suspect factors, such as race, in the charging process.257  At the federal 
level, prosecutors also have a significant level of discretion in determining how defendants 
are charged in capital cases.  However, there are a few guidelines that have been put in place 
that govern those charging practices.  The charging process begins with an internal 
assessment by prosecutors of eligibility of the offense for the death penalty.  All death-
eligible cases are generally required to meet three criteria: (1) the defendant is charged with 
an offense that is statutorily authorized to receive a death sentence; (2) the defendant 
intended or had a high degree of culpability with respect to the death of the victim; and, (3) 
one or more statutory aggravating circumstances must be present in the case.  Additionally, 
the decision to seek the death penalty in federal capital cases may also be influenced by 
whether it is in the interest of the Federal governme t to pursue the case over the interest of 
                                                
 257The lack of structured guidelines in the sentencing process was one of the main 
points raised by the Furman Court.  Although the Court did not suggest that the lack of 
guidelines would result in the consideration of suspect factors such as race, it did reason that 
the lack of such guidelines could make it difficult to determine whether race played a part in 
those sentencing decisions.  The Court, however, would make no similar ruling that 
prosecutorial charging guidelines were required to prevent race from being considered in the 
charging process in capital case.  
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the state in which the offense initially occurred.258  After eligibility requirements have been 
met and charging decisions have been finalized, the U.S. Attorneys are required to submit 
any pending cases for which the death penalty is authorized regardless of whether or not the 
death penalty is being recommended.  Finally, the U.S. Attorneys are required to identify all 
statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances that will be proven at trial.  Thus, for 
the purposes of the analysis, the aggravating and mitigating factors present in the death-
eligible cases should be expected to emerge as significant predictors in whether or not 
prosecutors seek the death penalty. 
 Since aggravating, mitigating and non-statutory aggr vating circumstances are 
commonly believed to have an impact on the charging decisions made by prosecutors; a few 
exploratory analyses were conducted in the present study.  During the variable selection 
process, it was determined that mitigating and non-statutory aggravating circumstances 
variables were missing large amounts of data which could have biased the coefficients in the 
logistic regression analyses.  Therefore, two dummy variables were created and coded to 
control for the presence of any mitigating or non-statutory aggravating circumstances in 
each capital case.259  For purposes of consistency, an additional dummy variable was also 
                                                
 258In death-eligible cases where concurrent jurisdiction with a State of local 
government is found to exist, Section 9-10.090 of the United States Attorney Manual states 
that a Federal indictment should be obtained only when the Federal interest in the 
prosecution has been demonstrated to be more substantial han the interests of the State or 
local authorities.  The determination of whether th Federal interest is more substantial than 
the interests of the State of local authorities is ba ed on a number of factors including: (a) 
the relative strength of the State’s interest in prosecuting the case; (b) the extent to which the 
criminal activity reached beyond the boundaries of a single local prosecutorial jurisdiction; 
and, (c)  the relative ability and willingness of the state to prosecute effectively and obtain 
an appropriate punishment upon conviction.  
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created to reflect the presence of any aggravating circumstances in each capital case. 
 Table 3a presents exploratory estimates which include a number of legal factors that 
are relevant in charging decisions by prosecutors in capital cases.260  The analysis in this 
instance was only conducted to examine the direction of the relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables.  In the first analysis, the defendant’s prior criminal 
record, pending cases against the defendant, and total aggregate scores for aggravating, 
mitigating, and non-statutory aggravating factors were analyzed to determine their influence 
on charging outcomes.  Although the defendant’s prior record or pending cases did not 
appear to influence charging patterns, two of the aggregate factors scores were significant in 
their impact.  However, the analysis produced a significantly large constant term and 
aggregate aggravating factors coefficient that was not statistically significant.261  The 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 259Although there are eight mitigating circumstances and eight non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances that may apply in federal capital cases, only three of the 
mitigating circumstances were found to have no missing data.  Additionally, all of the non-
statutory aggravating circumstances were found to have significant amounts of missing data.  
The aggregate mitigating and non-statutory aggravating dummy variables were created to 
provide additional control variables to examine race eff cts and to determine if statistically 
significant differences existed between the full logistic regression models and the 
parsimonious models. 
  
 260From a procedural standpoint, the likelihood that a case is changed with a death-
eligible offense has been found to be higher in cases where the defendant has a prior 
criminal record and/or other pending cases.  In the present exploratory analysis, however, 
the prior record and pending case variables were only added to the model to examine 
whether the analysis would produce aggravating, mitigat ng, and non-aggravating factors 
coefficients in the expected directions.  That is, aggr vating and non-statutory aggravating 
factors would be expected to increase the likelihood f a request for the death penalty and 
mitigating factors would decrease the likelihood of the death penalty being requested by 
prosecutors.     
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aggregate aggravating factor coefficient estimate was somewhat unexpected since it was 
coded in a manner to reflect the overall number of aggravating circumstances present in a 
given case, which, in turn, would be expected to significantly influence whether or not the 
death penalty was requested.  A second re-analysis of those variables listed in Table 3b 
produced estimates which showed a significant relationship between three of the five 
explanatory variables in the model.262  Thus, prosecutors, according to the model, were 
more likely to request the death penalty in cases where aggravating and non-statutory factors 
were found.  Alternatively, they were less likely to request the death penalty in cases where 
mitigating factors existed.  These findings, thus far, are consistent with those previously 
cited in a number of death penalty studies at the stat level.  The remaining analyses in the 
next two sections will examine race effects and charging decisions made by the U.S. 
Attorneys and the Attorney General. 
 
 C.  Preliminary Results – Unadjusted Estimates 
 This section will report preliminary, unadjusted estimates to examine whether any 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 261The aggravating factor coefficient conflicts with te expected statistically 
significant effect since the presence of one or more aggravating factors in a capital case is 
more likely to result in a request for the death penalty by a U.S. Attorney.  The fact that the 
aggravating factors dummy variable produced an unusually large and statistically 
insignificant effect suggested the possibility of a problem with the manner in which the 
aggregate aggravating factor was initially coded.    
  
 262Because of coding concerns, a variable in the original data set, which reflected the 
overall number of aggravating factors present in each case was re-coded into a dummy 
variable which dichotomized data points to distingush cases where no aggravating factors 
were present (coded, 0) from cases where aggravating f ctors were present (coded, 1).  
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differences exist between the charging decisions by prosecutors to request the death penalty 
for cases involving non-white and white victims and cases involving non-white and white 
defendants.  The purpose of the analyses in this section will be to assess whether any 
differences exist across cases involving whites and no -white groups.  The estimates, 
however, will not attempt to account for any of thedifferences across the racial groups if 
they are found.263  Table 4 provides a description of the charging rates of prosecutors for 
cases involving white and non-white defendants.  Among the cases where the prosecutors 
made the decision to request the death penalty, the data suggests that 20.5% (109/532) of the 
defendants were non-white and 31.2% (39/125) of the def ndants were white.264  The 
preliminary estimates also reported differences among cases where prosecutors requested 
the death penalty for cases involving nonwhite v. white victims.  In cases where the death 
penalty was requested, Table 5 presents exploratory inf mation which indicates federal 
prosecutors requested the death penalty in 17.6% (81/461) of cases involving non-white 
victims and 34.2% (67/196) of cases involving white v ctims.  Although these rates appear 
to indicate some racial differences in charging patterns, no conclusions can be drawn from 
these numbers since they are unadjusted figures and fail to take into account other legally 
relevant factors which might provide a reasonable explanation for the differences across the 
racial groups.  For example, the higher relative rats of requests for the death penalty in 
                                                
 263The final, adjusted estimates will examine the role f race and other legally 
relevant factors on charging decisions made by federal prosecutors.  
  
 264Since there were only 652 cases in the initial analysis, the racial groups (Native 
American, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Black Hispanic) were coded into dichotomous racial 
categories of white v. non-white.  This coding procedure prevented the potential loss of a 
significant number of cases in the initial analyses.  
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cases involving white defendants or white victims may be explained by a higher number of 
aggravating and non-statutory aggravating factors and/or fewer mitigating factors which are 
likely influence charging decisions by prosecutors.  
 In order to examine the differences further, a number of preliminary regression 
analyses were conducted to examine the role of race on harging decisions by federal 
prosecutors.  Specifically, the preliminary analyses will examine the relationship between 
race variables and charging decisions and assess the trength and statistical significance of 
the relationships found in the analyses.  Table 6 presents the logistic regression coefficients 
of six variables with the race of the defendant included in the model.  The variables were 
selected for the model based on their substantive relationship to charging outcomes in 
capital cases.  For example, the number of legally relevant variables (aggravating, 
mitigating, and non-statutory aggravating factors), the prior record of the defendant, and any 
pending cases against the defendant would be expected to have an influence on charging 
decisions made by prosecutors.   
 The results showed a fairly strong and statistically significant effect between the race 
of the defendant and the charging decisions by prosecutors in capital cases.  The estimates 
also suggested that cases involving white defendants were more likely to be charged with 
the death penalty than cases involving non-white def ndants.265  As expected, the legally 
                                                
 265The logistic regression coefficient, by itself, may not offer the desired intuitive 
value in describing the relationship between the independent variable(s) and the dependent 
variable.  For example, logistic regression coefficients demonstrate an increase or decrease 
in the predicted probability of having a certain characteristic or experiencing an event due to 
a one-unit change in the independent variable.  However, expressing the results in the form 
of odds via an odds multiplier may be interpreted as a measure of relative risk of a likely 
outcome (dependant variable) given the presence of an independent variable.  Therefore, 
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relevant factors also increased the likelihood that t e death penalty would be requested by 
federal prosecutors.  Cases with any aggravating factors present were more likely to have 
the death penalty requested and cases with non-statutory aggravating circumstances present 
were more likely to have the death penalty requests than cases where those factors were 
absent.  Not surprisingly, the presence of mitigatin factors decreased the likelihood that the 
death penalty would be requested.  One important consideration in the present analysis is 
that the relationship between the race of the defenant and the charging outcomes was found 
to be significant when a number of legally relevant f c ors were included in the model.   
 Although the prior record of the defendant was not found to be statistically 
significant, the race of the defendant, any pending cases against the defendant, and the 
presence of aggravating and non-statutory aggravating factors were found to be significant 
predictors of charging decisions by federal prosecutors.266  While the estimates of the legally 
relevant factors seem to confirm similar findings in other death penalty cases, the estimate 
produced by the race of the defendant would appear to run counter to the majority of 
previous results presented in other death penalty studies.  Although the race of the victim 
has been cited in a number of studies, relatively few of the post-Furman analyses have 
found a significant relationship between the race of the defendant and charging (or 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
each of the logistic regression coefficients produce  in the final, adjusted results listed in 
Section D will include odds multipliers in each of the models.  See Pampel, Logistic 
Regression: A Primer (2000) or Hosmer and Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression 
(1989).      
 
 266The presence of pending cases against the defendant was found to be statistically 
significant at the .10 level.  
 142
sentencing) outcomes.  However, it is important to note that no conclusions can be drawn 
from the model results since there are still several variables that have not been included in 
the analysis.  It is possible that the inclusion of other variables may reduce or eliminate its 
significant effect on charging decisions. 
 Table 7 presents similar estimates from the model which examined the role of the 
race of victim on charging decisions without the race of the defendant being included in the 
model.  Similar to the results found in the previous analysis, three of the five legally relevant 
factors also showed a significant impact on whether federal prosecutors requested the death 
penalty in capital cases.  Not surprisingly, cases where aggravating and non-statutory 
aggravating factors were present were more likely to have the death penalty requested, 
respectively.  Also, cases with mitigating factors p esent were less likely to have the death 
penalty requested by prosecutors.  Finally, the inclusion of victim’s race variable yielded an 
addition influence in the charging process as well.  The race of the victim, controlling for 
other legal factors, emerged as a statistically significant predictor of charging outcomes.267   
That is, cases involving white victims were more lik ly to be charged with the death penalty 
that cases involving non-white victims.   
 In the last analysis which produced preliminary results, Table 8 presents five legally 
relevant variables with the sex of the defendant, the race of the defendant, and the race of the 
victim.  In this instance, however, the race of the victim continued to show a significant 
effect on charging decision.  Cases involving white victims were more likely to result in the 
                                                
 267P<.05.  
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prosecutor requesting the death penalty than cases involving non-white victim cases.268  
This finding is consistent with several studies at the state level which were cited in Chapter 
II which found significant effects of the race of the victim on charging decisions made by 
prosecutors when controlling for legally relevant factors.  An additional finding that was 
consistent with past studies involved the estimate for the race of the defendant which was 
found to have an insignificant impact on charging decisions. 
 Although the initial estimates are consistent with findings from several death penalty 
studies at the state level, the unadjusted estimates provide, at best, an incomplete description 
of the potential role that race may play in charging decisions by federal prosecutors.  Since 
the preliminary analyses explored a few variables in each of the analyses, it is possible that 
the addition of other relevant variables may provide a better explanation in terms of which 
variables may be the best predictors of charging outcomes in capital cases.  That is, the 
addition of individual aggravating, mitigating, and on-statutory aggravating factors into the 
models may prove to be better predictors of charging decisions and may, in turn, reduce race 
effects cited in the preliminary results to statistically non-significance.  The final, adjusted 
estimates will be reported in Section D.269  
                                                
 268The significant finding of race of the victim effects were also noted in the Rand 
Corporation’s analysis of the federal death penalty system in 2006.  In that study, the 
regression coefficient cited in that study was .863 with a probability of .004.   
 
 269In addition to the logistic regression estimates, the final results will also include a 
Model Classification Table for each of the models which will include the percent of cases 
correctly classified by the model, which reflects the percentage of cases in which the model 
accurately predicted the decision to seek or not seek the death penalty; the percent of cases 
of cases correctly classified by chance, which reflects an assumption that the actual 
outcomes and predicted outcomes are independent; and, the proportion reduction in error 
relative to chance, which reflect the mount of error that is avoided by estimating the model 
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D.  Final Results – Adjusted Estimates 
1.  U.S. Attorney Charging Decisions 
 Although the preliminary results appeared to be consistent with previous death 
penalty studies which have cited the potential role of race in charging (and sentencing) 
outcomes, the unadjusted estimates fall short of properly explaining the exact nature of that 
relationship.  The purpose of the previous series of analyses was to examine whether any 
relationships existed between race and charging outcomes in the federal death penalty 
system.  The preliminary, unadjusted estimates produce  by the regression models, 
suggested the race of victim was statistically significant in its relationship to the decision to 
request the death penalty by federal prosecutors.  In order to provide a better explanation of 
the role of race on charging decisions, it was necessary to conduct a series of analyses which 
estimated the impact of separate aggravating and mitigating factors on charging outcomes 
with race variables included.270  The final, adjusted estimates were produced by a series of 
logistic regression analyses which included additional variables to provide a better 
explanation of the role of race in charging outcomes.  The final results will also report 
coefficients produced by a series of full regression m dels with a larger number of variables 
included as well as a number of reduced models which w ll limit the number of variables 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rather than relying on chance to predict the outcome (charging decisions).   
 
 270Typically, a number of case characteristics may be included into the analyses with 
race variables to estimate which variables are more likely to influence charging outcomes.  
However, in the federal system, prosecutors are required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that one of the death-eligible aggravating factors exi ts in a given case.  Therefore, rather 
than focus the large number of case characteristics, the present analyses focused on the 
extent to any of the aggravating circumstances influe ced charging outcomes.   
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included in those analyses.271  Finally, the final results will examine the role of race on 
charging decisions when the race of the defendants and victims are combined together into 
distinct groups. 
 Table 9 presents estimates from the full model which examined the effect of a 
number of individual aggravating and mitigating factors as well as other variables such as 
the race of the defendant, race of the victim, and the sex of the defendant while controlling 
for legally relevant case factors.272  Thus, the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors 
in each case may be able to explain race effects cited in a number of the initial analyses.  
That is, it is possible that once legally relevant f c ors are included, the role of race may 
disappear or be reduced to a statistically insignificant level.   
 As expected, the presence of a number of aggravating f ctors and non-statutory 
aggravating factors increased the likelihood that prosecutors would request the death 
penalty.  Defendants who previously were convicted for an offense where a life sentence or 
                                                
 271Given the concerns of overfitting the logistic regression models with a large 
number of variables relative to the number of cases in the pres nt sample, comparisons were 
made to examine differences between the estimates produced by the larger models and 
reduced (and more parsimonious) models.  Although there were over thirty variables under 
consideration to be included in the final analyses, a number were dropped due to missing 
data.  Eight of the fifteen aggravating factors were included in the analyses and three of the 
eight mitigating factors were included.  The remaining factors either were not found to have 
been present or had too many missing cases to be prop rly coded.  Other variables, which 
had sufficient cases, were dropped if they lacked substantive variable information necessary 
for the final make interpretations of the final estimates.      
 
 272The sex of the victim is typically added as a contrl variable in past death penalty 
studies.  In the present analysis, the variable contained missing data which resulted in a 
number of cases dropping out of the analysis.  Althoug  this variable was not included in the 
final analysis, it’s overall effect was examined in a series of models and found to be 
statistically insignificant and did not influence the strength or significance of the coefficients 
when included in a separate model and compared to the estimates produced by the final 
analyses.   
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death was an option were 6.47 times more likely to have the death penalty requested in their 
cases compared to those cases where that aggravating factor was not present.  Homicides 
committed during the distribution of illegal substances in violation of the Continuing 
Criminal Enterprise Act were found to be 4.07 times more likely to have the death penalty 
requested and homicides involving substantial planning and premeditation were 3.51 times 
more likely to have the death penalty requested relativ  to cases where that aggravating 
factor was not applicable.  Also, homicides involving heinous, cruel, or depraved behavior 
were 2.23 times more likely to result in the death being charged and homicides committed 
for payment were 2.62 times more likely to have the death penalty requested.273  The 
presence of non-statutory aggravating factors was also found to be statistically significant in 
the charging process.  Cases where any non-statutory agg avating factors were present were 
found to be 9.03 times more likely to have the death penalty requested compared to cases 
where no such factors were present.  The estimates also uggested that the prior record of 
the defendant or number of pending cases was not found to be very good predictors whether 
the death penalty was requested by the prosecutors.274  Also, the presence of one of three 
mitigating factors included in the model decreased th  likelihood that the death penalty 
                                                
 273Other aggravating factors were either moderately related to charging decisions 
made by prosecutors while others were found to be statistically insignificant. 
  
 274Because of the transparency in the federal charging process, compared to the 
charging processes at the state level, the weak reltionship between the prior record or 
pending cases against the defendant and final charging decisions may not be very surprising.  
In the federal system, prosecutors are required to emonstrate their ability to prove the 
presence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before their request for the 
death penalty is approved.  Therefore, other general case characteristics may not influence 
charging decisions compared to the statutory aggravating factors and non-statutory 
aggravating factors that are present in each capital case.     
 147
would be requested.  Cases involving equally culpable defendants were .23 times more 
likely to result in prosecutors not requesting the death penalty compared to cases where one 
defendant was more culpable than the other. 
 However, it is important to note that when the aggr vating and mitigating 
circumstances were considered in the model, the race of the victim continued to show a 
significant effect on charging outcomes.275  Cases involving white victims were 2.67 times 
more likely to have the death penalty requested than cases without white victims.  This 
finding is consistent with past studies which have cit d the race of the victim as a 
statistically significant factor on charging outcomes in capital cases.  Additionally, the race 
of the defendant was not found to be a statistically significant factor on the decision to 
request the death penalty in capital cases.  This finding is also consistent with a number of 
prior studies which have found that the race of the def ndant does not typically influence the 
charging decisions in capital cases.  The sex of the defendant, however, was significant and 
the estimates suggested male defendants were 5.48 times more likely to have the death 
penalty requested in their cases than female defendants.276  Finally, cases involving 
sympathetic victims were 2.16 times more likely to have the death penalty requested than 
cases without such victims present.277 
                                                
 275Unlike the aggravating and mitigating factors in the data set, a number of non-
statutory aggravating factors were coded in the initial data set with a large number of 
missing case per variable.  Therefore, the current analyses used the aggregate non-
aggravating factor variable instead of individual non-statutory aggravating factors.   
 
 276P<.10.  
 
 277This variable represented several types of victims including victims who defined 
as being good citizens, police officers, prison guards, non-criminals, or individuals 
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 At this point in the current study, there a number of findings that emerged in the 
analyses that are noteworthy.  First, the initial findings cited are consistent with assumptions 
that legally relevant factors typically determine whether the death penalty is requested by 
prosecutors in capital cases.  Second, neither the race of the defendant nor the sex of the 
defendant was found to be a statistically significant f ctor in the charging process.  Very few 
studies have found the defendant’s race to be significa t and gender bias would not 
necessarily be expected given the overwhelming involvement of males relative to females in 
death-eligible offenses.  However, past studies have consistently cited effects of the race of 
the victim on outcomes and capital cases and the curr nt findings, thus far, confirm these 
results at the state and federal levels. 
 Table 10 presents the estimates of the reduced model with a limited number of 
variables to examine and compare the estimates to those produced by the previous model 
which included a larger number of variables.  For example, all of the individual aggravating 
factors that were examined in the full model for their effects on charging outcomes were 
omitted from the reduced model and replaced with the aggregate aggravating factor variable.  
Similarly, the individual mitigating factors were omitted from the model and replaced with 
the aggregate mitigating factor variable.  The estimates produced by the reduced model were 
found to be consistent with the coefficients cited n Table 9.  Neither the prior record nor 
any pending cases against the defendant were found t be significant in the decision by 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
supporting other dependents. Victims defined by a separate variable as being vulnerable – 
under the age of 17, over the age of 60, pregnant, physically handicapped, or grossly 
undersized compared to the defendant – were not found to be statistically significant.  
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prosecutors to request the death penalty.  Similarly, the presence of aggravating factors, non-
statutory aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors all had a significant influence on 
whether or not the death penalty was requested.   
 The coefficients in the reduced model also indicated that cases with non-statutory 
aggravating factors present had the highest likelihood or having the death penalty requested.  
Defendants were found to by 5.96 times more likely to have the death penalty requested 
compared to cases where no such factors were present.  Also, prosecutors were 3.17 times 
more likely to request the death penalty in cases were any aggravating factors were present 
and .50 times less likely to request the death penalty if ny mitigating factors were present.  
Cases with victims deemed to be sympathetic were 1.83 times more likely to have the death 
penalty requested and cases with victims who were found to be vulnerable did not have a 
statistically significant influence on charging outcomes.  The remaining estimates in the 
analysis also yielded a number of findings that were consistent with those cited in the full 
model.  The estimates in the model produced results which suggested that neither the race 
nor sex of the defendant had a statistically significant influence on the decision by 
prosecutors to request the death penalty.  However, the ace of the victim continued to be 
statistically significant in the charging process.  That is, cases involving white victims were 
found to be 2.08 times more likely to result in requ sts by prosecutors to seek the death 
penalty that cases not involving white victims.   
 In order to examine the role of race on charging decisions further, a dummy variable 
was created to reflect an interaction between the rac of the defendant and the race of the 
victim.  Table 11 presents results which examined th influence of race when combinations 
of the race of the defendant and victim are considered together.  Past studies have suggested 
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that the differences in charging and sentencing rates can often be explained by the nature of 
the offense that occurs between the defendant and victim.  For example, if homicide cases 
involving black defendants and black victims are more likely to result from passion, such 
cases would not typically result in a request for the death penalty.  Alternatively, if homicide 
cases involving black defendants and white victims were more likely to involve 
premeditation and planning, such cases would have a higher likelihood of being charged as a 
death-eligible offense.  A number of pre-Furman studies which have focused on the 
interracial relationships between the offender and victim have found effects of the race of 
the offender and victim on whether a death sentence was imposed.  By comparing the race 
of both the offender and the victim, these studies found a higher likelihood of the death 
sentence resulting in cases where the offender was black and the victim was white.   In the 
present analysis, racial groups for defendants and victims were dichotomized into separate 
categories to examine race effects on charging decisions when the race of the defendant and 
victim are considered together.278  The present analysis will allow for the race of the
defendant and victim to be considered in combinatio while controlling for a number of 
legally relevant factors that may exist in their cases to explain charging outcomes.  In the 
present analysis, many of the results presented in the previous full model in Table 9 were 
found in the present analysis.  Neither the prior reco d nor any pending cases against the 
defendants were statistically significant and the vulnerability of the victim lack significance 
                                                
 278In the present analysis, the race of the defendants and victims were initially coded 
to reflect four separate defendant/victim racial group categories.  The four groups were then 
dichotomized into two separate comparison groups.  The first three groups - white 
defendant/non-white victim, non-white defendant/non-white victim, white defendant/white 
victim groups were coded 0 – and the final group - non-white defendant/white victims - 
were coded 1.  
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as well.  Additionally, the presence of aggravating factors and non-statutory aggravating 
factors were influential in charging outcomes.  Cases with any non-statutory aggravating 
factors present were 9.12 times more likely to have the death penalty requested than cases 
where those factors were not present.  Also, several of the aggravating factors increased the 
likelihood that the death penalty would requested compared to cases where those factors 
were not present.  Homicides committed during the distribution of illegal substances in 
violation of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act were found to be 3.57 times more likely 
to have the death penalty requested and homicides involvi g substantial planning and 
premeditation were 3.69 times more likely to have the death penalty requested relative to 
cases where that aggravating factor was not applicable.  Also, homicides involving heinous, 
cruel, or depraved behavior were 2.10 times more likely to result in the death being charged 
and homicides committed for payment were 2.71 times ore likely to have the death 
penalty requested.  The mitigating factors coefficients also yielded similar results.  
Additionally, the presence of mitigating factors decreased the likelihood of the death penalty 
being requested compared to cases where no such factors were present.  Cases involving 
equally culpable defendants were .22 times more likely to result in prosecutors not 
requesting the death penalty compared to cases where on  defendant was more culpable 
than the other.279  Finally, cases involving sympathetic victims were 2.16 times more likely 
to have the death penalty requested than cases without such victims present. 
 The analysis also produced a coefficient that showed a statistically significant 
relationship between the combination of the race of the defendant and victim on charging 
                                                
 279Two of the three mitigating factors were found to be statistically insignificant.  
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outcomes.  In this instance, cases involving non-white defendants and white victims were 
2.31 times more likely to have the death penalty requested, compared to cases involving 
white defendants/non-white victims, non-white defendants/non-white victims, or white 
defendants/white victims.  The reduced model estimates listed in Table 12 were fairly 
similar to the reduced model estimates that were previously cited in Table 10.  Neither the 
prior record nor any pending cases against the defenant were found to be significant in the 
decision by prosecutors to request the death penalty.  However, the presence of aggravating 
factors, non-statutory aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors all had a significant 
influence on whether or not the death penalty was requested.   The coefficients in the reduced 
model also indicated that cases with non-statutory aggravating factors present had the 
highest likelihood or having the death penalty requested.  Defendants were found to by 5.89 
times more likely to have the death penalty requested compared to cases where no such 
factors were present.  Also, prosecutors were 3.17 times more likely to request the death 
penalty in cases were any aggravating factors were pr sent and .52 times less likely to 
request the death penalty if any mitigating factors were present.  Cases with victims deemed 
to be sympathetic were 1.98 times more likely to have the death penalty requested and cases 
with victims who were found to be vulnerable did not have a statistically significant 
influence on charging outcomes.  The remaining estimates in the analysis also yielded a 
number of findings that were consistent with those cited in the full model.  The estimates in 
the model also produced results which suggested that sex of the defendant did not have a 
statistically significant influence on the decision by prosecutors to request the death penalty. 
Finally, the race of the victim and defendant in combination with each other no long showed 
a statistically significant effect on charging decisions by prosecutors.  Although the change 
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in the relationship across the full and reduced models is not completely clear, the change in 
the effect could have resulted the fact too few variables were included in the model to 
adequately explain the true nature of the relationship between the racial group combinations 
and charging outcomes.   
 Table 13 also presented a similar analysis of racial group combinations involving 
black defendant and white victim combinations.280 Many of the findings cited when several 
racial groups were analyzed in combinations were also found in the present model.  Similar 
to previous analyses discussed, the presence of aggrav ting factors continued to have a 
statistically significant influence on charging outcomes.  The presence of aggravating factors 
in cases where defendants were previously convicted of an offense where death or life 
imprisonment was an option and cases involving substantial planning and premeditation 
heavily influenced the charging decisions by prosecutors.  In those cases, prosecutors were 
10.19 and 5.07 times more likely to request the death penalty, respectively.  Prosecutors 
were also 3.66 times more likely to request the death penalty in cases committed for 
payment and 2.72 times more likely to request the death penalty if a homicide occurred 
during the commission of another crime.  Prosecutors were also .13 times less likely to 
request the death penalty if the defendant’s were equally culpable.281  The extent to which 
the victim was determined to be vulnerable or sympathetic also produced relationship to 
                                                
 280This analysis was conducted in a sub-sample of the overall sample and consisted 
of 450 cases.  Defendants who were Native American, Asian, Hispanic, or originally coded 
as “other” were removed from the analysis. In this analysis, cases involving white 
defendants/black victims, white defendants/white victims, black defendants/black victims, 
were compared to cases involving black defendants and white victims. 
 
 281Two of the three mitigating factors were statistically insignificant and the third 
factor was weakly related to the decisions by prosecutors to request the death penalty.  
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charging decisions that were previously discussed.  Although the vulnerability of the victim 
was not found to be statistically significant, prosecutors were 3.10 times more likely to 
request the death penalty in cases where the victim might draw more sympathy compared to 
cases without such victims.  Finally, the model produced a race effect coefficient similar to 
the one previously discussed.  When the three racial groups were compared to cases 
involving black defendants and white victims, prosecutors were 2.22 times more likely to 
request the death penalty for cases involving black defendants and white victims compared 
to cases where that racial combination of defendants d victims were not present.282   
Similar to the estimates presented in Table 12, the reduced model estimates listed in Table 
14 produced similar results when considering the role of the race of the defendant and 
victim in combination with each other on charging outc mes: the race of the victim and 
defendant in combination with each other no longer showed a statistically significant effect 
on charging decisions by prosecutors.  Instead, legally relevant case characteristics emerged 
as having the strongest relationship on charging decisions in capital cases.  Prosecutors were 
13.81 times more likely to request the death penalty if several non-statutory aggravating 
factors were present and 3.50 times more likely to request the death penalty if any of the 
applicable statutory aggravating factors were present in a given case.  Additionally, 
prosecutors were 1.78 times more likely to request the death penalty if other cases were 
pending against the defendant and 2.79 times more likely to request the death penalty if the 
cases involved the killing of a sympathetic victim.  The final analysis discussed below will 
examine the final charging decisions made the Attorney General. 
                                                
 282 P <.10.  
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  2.  Attorney General Charging Decisions 
 
 The final analysis was conducted to examine the final charging decisions of the 
Attorney General in federal capital cases.  Since ra ial characteristics have all but been 
removed from the case files by the time that the Attorney General makes a final 
determination regarding whether he or she will seek th  death penalty in a federal case, it 
may not make the most sense to look at charging decisions at this phase in the process.  The 
Attorney General, in most instances, will not have ny information on race in the case under 
consideration.283  However, the initial statistical data conducted by the Department of 
Justice noted that the agreement in charging requests by the U.S. Attorneys and final 
approval by the Attorney General was 88%.  That is, the U.S. Attorneys and Attorney 
General agreed on decisions to seek the death penalty 88% of the time.  Thus, the final 
decision by the Attorney General may simply reflect the initial charging requests made by 
the U.S. Attorneys given the high rate of agreement b tween the two parties.  If this is the 
case, race effects on charging decision found at both decision making points may question 
the overall value of removing information on race from the case files during the charging 
process.  In the present analysis, Table 15 presents coefficient estimates which yielded 
similar findings as those cited in the prior analyses.  The race of the victim continued to 
indicate a statistically significant influence on fial charging outcomes overall for the 
sample of cases reviewed.  Cases involving white victims are 2.12 times more likely to have 
the death penalty approved be the Attorney General compared to cases where the victim is 
                                                
 283Racial characteristics may be cited in the file rega ding an organization such as 
the “Latin Kings”, the “Black Guerilla Family”, or the “Aryan Nation”.  However, all 
references with respect to the race of the defendant or victim have been removed from the 
case file by the time it is reviewed by the Attorney General.  
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not white.  Again, the point is not that the Attorney General is making charging decisions 
based on the race of the victim in each case.  Clearly, the Attorney General does not have 
access to this information.  However, if race effects are found at the stage when the death 
penalty is requested by the U.S. Attorneys and there is a high rate of agreement U.S. 
Attorneys and the Attorney General, the intervening processes geared towards making the 
final charging decisions “race-blind” by removing race characteristics may not matter in the 
charging process.284   
 It is also important to note that many of the factors hat influenced the charging 
requests by the U.S. Attorneys also found to be statistic lly significant predictors in the 
Attorney General’s final decisions to approve the death penalty in the applicable cases.  The 
overall prior record or presence of any pending cases did not influence the final charging 
decisions, but the presence of non-statutory aggravating factors continued to have a 
statistically significant influence in the charging process.  Cases were non-statutory 
aggravating factors were present were 16.30 times more likely to have the request for the 
death penalty approved compared to cases where thos factors were absent.  The present of 
mitigating factors decreased the likelihood that the death penalty would be approved and a 
presence of a number of aggravating factors increased the likelihood that the death penalty 
would be approved by the Attorney General.  Cases with sympathetic victims were also 
more likely to result in the death being charged, but cases with victims found to be 
vulnerable were not found to have an effect on the final charging decisions. 
                                                
 284The race of the defendant, as noted in a number of the previously discussed 
analyses, was not found to be a statistically significant factor in the final approval the 
Attorney General to seek the death penalty.  
 157
 Although the findings in the full models produced r sults that were consistent with 
past death penalties which examined the race effects in apital cases, a few limitations of the 
study, which will be discussed below, must be addressed. 
 
A. Study limitations 
 Overall, the findings cited above are consistent with a number of prior death penalty 
studies that were reviewed in Chapter II.  Consistent with the majority of previous post-
Furman death penalty research, two of the findings cited above regarding the role of race on 
charging decisions are noteworthy.  First, the current study, using logistic regression 
procedures, examined the race of the defendant in the charging process in the federal death 
penalty system and found no statistically significant relationship between the defendant’s 
race and the decision by the federal prosecutors to request the death penalty.  Second, when 
the race of the victim was analyzed, cases involving white victims were found to be over 2 
times more likely to have the death penalty requested compared to cases where no white 
victims were present.  However, two issues related to the study must be addressed:  the use 
of logistic regression approaches and sample selection bias.  Both issues will be addressed 
below. 
1. Logistic regression and the death penalty  
    
 Despite the overall sophistication and improvements in death penalty studies over 
time, recent questions have been raised as to whether multivariate analyses used in such 
studies are the appropriate method for examining the role of race on charging and 
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sentencing outcomes.285  To date, a number of re-analyses of data sets in several state 
jurisdictions where race effects have been found have used alternate statistical approaches 
and have found no significant relationships between race and charging or sentencing 
outcomes.  In explaining the discrepancies between studie  employing multivariate analyses 
and other alternative approaches, critics have suggested that race variables cannot be 
employed in a statistical analysis in a similar fashion as a treatment variable.  Thus, the use 
of race in a causal model consists of a violation of the assumption the model that each 
predictor can be manipulated independently of all other predictors.  It is argued, instead, that 
race cannot be manipulated which makes it impossible to assess the true relationship 
between those variables and charging outcomes.   
 Critics have also pointed to the potential limitations of regression diagnostics, such 
as model classification tables, which are typically used to assess the predictive ability of the 
regression model.  Specifically, it is argued that e improvement of a model’s ability to 
correctly predict outcomes over chance is often margin l at best.  This is a valid point.  In 
the present study, a review of several of the model classification tables produced by the full 
regression models showed an average improvement of 7.5% in the ability of the model to 
accurately predict charging outcomes over chance.  Given the marginal contribution of the 
predictive ability of the model to accurately predict outcomes compared to that of the 
baseline model, it is argued that such a model may isclassify cases where the death penalty 
is requested compared to cases where the death penalty is not requested.   
                                                
 285Berk, R., A. Li, and L. Hickman (2005).  Statistical Difficulties in Determining 
the Role of Race in Capital Cases:  A Re-analysis of Data from the State of Maryland.  
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 21, 365-390.  
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 It should be noted, however, that the model classification tables are only one of a 
number of diagnostics used in logistic regression analyses.  In the present study, several 
individual analyses produced fairly strong coefficients of the race of the victim which 
suggested a statistically significant relationship to charging decisions made by prosecutors in 
capital cases in the federal system.  Additionally, the coefficients were considered with an 
odds multiplier which indicated a higher risk for cases to have the death penalty requested in 
cases where the victims were white.  Although the focus of the current study was not to 
settle this question, the use of logistic regression analyses as an analytical approach to 
address issues regarding the role of race on charging and sentencing outcomes will likely 
present challenges to researchers and the findings produced by death penalty studies in the 
future. 
2.  Sample Selection Bias 
 Although the finding of a statistically significant relationship between the race of 
victim and charging decisions was found in the analyses and previously discussed, the 
problem of sample selection bias can make interpretations of race effects difficult.  This 
problem can be understood by first examining the process of how cases begin at the arrest 
stage and end at the charging stage.  The criminal justice system is composed of several 
autonomous organizations which make different decisions along the process involving 
decisions related to making an arrest, accepting a case for prosecution, declining a case for 
prosecution, seeking a specific case indictment, or seeking a charge and penalty for a given 
offense.  The result of these various decision making points ultimately influence the number 
of cases analyzed at the charging phase (or other phases) in the process.   
 The present analysis presents a good example of this problem since a number of 
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cases likely dropped out at earlier stages in the process because of the discretion afforded to 
the U.S. Attorneys in making determinations of whether or not to accept cases for 
prosecution and, ultimately, whether or not to seek th  death penalty.  For example, O’Neill 
examined charging decisions by U.S. Attorneys to assess which factors were more likely to 
predict why prosecutors select certain cases for prosecution and disregard others.286  He 
found that charging decisions are based on a number of factors including pressures from 
communities in the U.S. Attorney’s respective district, the size of the district, staffing levels 
in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, existing resources, or the relationships that the U.S. 
Attorney’s have with the federal law enforcement agencies in their districts.  Thus, the 
universe of death-eligible federal cases in the present analysis represents a non-random sub-
sample of a larger number of cases where prior decisions were made whether or not to 
arrest, accept the case for prosecution, and seek an indictment or to charge the defendant 
with a death-eligible offense.  Berk287 suggests that the non-random exclusion of these cases 
presents a problem to the internal and external validity of the analysis.  By examining the 
effect of race at the charging stage, the internal validity of the analysis is threatened by the 
exclusion of the larger number of cases in the population.  This exclusion of cases may lead 
to causal interpretations that are actually the result of the random nature of the cases 
included in the analysis rather than an actual relationship between the race of the victim and 
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the charging outcome (i.e., whether or not to seek th  death penalty).  Bishop and Frazier288 
noted that bias created from the excluded or missing data may actually mask racial 
disparities in sentencing since single-stage analyses cannot account for the effect of race on 
earlier decisions in the legal process (i.e., the decision to arrest or indict).  Also, single-stage 
analyses cannot assess the impact of race on earlier decisions where a small or no significant 
effect at any one stage in the process may produce a large cumulative effect at later stages in 
the legal process.289   
 Sample selection bias can be addressed in two ways.  One way to add the problem 
would be to confirm that a high rate of cases were included in the sample of cases.  If this 
determination can be made, the problem of sample selection bias can be reasonably ignored.  
Unfortunately, there is no way for the present study to confirm whether the present sample 
of case represents all but a few death-eligible cass in the federal system.  The second 
approach might be to examine earlier stages in the criminal justice process that precedes the 
stage being analyzed.  The approach suggests that race effects on decisions at earlier stages 
in the process may mask or partial mask race effects at later stages in the process.  However, 
the aforementioned problems contained in studies addressing the issue of racial disparity in 
charging outcomes do not invalidate the previous findings, but make it necessary for 
additional research and proper controls in order to make valid inferences.  Implications for 
this study will be discussed in the Chapter V.     
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Summary and Conclusions 
      A.   The Role of Race and the Death Penalty  
    In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, struck down the 
existing death sentencing statutes at that time becaus  of a lack of guidelines deemed 
necessary to structure the decision making process of judges and juries in imposing the 
death penalty in capital cases.  The Court believed that the absence of such guidelines 
increased the possibility that suspect factors suchas race could enter into the sentencing 
process.  Although the majority decision consisted of five separate opinions, the common 
theme that resonated in the Furman decision involved the concern that the system in place at 
that time could subject defendants to potential risk in capital cases. 
 Justice Douglas suggested the death penalty could be considered “unusual” if it 
discriminated against a defendant because of his race, wealth, religion, social position, or 
class.  He also noted that any system that operated under procedures that allowed such 
prejudices to result in the imposition of the death penalty would be inconsistent with the 
principles of the 8th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  Drawing upon a study 
of capital cases in the State of Texas, Justice Douglas noted what he referred to as ethnic 
disparities related to the manner in which black and white defendants were sentenced from 
1924 to 1968.  Specifically, he found that the death penalty was unequally imposed on 
“poor, young, and ignorant” and that black defendants, and black co-defendants who were 
given separate trials, were more likely to receive the death penalty than their white 
counterparts.  While reserving comment on the culpability of the defendants or the 
appropriateness of the punishment in the cases before the Court, Justice Douglas noted that 
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the Court’s scrutiny was not restricted to the individual cases, but also to the system that 
gave judges and juries the uncontrolled discretion to determine who should be sentenced to 
death or life imprisonment.  In his view, sentencing statutes that allowed such discretion 
were unconstitutional, were “pregnant with discriminat on” and ran contrary to the Cruel 
and Unusual Clause under the 8th Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause under the 
14th Amendment.290   
 Justice Brennan also addressed the notion of that a system that subjected some to the 
risk of the death penalty over others could not be constitutionally permissible.  Although he 
took the position that the death penalty was unconstitutional on all instances, he noted that 
any system that inflicted the death penalty on some people and not on others failed to show 
a basic respect for human dignity.  To buttress his argument, Justice Brennan noted a steady 
decline in the imposition of the death penalty from 1930 to 1971.  Given the reductions in 
executions over time, Justice Brennan concluded that one could draw an inference from the 
data that the death penalty was not being applied regularly or fairly and that the death 
penalty system smacked of little more than a lottery system.291  Justice Brennan also 
expressed concern that state sentencing procedures we  not constructed with safeguards 
against capriciousness and questioned whether the system in place at the time operated in a 
way that the “worst of the worst” were being sentenced to death. 
 Justice Stewart, like Justice Brennan, withheld comment on the guilt of the 
petitioners or the appropriateness of the punishment.  Instead, he emphasized that the death 
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penalty was different from all other forms of punishment because of its irrevocability.  
Because of this view of the death penalty, Justice Stewart expressed concern that the system 
in place at that time was cruel in the sense that i allowed the imposition of sentences of 
death that went beyond the intent of the legislatures and unusual in the sense that it allowed 
death sentences to be infrequently imposed for the crime of murder.  Justice Stewart also 
suggested that the sentence of death was imposed in a ma ner similar to being “struck by 
lightning, which he also found cruel and unusual.  In his opinion, he concluded that the 
Constitution could not allow such a legal system to operate so wantonly and freakishly.292 
 Justice White’s assessment of the cases before the Court also drew upon notions of 
fairness and the manner in which the death penalty w s imposed.  In his view, the death 
penalty was imposed with such a level of infrequency that the odds at the time were stacked 
against murderers and rapist receiving that punishment.  Because of this infrequency, there 
was, in his opinion, no “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [the 
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it s not.”293  Thus, he concluded 
the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual p nishment had been violated by 
the level of discretion given to sentencing authoriies such as juries, which called into 
question how decisions of punishment were determined. 
 Finally, Justice Marshall who, like Justice Brenna, found the death penalty to be 
constitutionally impermissible in all instances noted he guilt and reprehensible behavior of 
the defendants in the cases before the Court.  However, he also noted that not only were the 
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lives of the three defendants before the Court at stake, be so were the approximately 600 
defendants on death row at that time.  Justice Marshall’  opinion drew upon notions of 
fairness by noting higher execution rates for blacks defendants for murder and rape 
compared to white defendants.  In view of the differential rate in sentencing outcomes, 
Justice Marshall concluded that unstructured discretion given to juries to decide who lived 
or died was a recipe for discrimination. 
 The importance of the majority’s opinions in Furman may be viewed in terms of 
focus that the Court took in the death penalty cases during this period.  The Court’s concern 
at the time focused on the manner in which the system imposed penalties which it found to 
be potentially problematic and contrary to the 8th and 14th Amendments.  The Court also 
expressed concern that the system operated in a way that certain groups of defendants could 
be at a higher risk to receive the death penalty than other groups of defendants.  While 
conceding the probable guilt of the defendants, the Court focused its scrutiny on the overall 
death penalty system instead of attempting to ascertain whether the defendant’s in the cases 
before them were victims of discriminatory sentencing practices.  Without evidence to 
support the claims of discrimination in the individual cases, the Court raised the possibility 
that discrimination could have played a part in the process due to the unstructured discretion 
that given to juries in capital cases.  Because of this level of discretion, the Court would 
strike down existing death penalty statutes across the nation and states, wising to retain the 
death penalty in their respective jurisdictions, were r quired to revise their statutes to 
address the Court’s concerns in Furman.    
 The Court would re-examine the nature of discretion, fairness and the death penalty 
four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.  Specifically, the Gregg Court would ultimately 
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determine whether new statutory revisions to death sentencing schemes in Georgia, Florida, 
and Texas were consistent with the 8th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution.  
Recognizing the Furman Court’s concerns that discretion should be directed and limited to 
minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing, the revised statues offered promise 
over the former schemes that were struck down in Furman by structuring the discretion of 
the judges and juries in capital cases.  The newly created sentencing schemes included a 
number of statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances that were required 
to be found beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the imposition of the death penalty by 
sentencing authorities.  It was believed at the tim that the new death penalty statutes would 
adequately structure the discretion of the judges and juries, add a level of transparency to the 
appellate review process, and reduce the threat of discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious 
decision making practices.  The Gregg Court, without evidence to the contrary, concluded 
that the new procedures appeared to satisfy the concerns of the Furman Court. 
 Although the new statutes structured the discretion of judges and juries in capital 
cases, the uncontrolled discretion of prosecutors was not addressed by the Court.  The 
petitioner in Gregg suggested that many of the revisions to the new death penalty statutes 
were simply cosmetic and the failure of the statutes to address the discretion of the 
prosecutor would not adequately address concerns of di criminatory, arbitrary, or capricious 
decision making in capital cases.  However, the Court stopped short of requiring the 
discretion prosecutors to be structured in the same manner as that of judges and juries.  In 
fact, the Court believed that concerns that prosecutors would abuse their discretionary power 
were unsupported by any facts.  Additionally, the Court would conclude that the assumption 
could not be made that prosecutors were motivated in their charging decisions by any other 
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factors than the strength of their respective cases in pursuing the death penalty.  Thus, the 
Court, in absence of evidence that prosecutors wereincompetent in their charging decisions, 
were satisfied that the limitless discretion afforded to prosecutors was within the permissible 
boundaries of the Constitution.  Accordingly, the Gregg Court ruled that the new death 
penalty procedures were sufficient to address the concerns of the Furman Court. 
 However, since the Court's landmark decisions in 1976, a body of evidence has 
surfaced which has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the new sentencing guidelines to 
reduce, among other things, the influence of race on the sentencing disposition in capital 
cases.  Several studies conducted after the Court's ruling in Gregg v. Georgia and the 
companion cases have consistently found racial disparities in their analyses which examined 
the role of race on charging and sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  Specifically, the race 
of the victim on charging and sentencing outcomes has been consistently cited in studies 
where legal factors in each case such as the number of aggravating circumstances proven 
were properly accounted for in the respective analyses.   
      In 1987, after considering the argument that an emerging new body of evidence 
seemed to question the Court's prior belief that the role of race in sentencing would be 
reduced to constitutionally permissible levels by the new sentencing guidelines, the Court 
rejected 8th and 14th Amendment arguments in McCleskey v. Kemp, and upheld the 
constitutionality of the present death sentencing statutes.  In rejecting statistical evidence of 
racial discrimination submitted by the petitioner, the Court held that the nature of the capital 
sentencing system was fundamentally different when considering statistical data which 
attempted to establish racially discriminatory practices.  In such cases, the data, to pass the 
scrutiny of the Court, was required to present a “strk” pattern to be accepted as proof of 
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racial discrimination in a particular case.  More importantly, the uniqueness of capital cases, 
in the Court’s opinion, required that exceptionally cear proof had to be established by the 
statistical data submitted to the Court that discretion, which was held to be a necessity by the 
Court, had been abused by prosecutors, judges, or juries.  Thus, given the number of 
safeguards contained in the Georgia death sentencing statute to reduce the taint of racial bias 
in sentencing, a defendant alleging equal protection vi lations had to demonstrate that 
“purposeful discrimination” existed in his or her case and that the death sentencing statutes 
were enacted by the state legislature in anticipation of a discriminatory effect on certain 
racial groups of defendants.  
 The Court would rule that the Baldus study, which was offered as proof of 
discrimination in the Georgia death penalty system, failed to prove that the state’s capital 
sentencing statute was implemented with a “discriminatory purpose”.  Although the Baldus 
data introduced evidence to the Court which suggested that defendants who killed white 
victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a sentence of death than defendants whose 
victims were black, the Court rejected the study for its failure to demonstrate the existence 
of racial bias in the petitioner’s specific case.  In the view of the Court, such a purpose could 
be demonstrated if the evidence established that the state legislature selected and enacted a 
particular statute with the knowledge that it would have an adverse effect on an “identifiable 
group”.294  Thus, for a claim of racial discrimination to prevail, McCleskey had to 
demonstrate that the death penalty statute was administered with prior knowledge by the 
State of Georgia that it would have racially discriminatory effect.    
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 Although the Court would concede that disparities in Georgia sentencing statute 
were an inevitable part of the criminal justice system, it believed that the disparities 
demonstrated by the Baldus study were insufficient to indicate a "constitutionally 
unacceptable risk of racial prejudice in the capital sentencing decisions”.295  Additionally, 
the Court ruled that the sophisticated analysis submitted by the Baldus study merely 
demonstrated  a “risk” that race could have entered into some of the capital sentencing 
outcomes in the state of Georgia.   Thus, in light of the fact that the Court noted that certain 
discrepancies cited in the statistical evidence that appeared to correlate with race could not 
be fully explained, they declined to "assume that what as unexplained was invidious”.296   
 By upholding the constitutionality of the existing statutes, the Court established the 
standard that any claims of discrimination on the part of the defendant involving his or her 
sentence of death had to be supported by a showing that lawmakers adopted death penalty 
legislation because of prior knowledge that the use of such legislation would lead to a 
discriminatory outcome in his particular case.  Additionally, the petitioner in a given death 
penalty case would bear the responsibility of demonstrating that his race or that of his victim 
was the primary reason for the imposition of his death sentence. 
 This decision by the Court would represent a significant shift in the Court’s guiding 
philosophy in death penalty cases where racial discrimination was raised as a constitutional 
claim.  Thus, instead of the approach taken by the Furman Court which attacked the system 
as well as the manner in which the sentence of death w s imposed in capital cases, the Court 
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in McCleskey took a more case-by-case approach in its ruling.  
 Although the McCleskey Court’s definition of how “risk” in capital cases before the 
Court would considered represented a departure from the Furman Court, the dissent 
suggested the majority appeared to provide an opinion that appear to wobble somewhat on 
its view of the role of the Court’s responsibilities in considering equal protection violations.  
In a critique of the majority’s decision, Justice Brennan noted that the Furman Court held 
that the Constitution prevented the death penalty from being imposed under a set of 
sentencing procedures that created “substantial risk” that the punishment could be inflicted 
in a arbitrary or capricious manner.  By focusing o the death penalty procedures, the 
Furman Court recognized the difficulty in attempting to uncover the jury’s motives in an 
individual case and believed that the Court’s respon ibility was to evaluate the system as a 
whole in making the determination that it operated in a rational manner.  Justice Brennan, in 
drawing upon the Court’s history, noted that defendants who challenged their death 
sentences were never required to prove that suspect considerations entered into their 
particular sentencing outcomes.  Instead, the Court required defendants to demonstrate that 
the risk of racial prejudice played a role in the death sentencing system.  In view of this 
standard, the Baldus study, in Justice Brennan’s opinion, was sufficient to establish a level 
of risk of racial consideration in his case. 
 Justice Brennan also suggested that the value of the Baldus study, which provided 
evidence of racial bias, also had to be considered with Georgia’s legacy of racial 
discrimination and human experience.  In his view, history demonstrated Georgia’s 
longstanding dual system which distinguished crimes that were committed by and against 
blacks and whites.  The system, which was created during the Civil War period, punished 
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blacks more harshly that whites for the commission of similar offenses and showed whites 
leniency on cases involving black victims.  Justice Br nnan also noted that the Court had 
struck down Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme three times over a fifteen year period.  In 
addition to his reference to Georgia’s history of racial animus towards blacks, Justice 
Brennan noted that the discretion afforded to juries and prosecutors presented an opportunity 
for race to enter into the decisions made at various points in the process.  Also, he charged 
that the results of the study called into question whether the statutory safeguards approved 
by the Gregg Court were sufficiently reliable to accomplish its s ated goals.  
 In his rebuke of the majority’s decision in McClesk y, Justice Blackmun also 
expressed disappointment in the Court’s decision, which e believe represented a movement 
away from the necessary level of judicial scrutiny that was required in capital cases where 
equal protection claims were raised.  In his opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court, 
from a historical standpoint, had never placed an otherwise legitimate basis for a conviction 
before an equal protection violation.  However, he noted that the Court’s decision in 
McCleskey’s case appeared to suggest that legitimate explanations in his case outweighed 
his claim that his death sentence reflected a constitutionally impermissible risk of racial 
discrimination.297 One particularly interesting question that was raied Justice Blackmun 
involved the constitutional threshold at which disparities became unacceptable.  In 
answering this question, Justice Blackmun examined various decision making points in the 
Georgia death sentencing scheme.  First, he noted that the Baldus study found that the 
killing of a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to result in a death sentence.  This 
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finding, in his opinion, was very compelling and lehim to question whether this factor 
outweighed McCleskey’s culpability and increased the likelihood of his sentence.  Justice 
Blackmun also noted the role of the prosecutor in determining whether or not to seek the 
death penalty.  It was at this decision making point in the Georgia death penalty system that 
Justice Blackmun cited the unstructured discretion afforded to state prosecutors which he 
believed to invitation for abuse in decision making.  Justice Blackmun pointed to 
McCleskey’s contention that the District Attorney’s Office lacked guidelines for the state’s 
assistant district attorneys to assist them in making decisions such as when to seek an 
indictment for murder as opposed to other charges, when to accept a guilty plea to murder, 
when to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, whn to reduce or dismiss charges, or when 
the death penalty should be sought.  Additionally, McCleskey pointed to the fact that very 
little formal oversight existed to examine how the assistant district attorneys reached their 
charging decisions.  It was the lack of guidelines that, according to the dissent, could result 
in decisions being made in capital cases that could run contrary to the 8th and 14th 
Amendments. 
 The majority would make a final ruling on McCleskey’s claims that seemed to send 
a mixed message to potential petitioners in capital cases seeking relief before the Court.  
Using a rationale that drew concerns from the dissenting Justices, the majority also appeared 
to shift away from the Furman Court’s “death is different” philosophy that defined the 
Court’s responsibility to evaluate how death penalty systems were administered.  The 
McCleskey  majority, in recognizing that the 8th Amendment was not solely tied to the death 
penalty, but to lesser penalties as well, expressed concern the upholding McCleskey’s 
claims would open the door to claims from other groups.  That is, the Court expressed 
 173
concern that unexplained discrepancies such as those pr duced in the Baldus study, could be 
used by other minority groups as a blueprint to use statistical data to attack discrepancies in 
other areas of the criminal justice system.  Thus, the Court reasoned that future claims could 
extend beyond race or gender and could include other arbitrary factors such as the 
defendant’s facial characteristics or physical attractiveness.  Based, in part on these 
concerns, the McCleskey Court concluded that the best solution for the defndant’s claims 
would be to present his equal protection claims of racial discrimination to the applicable 
legislative bodies that, in the opinion of the Court, were responsible for determining the 
appropriate punishment for criminal offenses. 
 
B. From Furman to McCleskey:  The Role of Death Penalty Research 
   
 When the road from Furman to McCleskey is navigated, there are a number of issues 
the illustrate the past, present, and future of death penalty research as it applies to 
examinations of the role of race in charging and sentencing decisions.  First, at the time that 
the Furman v. Georgia was decided, there were no structured sentencing guidelines in place 
to assist judges and juries in capital cases in determining who should live and who should 
die.  At the same time, the Court operated by a “death is different” philosophy which placed 
an emphasis on the Court’s responsibility to scrutinize the manner in which a death penalty 
system operated to ensure that suspect factor such a  race did not influence for final 
decisions in capital cases.  However, the overall qu ity of research at that time criticized as 
being incapable to provide useful conclusions regarding the effects of race on charging and 
sentencing outcomes. 
 Critics pointed to the fact that many of the pre-Furman studies were characterized 
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by poor or limited methodological approaches which made it difficult to draw conclusions 
of the effect of race on charging or sentencing outcomes.  For example, many of the studies 
failed to control for key legal variables such as the prior criminal record of the offender or 
included very crude measures of the defendant’s prior record. Additionally, many of the 
studies that examined the role of offender/victim relationships on sentencing outcomes 
failed to consider the prior record of the offender or produced findings that were called into 
question by a series of later studies. 
 After the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, key revisions were made a number 
of death sentencing statues and the Court was satisfied that the revisions would adequately 
address the concerns of the Furman Court.  That is, the Court expressed confidence that the 
death penalty statutes would reduce the risk of arbitr y, capricious, and discriminatory 
decision making in capital cases to constitutionally cceptable level.  However, as 
improvements were made in the methodological designs of a number of death penalty 
studies and additional variables were collected for analysis, several of the studies that were 
conducted after the Gregg indicated a continued pattern of racial disparities at several stages 
in the death penalty process after the Furman decision and the post-Gregg statutory 
revisions to a number of death penalty statutes.  The race effects that were assumed by the 
Gregg Court to have been reduced to insignificant level or eliminated continued to 
demonstrate significant influences on charging and sentencing outcomes.  Specifically, 
cases involving white victims were found to have a higher likelihood of being charged or 
sentenced in death penalty cases.   
 By the time that McCleskey was decided, two equally important developments 
occurred.  First, the Court’s “death is different” philosophy which was a key characteristic 
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of the Furman Court’s emphasis of the need for constitutional scrutiny of death sentencing 
schemes to determine whether they subjected certain groups to a higher risk of being 
sentenced to death relative to other groups began to shif  over time.  The McCleskey Court 
would hold petitioners to a different standard thate Furman Court.  By 1987, any 
petitioners who sought to raise 8th and 14th Amendment claims based on racial 
discrimination were required to show purposeful discrimination in his or her specific case.  
The Court also appeared to take a strict stance on how statistical data submitted to the Court 
in support of a petitioner’s claim of racial discrimination would be viewed.  Absent a 
showing of a “stark pattern” or “purposeful discrimination” on the part of a legislative body, 
the Court likely rule that the statistical data submitted insufficient to demonstrate that race 
influenced sentencing outcomes in capital cases.  Such a ruling might be expected to have 
significant implications for the future of death penalty research which focused on the role of 
race in such cases. 
 
       C.   The Federal Death Penalty System & Study Findings 
 At the time that the federal death penalty system was put into operation, it included 
many of the procedural protections approved by the Gregg decision.  Death penalty cases in 
the federal system were subjected to a separate, bifurcated hearing and prosecutors were 
required to provide written notice to defendants of their intent to seek the death penalty 
within a reasonable time before the trial proceeding.  Additionally, Federal prosecutors were 
also required to specify which statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances they 
intended to prove at trial and are limited to those identified circumstances unless amended 
and approved by the court and defendants were afforded two defense lawyers in their capital 
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cases.  Finally, an appeals process was put into place to determine, among other things, 
whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influ nce of passion, prejudice, or any 
other arbitrary factor.  
 Despite the substantive and procedural changes, however, concerns of racial bias 
were also raised by opponents of the federal death penalty system when, initial statistics 
collected and analyzed in September 2000 showed ethnic and racial disparities in charging 
decisions made by the U.S. Attorneys across the United S ates.  Specifically, the report 
found that of the 682 cases submitted for review to the U.S. Department of Justice between 
1995 and 2000, 20% involved White defendants, 48% involved Black defendants, and 29% 
involved Hispanic defendants.  Although the Attorney General at that time did not believe 
that the statistics presented established racial or ethnic bias in the charging process, a 
moratorium on the federal death penalty was declared pending a more rigorous analysis.  Of 
particular importance was the need for the future studies to examine, (1) whether the 
evidence and the law justified the decisions in all c ses to seek the death penalty, and (2) 
whether the studies show disparities, as opposed to bias, which could result from 
consideration of suspect factors such as race. 
 The current study was conducted to examine the role of race in charging decision 
made by the U.S. Attorneys across the 94 federal districts in the U.S.298  A number of 
models were conducted to examine the effect of a number of individual aggravating and 
mitigating factors as well as other variables such as the race of the defendant, race of the 
                                                
 298Although descriptive statistics were provided in Chapter III which included 
information related to the different regions contaiing the 94 Federal Districts, the current 
study could not examine charging outcomes by region because that information was stripped 
from the original data set because of privacy concerns.  
 177
victim, and the sex of the defendant.  These models w re significant since they attempted to 
control for legal factors relevant to each case while examining the role of race on charging 
outcomes in capital cases.  Thus, the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors in each 
case could have adequately explained the unadjusted rac  effects cited in a number of the 
initial analyses.  That is, it is possible that once legally relevant factors were included, the 
role or race could have disappeared or been reduced to statistical insignificance.   
 As expected, the presence of a number of aggravating f ctors and non-statutory 
aggravating factors increased the likelihood that prosecutors would request the death 
penalty.  The presence of a number of aggravating factors and non-statutory aggravating 
factors were found to increase the likelihood that federal prosecutors would request the 
death penalty compared to cases where those factors were absent.   
 The analyses also suggested that the presence of non-statutory aggravating factors 
were more likely to result in requests for the death penalty than the presence of aggravating 
factors. Not unexpectedly, the presence of mitigating factors decreased the likelihood that 
the death penalty would be requested.  The study also found that neither the race of the 
defendant nor the sex of the defendant was found to be a statistically significant factor in the 
charging process.  Neither of these findings was surpri ing since very few studies have 
found the defendant’s race to be significant and gender bias would not be expected given the 
overwhelming involvement of males in death-eligible offenses. 
 Equally important were the findings related to the relationship between the race of 
the victim and charging decisions made the U.S. Attorneys.  A number of models were 
conducted to examine various aspects of the role that race may play in charging decisions.  
In the first model, the race of the victim was analyzed.  Two subsequent models examined 
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the role of the race of the defendant and victim in combination with each other to determine 
what, if any, relationship that combination may have had on charging outcomes.  In the first 
model, cases involving white victims were over 2 times more likely to result in the death 
penalty being requested compared to cases where no white victims were present.  In the 
second model, cases involving non-white defendants and white victims were over 2 times 
more likely to have the death penalty requested than t e other three groups that combined 
the race of the defendant and the race of the victim together.  The third analysis, which 
looked at black and white defendants and victims, found the cases involving black 
defendants and white victims were over 2 times more likely to have the death penalty 
requested compared to the three other racial combination groups.  
 The findings listed above are consistent with several past studies at the state level 
which have examined the role of race on charging and sentencing outcomes.  In each model, 
a number of legally relevant factors (aggravating factors, mitigating factors, and non-
statutory aggravating factor) were analyzed along with other case characteristics, as well as 
a number of variables related to the race of the victim and the defendant.  Given the nature 
of the findings, there are a number of implications i  terms of contributions that can be 
made to the field and a number of future directions that this type of research can explore.  
These will be discussed below.   
1. Implications 
 Although the findings previously discussed appeared to confirm prior findings of 
studies at the state level, the present study did not settle the issue related to the role that race 
may play in charging decisions.  However, the findings suggest there are a number of 
implications that this study may have for the field. 
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a. Systematic Data Collection 
 
 One of the early criticisms of death penalty research focused on the lack of data 
points in pre-Furman studies which prevented researchers from critically assess the 
relationship between racial characteristics and charging or sentencing outcomes.  However, 
as studies began to collect larger numbers of data points to consider potential influences on 
case outcomes, race effects continued to emerge as significant factors which, in turn, served 
to illustrate the need for better data.  After concer s of racial bias in charging decisions were 
raised in the federal death penalty system, the U.S. Justice Department convened a technical 
advisory group of scholars in death penalty research to discuss the types of variables needed 
sufficiently examine the role of race on charging decisions in the federal system.  
Unfortunately, a “wish list” of desirable variables needed to conduct a comprehensive 
examination race on charging decisions don’t often met reality when conducting data 
analyses retrospectively.  Upon review of a number of death penalty studies at the national, 
state, and local level, one of the glaring problems cited by the Government Accounting 
Office involved the finding that many of the weaker studies suffered from a number of 
variables being omitted from their analyses.  This finding was critical in view of the fact that 
the effect of race on charging outcomes can be mistakenly interpreted if other variables 
thought to have a significant influence on charging outcomes are not controlled for in the 
analyses.  Although the federal death penalty data th t was analyzed in the current study 
appeared to contain a wealth of data, a number of the variables contained very few valid 
cases that could be reasonably coded for the analyses.299     
                                                
 299It should be noted that the original data collection system that was created by the 
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 However, one area where improvements were made involved the requirement that 
all death-eligible cases accepted by the U.S. Attorney for prosecution be submitted for 
analytical comparisons.  Prior to 1995, there was no formal review process for cases 
submitted with charging recommendations by the U.S.Attorneys to the Attorney General.  
Therefore, no comparisons could be made from the universe of death-eligible cases to 
distinguish those cases where the death penalty was being requested from those where the 
death penalty was not being requested.  The creation of the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
review process allowed further analysis to examine which factors were most likely to 
influence charging outcomes in the federal death penalty charging process.  The logic of 
requiring the submission of al death-eligible cases for review could be followed by similar 
requirements to collect necessary data point for research purposes.  Such improvements in 
systematic data collection could also result in an increase in the overall the quality of 
statistical analyses geared towards examining the role of race, and other suspect factors, in 
charging recommendations made by the U.S. Attorneys and final charging decisions made 
by the Attorney General. 
b.   Guidance for Policy and Practice at the State and Local Level 
 
 One of the unique features of the federal death penalty system involves the current 
review committee that operates as an oversight bodywhich evaluates all charging requests 
for the death penalty made by the U.S. Attorneys in capital cases.  The U.S. Attorney 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Department of Justice to collect relevant case data id not require systematic data collection 
of many of the data points that were later identified as necessary to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis on the impact of race on charging decision.  
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General’s Review Committee represents a critical oversight authority in the federal charging 
process and adds a level of transparency to the charging process that isn’t typically seen at 
the state level.  From a policy and practice standpoint, the system currently in place at the 
federal level could serve as a blueprint and could reasonably be adopted in some form by 
state authorities in district attorney’s offices as a way to add structure and guidance to assist 
state prosecutors in making charging decisions in capital cases.  Following the federal 
model, statewide (or county-wide) review committees could be structured in a way to 
provide a set of charging policies and procedures for tate prosecutors to follow in death 
penalty cases.  The review committees could be created in each county according to a set of 
policies that would be agreed upon and crafted by a committee of senior-level officials from 
across the state.  Such a system might also contribute to addressing geographic variation in 
states where unexplained racial variation in charging patterns may exist.  The primary 
benefit of such a system at the state level would be to structure, not eliminate, the discretion 
of the state prosecutors in a way that would control potential influences that could result in 
unexplained variation in charging decisions in a given state jurisdiction.   
 In reviewing the federal charging process, the consistency in the charging requests 
by the U.S. Attorneys and the final charging decision  f the Attorney General has been 
found to be quite high.  One explanation for the consistency in charging decisions between 
the two parties may be related to strict oversight sys em currently in place which requires all 
U.S. Attorneys to explain their charging decisions to the Attorney General’s Review 
Committee and the Attorney General before the finalrequest to seek the death penalty is 
authorized.  Such a system could have the result of adding overall consistency across a given 
state or local jurisdiction. 
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    E.   Future Directions in Research 
 1.  Regional Variation and the Federal Death Penalty  
 One of the future directions in research that could result from the present study 
involves the need by the Department of Justice to have better understanding of how the local 
conditions in each of the 94 federal districts may influence charging decisions made by the 
U.S. Attorneys.  Although the current study found a rel tionship between the race of the 
victim and charging decisions, this finding may only tell part of the story.  As previously 
discussed, the only cases that were analyzed on the current study where those death-eligible 
cases that were accepted by the U.S. Attorneys for further consideration in the death penalty 
process.  What is not especially clear, however, is whether the number of cases that never 
reached that stage had an impact on racial variations in charging requests across the country. 
 As the chief law enforcement official in each of the 94 federal districts, each U.S. 
Attorney has the primary responsibility for initiating and prosecuting federal death penalty 
cases.  Additionally, the U.S. Attorneys also have significant discretion in determining 
which cases will be declined in favor of state or local prosecution.  At the same time, the 
Department of Justice expects the federal laws to beapplied fairly and consistently across 
the federal districts.300  However, the emphasis on national consistency by the federal 
authorities, while commendable, may be difficult to achieve when considering that charging 
decisions by the U.S. Attorneys are often based on the local conditions within each of the 
                                                
 300The fact that the federal government expanded the use of the death penalty to 
crimes that were historically prosecuted by state and local officials has added an extra 




federal districts.  For example, a statistical analysis by region in the current study could have 
revealed varying levels of bias by region.  Since the local conditions often influence the 
manner in which cases are accepted or rejected for further prosecutorial consideration at 
later stages in the process, it may be reasonable to assume that racial effects on charging 
outcomes may not be equally distributed across the 94 f deral districts. 
 O’Neill examined charging decisions by U.S. Attorneys to assess which factors were 
more likely to predict why prosecutors select certain c ses for prosecution and disregard 
others.301  He found that charging decisions are based on a number of factors including 
pressures from communities in the U.S. Attorney’s respective district, the size of the district, 
staffing levels in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, existing resources, or the relationships that the 
U.S. Attorney’s had with the federal law enforcement agencies in their districts.   
 The finding that the existing relationships that the U.S. Attorneys have with federal 
agencies in their districts may influence charging outcomes illustrates the need for better 
data collection to examine the role of race in charging outcomes.  For example, O’Neill 
noted that U.S. Attorneys were more likely to decline cases that were filed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and more likely to file charges in cases submitted by the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, despite the fact that the FBI had more filings.  Although no definitive 
conclusions could be drawn from the data for the diff rences in declination rates between 
the two agencies, O’Neill suggested that the rates could have been due to forged working 
relationships that prosecutors had with the DEA as opposed to the FBI.  If this is in fact the 
                                                
 301O.Neill, M.  (2004). Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factor.  The American Criminal Law Review, 41 (4), 
1439-1498.  
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case, better data collection could separate potential suspect factors as race from other neutral 
factors that may account for bias in charging outcomes.  That is, if the DEA is more likely to 
file charges involving drug murders where minorities may be represented in numbers 
disproportionate to the general population, the working relationships between prosecutors 
and the DEA may, controlling for race, provide a better explanatory factor influencing 
charging outcomes in capital cases.   
 Additionally, he noted that, consistent with the carging policies and procedures in 
the federal system, the U.S. Attorneys are also requir d to report their reasons for choosing 
to forgo a prosecution as well.  The Department of Justice currently provides a standard 
form for all of the U.S. Attorneys to use to specify their reasons for not pursuing a 
prosecution.  The thirty-four standard reasons within six main categories that offer the U.S. 
Attorneys an opportunity explain their reasons for declining to prosecute a case.302  O’Neill 
noted that federal prosecutors declined to prosecute for a variety of reason including: a 
finding of minimal Federal interest, a lack of evidence of criminal intent, no Federal offense 
evident, weak or insufficient admissible evidence, witness problems, lack of investigative 
resources, prosecution by other authorities, or becaus  of the suspects cooperation. 
Thus, there are a great number of factors that determin  how cases are accepted and 
declined for prosecution by the U.S. Attorneys.  Future research in this area could yield 
useful information to better understand how these processes may or may not influence 
charging decisions in the federal death penalty system. 
                                                
 302Thirty-four standard reasons for declining to prosecut  a case are contained in the 
following categories: policy, evidentiary, procedural, resources, suspect status, or an 
alternate disposition.  
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2. Theoretical linkages 
 
 Previous attempts to uncover the nature of racial bias in capital cases has typically 
focused on assessing the role of legal factors, case haracteristics, and other suspect factors 
such as the race of the victim on charging and sentencing outcomes.  However, there may be 
other forces at work that may provide alternative explanations to the race effects that have 
been cited in the literature.  Specifically, there may be forces at work in mainstream society 
that may influence, at least in part, the outcomes in capital cases that are routinely attributed 
to the discretionary powers of prosecutors, judges and/or juries. In his power threat theory, 
Blalock suggested that the majority population willimpose punitive sanctions on members 
of its minority population if it believes the minority has evolved into a threat to the existing 
social order.303  Linked to conflict theory, Blalock suggested that these forces are likely to 
occur as the majority perceives that members in the minority group are emerging as a threat 
to the existing social, political, and economic resources.  For example, the theory posits that 
in areas where blacks outnumber whites, or constitute a powerful minority, one might expect 
to find social control measures taken and directed a  minority groups that white may fear 
will threaten or diminish their respective power struc ure.  Blalock also applied this theory to 
explain the use of punitive sanctions such as the death penalty, mandatory minimum or 
maximum sentencing or other such sanctions to incarcer te or execute members of the 
minority community as a way of eliminating the perceived threats to the majority’s 
powerbase.  Thus, power threat theory could provide a theoretical explanation for the higher 
likelihood of prosecutors requesting the death penalty in white victim cases relative to cases 
                                                
 303Blalock, H. (1967).  Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations.  New York: 
John Wiley. 
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involving black victims. Additionally, the theory might be used to gain a better 
understanding of how local conditions such as conflicts between different racial groups may 
contribute to regional variations in charging decision  by the U.S. Attorneys.   
 A second theoretical approach that could be applied to death penalty research would 
involve an examination of different workgroups in the courtroom setting to gain a better 
understanding how the views by prosecutors, judges, or jury members of offenders can 
translate into varying outcomes in capital cases.  Some researchers have suggested that 
negative stereotyping by white Americans is fueled, at least in part, by the continuing 
association of race and economic disadvantage in American society.   This argument refers 
to the possibility that the existence of racial inequality may serve as a justification for the 
continued belief that members of certain groups in society are unmotivated or fail to try hard 
enough to succeed.  A key notion of “status generalization” theory is that members of 
certain groups form performance expectations of themselves and others based on certain 
identifiable characteristics.  As the association ctinues to be emphasized between a 
resource level (economic) and another characteristics uch as race, the status generalization 
processes, according to the theory, may cause individuals from one minority group to be 
seen as less worthy than the individuals from the majority group. 
 Although these beliefs may differ significantly from other beliefs that members of 
certain groups are biologically inferior, this theory might explain variation in charging and 
sentencing rates for members of different racial groups.  Thus, the differences in charging 
rates where the death penalty is requested by prosecut rs may be the result of perceptions 
that white victims may possess a higher status than black victims.  Presumably, such a 
perspective could examine possible origins of race effects found in capital cases by 
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extending the discussion and the focus of research efforts beyond traditional charges of 
racism as the cause of charging or sentencing outcomes.   
 One final perspective that could be linked to death penalty research in some form is 
social identity theory.  Originally proposed by Henri Tajfel, social identity theory attempts 
to explain cognitions and behavior with the help of gr up processes.  That is, members of a 
certain group often show various forms of behavior such as solidarity within the group and 
may display discrimination against members of other groups as a part of social identity 
processes.  Based on the notion of self categorizati n, Tajfel suggested that as members join 
certain groups, intraclass differences among the members within those groups tend to be 
understated and restrained.  However, the interclass differences between members of one 
group versus another tend to be emphasized and magnified.  Thus, the intragroup members, 
according to the theory, are more likely to identify with members of their group versus 
members of other groups.  Such a theoretical perspective might find that charging and 
sentencing outcomes might be influenced, in part by the fact that members of one group 
may be more likely to sympathize, consciously or unconsciously, with individuals that are 
perceived to be members of their groups.  Alternatively, such in-group, out-group 
perspectives could also explain why cases involving white victims may be less likely to 
receive leniency in charging decisions made by prosecutors or sentencing decisions made by 
juries in their respective cases.   
 
 F. Final Conclusions 
 When the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) of 1994 was passed, a number of 
substantive and procedural protections were put into place which addressed the concerns of 
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the Furman Court and probably exceeded the expectations of the Gregg Court.  Under the 
current system, death penalty cases are entitled to a separate, bifurcated hearing to determine 
the penalty after a finding of guilt and prosecutors are required to provide written notice to 
defendants of their intent to seek the death penalty within a reasonable time before the trial 
proceeding.  Federal prosecutors are also required to specify which statutory and non-
statutory aggravating circumstances they intend to prove at trial and are limited to those 
identified circumstances unless amended and approved by the court.  The statute also 
provides defendants with two attorneys who are experienced in death penalty law and all 
death sentences, upon request, are subject to appellate r view for the purpose of determining 
whether their sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or 
any other arbitrary factor. 
 An additional, and central feature in the process involves a number of procedures 
and policies that were put into place to bring consistency, oversight, and transparency  to the 
decision making process involving the U.S. Attorneys request to seek the death penalty.  
The final authorization to seek the death penalty is made by the Attorney General after the 
case has made its way through several layers in the proc ss to ensure that charging decisions 
are made consistently and without the influence of suspect factors such as race.  Thus, the 
current system, which appears to have addressed the conc rns of the Furman Court, could 
serve as a blueprint to assist state and local authorities in creating systems designed to 
improve their charging policies and practices.  However, there is one caveat that must be 
considered.  
 The present study looked at the effect of race on charging decisions at the federal 
level and final results suggested that the race of the victim was one of a number of factors 
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that was related the charging requests by U.S. Attorneys for the death penalty in a number of 
capital cases.  Several analyses in the current study appeared to be consistent with previous 
findings at the state level which found the race of the victim to have a statistically significant 
effect on charging outcomes.  But what conclusions may be drawn from these (and other) 
findings?  What are these race effects that are being found in several past analyses?  At best, 
one conclusion that may be drawn is that potential “risk” is present in capital cases.  That is, 
the race of the victim in a given case may increase the risk that the death penalty may be 
requested by state or federal prosecutors.  Although this level of risk, given the opinion of 
the McClesley Court, appears to fall within constitutionally permissible boundaries, it 
remains a level of risk that should merit continued scrutiny by state and federal authorities.  
 One final point illustrates the need for continued r search in this area.  The present 
study could not examine whether regional bias in charging decisions existed in the federal 
system.  Such an analysis could have found that the relationship of race on charging 
outcomes could have varied by region. Additionally, an examination of factors related to 
why federal prosecutors decline to charge certain cases may be critical in understanding how 
race figures into overall charging decisions in death-eligible cases.  If prosecutors are 
responding to community concerns over guns, drugs, and g ngs, these factors may add 
context to race effects found at later points in the processing stage of the criminal justice 
system.  Federal officials should also be mindful o the fact that race effects may continue to 
have an influence on charging decisions as Federal government moves into areas of law 
enforcement that have been traditionally controlled by state and local authorities.  Although 
there are currently significant procedural and substantive protections and safeguards in 
place, the consistency with which the effect of the race of the victim may have on charging 
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and sentencing outcomes continues to be cited in the death penalty literature and suggests 


































List of Covariates Analyzed for the Federal Death Penalty Study                        Correlation 
 
 
1. Other victims against the defendant not named in case summary 0.034 
2. IQ/Intelligence level -0.090 
3. History of serious head injury of disorder -0.246 
4. History of physical or sexual abuse as child -0.015 
5. Defendant’s history of mental illness or emotional problems  -0.101 
6. Defendant’s history of drug abuse            -0.094 
7. Defendant’s history of alcohol abuse -0.128 
8. Defendant reportedly working in criminal activity/enterprise            -0.017 
9. Defendant occupation at time of the offense  -0.11  
10. Report of prior adult convictions against defendant 0.121 
11. Report of other cases against this defendant  0.135 
12. Report of intent by the defendant to the victim  0.163 
13. Report of any role by the defendant 0.030 
14. Reported motive by defendant against victim  0.05  
15. Victim killed  0.021 
16. Victim shot/stabbed – other 0.061 
17. Victim shot/stabbed in – other  0.066 
18.  Victim shot/stabbed in – neck  0.021 
19. Victim shot/stabbed in – arms/hands      0.040 
20. Victim shot/stabbed in – head  0.018 
21. Victim shot/stabbed in – face  -0.001 
22. Victim shot/stabbed in – legs feet -0.045 
23. Victim shot/stabbed in – buttocks -0.074 
24.  Victim shot/stabbed in – trunk/torso -0.065 
25. Victim shot/stabbed in – back  -0.004 
26. Victim shot/stabbed in – groin 0.022 
27. Victim shot/stabbed in – stomach -0.045 
28. Victim shot/stabbed in – chest 0.127 
29. Victim injured/killed by – burned 0.036 
30. Victim injured/killed by – bombing or explosion 0.053 
31. Victim injured/killed by – drowned -0.009 
32. Victim injured/killed by – suffocated/smothered 0.086 
33. Victim injured/killed by – strangulation with rope or other cord -0.038 
34. Victim injured/killed by – strangulation with hands 0.020 
35. Victim injured/killed by – beaten or kicked with hands or feet 0.024 
36. Victim injured/killed by – blunt object (baseball bat, pipe, or brick) 0.160 
37. Victim injured/killed by – other blade or sharp-like instrument -0.062 




Table 1 (cont’d) 
List of Covariates Analyzed for the Federal Death Penalty Study                     Correlation 
 
 
39. Victim injured/killed by – ax 0.073 
40. Victim injured/killed by – knife 0.048 
41. Victim injured/killed by – other firearm -0.163 
42. Victim injured/killed by – other firearm 0.019 
43. Victim injured/killed by – saw-off shotgun -0.019 
44. Victim injured/killed by – shotgun  -0.032 
45. Victim injured/killed by – rifle -0.042 
46. Victim injured/killed by – handgun/revolver/pistol  0.007 
47. Victim injured/killed by – automatic or semi-automatic gun -0.028 
48. Gross difference in size or strength of defendant 0.064 
49. Victim under age of 17 or over age of 60 0.147 
50. Victim pregnant 0.073 
51. Victim physically handicap, disabled or ill, bedridden -0.060 
52. Evidence of mental or emotional problems of victim  -0.068 
53. Victim developmental delayed, low IQ, or other cognitive problems 0.009 
54. Victim a police informant or witness -0.048 
55. On-duty prison guard or correctional officer 0.104 
56. On-duty law enforcement officer 0.000 
57. Victim responsible for dependents 0.114 
58. Victim attending school/college at time of offens  0.051 
59. Victim a good citizen 0.164 
60. Defendant/victim relationship – current or forme  rival/competitor -0.094 
61. Defendant /victim relationship – sexual rivals -0.026 
62. Defendant/victim relationship – other family mebers 0.041 
63. Defendant/victim relationship – parent/guardian/p rtner’s child -0.064 
64. Defendant/victim relationship – current or forme  spouse, boyfriend,       
             girlfriend, intimate, or sexual partner 0.079 
65. Defendant/victim relationship – current/former friends/acquaintances -0.051 
66. Defendant/victim relationship – strangers 0.101 
67. Before killing – any conditions reported 0.070 
68. At crime scene – any conditions reported 0.101 
69. After killing – any conditions reported 0.190 
70. Current or former military or reservist  0.070 
71. Victim abused, insulted or antagonized the defendant -0.097 
72. Defendant aided the victim -0.062 
73. Number of aggravating circumstances offered/considered provable 0.289 
74. Number of aggravating circumstances minus number of mitigating  




Table 1 (cont’d) 
List of Covariates Analyzed for the Federal Death Penalty Study            Correlation 
 
 
75. Mitigating factor – impaired capacity of defenda t 0.007 
76. Mitigating factor – minor participation by defendant  -0.131 
77. Mitigating factor – equally culpable defendants -0.233 
78. Number of mitigating circumstances offered/considered provable -0.253 
79. Reported evidence in case against defendant (DNA, etc.) 0.139 
80. After killing – attempt to hide or conceal or dispose of defendant’s 
body 0.217 
81. After killing – body set on fire 0.003 
82. After killing – victim mutilated/dismembered  0.076 
83. Gruesome crime scene  0.223 
84. Victim not found clothed 0.054 
85. Before killing – victim was begging/pleading for his or her life 0.146 
86. Before killing – victim started incident with defendant -0.080 
87. Aggravating factor – prior conviction where life or death was       
             authorized 0.062 
88. Aggravating factor – heinous, cruel, or depraved manner  in offense 0.224 
89. Aggravating factor – previous conviction for prior  serious offenses 0.059 
90. Aggravating factor – procurement of the offense by payment  0.161 
91. Aggravating factor – substantial planning and premeditation  0.283 
92. Aggravating factor – death during commission of another crime 0.146 
93. Aggravating factor – vulnerability of victim 0.156 
94. Aggravating factor – CCE involving distribution to minors 0.147 
95. Number of aggravating factors 0.183 
96. Number of aggravating factors: non-statutory 0.311 
97. Number of mitigating factors -0.307 
98. Any victim under 17 -0.011 
99. Victim under 17, over 60, pregnant, physical handicap, gross size  
             difference between defendant and victim 0.135 
100. Victim good citizen, in school, law enforcement, prison guard, or not  
             criminal 0.190 
101. Victim works criminal activity, prison inmate, or current or former  
             rival in criminal activity  -0.087 
102. Sex of the Victim -0.118 
 







Table 2  
Reduced List of Covariates Analyzed in the Federal De th Penalty Study             Correlation 
 
 
1. Report of prior adult convictions against defendant 0.121 
2. Report of other cases against this defendant 0.135 
3. Report of intent by the defendant to the victim 0.163 
4. Victim shot/stabbed in – chest  0.127 
5. Victim injured/killed by – blunt object (baseball bat, pipe, or brick) 0.160 
6. Victim under age of 17 or over age of 60 0.147 
7. On-duty prison guard or correctional officer 0.104 
8. Victim responsible for dependents 0.114 
9. Victim a good citizen 0.164 
10. Defendant/victim relationship – parent/guardian/p rtner’s child -0.064 
11. Defendant/victim relationship – current or forme  spouse,  
 boyfriend, girlfriend, intimate, or sexual partner 0.079 
12. Defendant/victim relationship – current or forme  rival/competitor -0.094 
13. Defendant/victim relationship – strangers 0.101 
14. At crime scene – any conditions reported 0.101 
15. After killing – any conditions reported  0.190 
16. Victim abused, insulted or antagonized the defendant -0.097 
17. Number of aggravating circumstances offered/considered provable 0.289 
18. Number of aggravating circumstances minus number of mitigating  
             circumstances 0.406 
19. Mitigating factor – minor participation by defendant -0.131 
20. Mitigating factor – equally culpable defendants -0.233 
21. Number of mitigating circumstances offered/considered provable -0.253 
22. Reported evidence in case against defendant (DNA, etc.) 0.139 
23. Gruesome crime scene  0.223 
24. Before killing – victim was begging/pleading for his or her life 0.146 
25. Before killing – victim started incident with defendant -0.080 
26. Aggravating factor – prior conviction where life or death was  
             authorized 0.062 
27. Aggravating factor – heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in offense 0.224 
28. Aggravating factor – procurement of the offense by payment 0.161 
29. Aggravating factor – substantial planning and premeditation 0.283 
30. Aggravating factor – death during commission of another crime 0.146 
31. Aggravating factor – vulnerability of victim 0.156 
32. Aggravating factor – CCE involving distribution to minors 0.147 
33. Number of aggravating factors 0.183 
34. Number of aggravating factors: non-statutory  0.311 




Table 2 (cont’d) 
List of Covariates Analyzed in the Federal Death Penalty Study                          Correlation 
 
 
36. Victim under 17, over 60, pregnant, physical handicaps, gross size   
             difference between defendant and victim  0.135 
37. Victim good citizen, in school, law enforcement, prison guard, or not  
             criminal 0.190 
38. Victim works criminal activity, prison inmate, or current  
   or former rival in criminal activity -0.087 
 
      
                 
   
        































Exploratory Estimates of Legally Relevant Factors only 
 










Number of Prior Adult Convictions    -.012     .963 
Other cases against defendant .266 .287 
Sum total of Aggravating Factors Present 19.663 .997 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -1.267 .000 





Exploratory Estimates of Legally Relevant Factors only (including recod d Sum Total of 
Aggravating Factors Present variable) 
    
    









Number of Prior Adult Convictions    -.040 .869 
Other cases against defendant .407 .077 
Sum total of Aggravating Factors Present 1.901 .000 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.732 .004 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors present 1.147 .000 
 














Exploratory Results - Counts of U.S. Attorney Charging Decisions involving Death–
Eligible Cases by the Race of the Defendant 
 
 














0 = Count 423 86 509 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
83.1% 16.9% 100.0% 
% within CCU 
DEFENDANT RACE 
79.5% 68.8% 77.5% 
% of Total 64.4% 13.1% 77.5% 
1 = 
Seek 
Count 109 39 148 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
73.6% 26.4% 100.0% 
% within CCU 
DEFENDANT RACE 
20.5% 31.2% 22.5% 
% of Total 16.6% 5.9% 22.5% 
Total Count 532 125 657 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
81.0% 19.0% 100.0% 
% within CCU 
DEFENDANT RACE 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 












Exploratory Results - Counts of U.S. Attorney Charging Decisions involving Death–
Eligible Cases by the Race of the Victim 
 
USAO Final Recommendation by Any White Victims Cases 
   Any White 
Victims According 
to CCU Victim 
Race Information 
Total 






0 Count 380 129 509 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
74.7% 25.3% 100.0% 
% within Any White 
Victims According to CCU 
Victim Race Information 
82.4% 65.8% 77.5% 
% of Total 57.8% 19.6% 77.5% 
1 = Seek Count 81 67 148 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
54.7% 45.3% 100.0% 
% within Any White 
Victims According to CCU 
Victim Race Information 
17.6% 34.2% 22.5% 
% of Total 12.3% 10.2% 22.5% 
Total Count 461 196 657 
% within USAO Final 
Recommendation 
70.2% 29.8% 100.0% 
% within Any White 
Victims According to CCU 
Victim Race Information 









Preliminary, Unadjusted Estimates (including the Race of the Defendant variable)  
 
  









Number of Prior Adult Convictions    -.008 .974 
Other cases against defendant .420 .070 
Sum total of Aggravating Factors Present 1.148 .000 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.752 .003 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors present 1.913 .000 




Preliminary, Unadjusted Estimates (including the Race of the Victim variable)  
                                                   









Number of Prior Adult Convictions    -.028 .908 
Other cases against defendant .398 .092 
Sum total of Aggravating Factors Present 1.162 .000 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.767 .003 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors present 1.892 .000 













Preliminary, Unadjusted Estimates (including the Race of the Defendant, Race of the 
Victim, and the Sex of the Defendant variables) 
      










Number of Prior Adult Convictions    -.041     .868 
Other cases against defendant .406 .086 
Sum total of Aggravating Factors Present 1.148 .000 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.757 .003 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors present 1.879 .000 
Race of the Defendant .163 .621 
Race of the Victim .934 .001 
























Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Full Model Examining the Independent Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the 
Race of the Victim 
                                         







Constant -6.477 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions .425 .095 1.53** 
Other Cases against Defendant .423 .100 1.53 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present      2.200 .000 9.03* 
Sex of the Defendant      1.701 .071   5.48** 
Race of the Defendant      -.134 .725 .87 
Race of the Victim       .989 .003 2.67* 
Mitigating Factors    
Defendant’s Impaired Capacity      -.285 .560 .75 
Minor Participation      -.731 .189 .48 
Equally Culpable Defendants    -1.461 .000  .23* 
Aggravating Factors    
Death during the Commission of another 
Crime       .654 .081  1.89** 
Prior Conviction involving Potential 
Sentence of Life Imprisonment or Death     1.867 .002 6.47* 
Prior Conviction of other Serious Offenses       .635 .221    1.89 
Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Manner of 
Committing Offense       .803 .006 2.23* 
Procurement of Offense by Payment       .962 .006 2.62* 
Substantial Planning and Premeditation     1.256 .000 3.51* 
CCE involving Distribution to Minors     1.403 .009 4.07* 
Vulnerability of Victim       .146 .734    1.16 
Sympathetic Victim        .768 .013 2.16* 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 83.6% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 77.2% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 45% 
 





Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Reduced Model Examining the Independent Effects of the Race of the Defendant and 
the Race of the Victim  
  







Constant -4.640     .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions .068     .788 1.07 
Other Cases against Defendant .369     .125 1.45 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present 1.786     .000  5.96* 
Sum of Total Aggravating Factors Present 1.155     .000 3.17* 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.693     .008 .50* 
Sex of the Defendant 1.198     .154 3.31 
Race of the Defendant .220     .512 1.25 
Race of the Victim .733     .013    2.08* 
Vulnerability of Victim .516     .734 1.68 
Sympathetic Victim .605     .000 1.83 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 82.3% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 77.2% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 35.5% 
 














Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Full Model Examining the Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the Race of the 
Victim combined (White v. non-White Racial Groups)  
                                         







Constant -6.126 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions    .414 .100       1.51 
Other Cases against Defendant    .416 .103       1.52 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present  2.210 .000       9.12* 
Sex of the Defendant  1.478 .118       4.38 
Mitigating Factors    
Defendant’s Impaired Capacity   -.143 .768         .87 
Minor Participation   -.744 .181         .48 
Equally Culpable Defendants -1.533 .000         .22* 
Aggravating Factors    
Death during the Commission of another 
Crime    .762 .037       2.14* 
Prior Conviction involving Potential Sentence 
of Life Imprisonment or Death  1.793 .003       6.01* 
Prior Conviction of other Serious Offenses    .668 .192       1.95 
Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Manner of 
Committing Offense    .742 .010       2.10* 
Procurement of Offense by Payment    .998 .004       2.71* 
Substantial Planning and Premeditation  1.306 .000       3.69* 
CCE involving Distribution to Minors  1.272 .017       3.57* 
Vulnerability of Victim    .333 .423       1.40 
Sympathetic Victim     .768 .013       2.16* 
Non-White Defendant/White Victim    .838 .015 2.31* 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 82.9% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 77.2% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 44.8% 
 





Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Reduced Model Examining the Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the Race of 
the Victim combined (White v. Non-White Racial Groups) 
 









Constant -4.109 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions .069 .781 1.07 
Other Cases against Defendant .364 .123 1.44 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present 1.774 .000 5.89* 
Sum of Total Aggravating Factors 
Present 1.155 .000 3.17* 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present -.657 .011 .52* 
Sex of the Defendant 1.198 .154 3.31 
Vulnerability of Victim .684 .070 1.98** 
Sympathetic Victim .683 .015 1.98* 
Non-White Defendant/White Victim .429 .161 1.54 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 80.3% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 77.2% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 33.5% 
 














Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Full Model Examining the Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the Race of the 
Victim combined (White v. Black Racial Groups) 
 







Constant -7.852 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions        .517 .107   1.68 
Other Cases against Defendant     .658 .040   1.93* 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors 
Present       3.526 .000 33.99* 
Sex of the Defendant       1.754 .090 4.38** 
Mitigating Factors    
Defendant’s Impaired Capacity -.617 .335    .05 
Minor Participation -.569 .399    .57 
Equally Culpable Defendants -2.007 .000 .13* 
Aggravating Factors    
Death during the Commission of another Crime .999 .041   2.72* 
Prior Conviction involving Potential Sentence of 
Life Imprisonment or Death 2.321 .002 10.19* 
Prior Conviction of other Serious Offenses .570 .345   1.77 
Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Manner of 
Committing Offense .568 .149   1.76 
Procurement of Offense by Payment 1.297 .005 3.66* 
Substantial Planning and Premeditation 1.624 .000 5.07* 
CCE involving Distribution to Minors 1.052 .082  2.86** 
Vulnerability of Victim .329 .511   1.39 
Sympathetic Victim  1.131 .003   3.10* 
Non-White Defendant/White Victim .797 .070 2.22** 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 82.9% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 74.9% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 55.3% 
 







Final, Adjusted Estimates for the U.S. Attorneys Decisions to Request the Death Penalty 
– Reduced Model Examining the Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the Race of 
the Victim combined (White v. Black Racial Groups) 
             






Constant -4.992 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions   -.010 .973 .99 
Other Cases against Defendant    .577 .041 1.78* 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present  2.625 .000        13.81* 
Sum of Total Aggravating Factors Present  1.253 .000 3.50* 
Sum of Total Mitigating Factors Present   -.614 .050 3.07** 
Sex of the Defendant    .909 .284 2.50 
Vulnerability of Victim    .573 .188 1.77 
Sympathetic Victim  1.027 .002 2.79* 
Non-White Defendant/White Victim    .429 .161 1.54 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 79.8% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 74.9% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 41.3% 
 















Final, Adjusted Estimates for the Attorney General’s Decisions to Recommend the Death 
Penalty – Full Model Examining the Effects of the Race of the Defendant and the Race of 
the Victim combined (White v. non-White Racial Groups)      
      







Constant -6.012 .000  
Number of Prior Adult Convictions -.282 .319 .75 
Other Cases against Defendant -.098 .741 .91 
Sum of Total Non-Statutory Aggravating 
Factors Present 2.791 
 
      .000   16.30* 
Sex of the Defendant .958 .231     2.61 
Race of the Defendant -.115 .784       .89 
Race of the Victim .751 .045 2.12* 
Mitigating Factors    
Defendant’s Impaired Capacity -.848 .231     2.33 
Minor Participation -19.111 .997 .50 
Equally Culpable Defendants -2.026 .000 .13* 
Aggravating Factors    
Death during the Commission of another 
Crime .337 .422     1.40 
Prior Conviction involving Potential Sentence 
of Life Imprisonment or Death 2.420 .003   11.25* 
Prior Conviction of other Serious Offenses 1.057 .177     2.88 
Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Manner of 
Committing Offense 1.324 .006 3.76* 
Procurement of Offense by Payment .841 .030 2.32* 
Substantial Planning and Premeditation 2.194 .000 8.97* 
CCE involving Distribution to Minors .795 .349     2.21 
Vulnerability of Victim .346 .491     1.41 
Sympathetic Victim  .765 .028 2.15* 
 
 
Model Classification Table: 
Percent Correctly Classified by Model = 85.9% 
Percent Correctly Classified by Chance = 75.9% 
Percent Reduction in Error Relative to Chance = 55.6% 
 

















































Code Sheet for Key Variables in the Federal Death Penalty Data Set 
 
 
Variable:   1 
Name:   Report of Prior Adult Convictions against this Defendant 
 
Code/Values: 0 = No prior felony convictions 
  1= Prior felony convictions 
 
Variable:   2 
Name:  Report of Other Cases Pending against this Defendant 
Code/Values:  0 = No pending cases 
            1 = Pending cases against defendant 
 
Variable:   3 
Name:   Defendant’s Gender 
Codes/Values:   0 = Female 
    1 = Male 
 
Variable:   4 
Name:   Defendant’s Race 
Code/ Values:   0 = Non-white 
    1 = White    
 
Variable:   5 
Name:  U.S. Attorneys Final Recommendation 
Code/Values:   0 = Death penalty not sought 
   1 = Death penalty sought 
 
Variable:  6  
Name:  Victim’s Gender 
Code/Values: 0 = Female 
  1 = Male 
 
Variable:  7 
Name: Victim’s Race 
Code/Values: 0 = Non-white 








Code Sheet for Key Variables in the Federal Death Penalty Data Set 
 
Variable:  8 
Name: Mitigating Factor:  Impaired Capacity 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  9 
Name:  Mitigating Factor:  Minor Participation 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  10 
Name: Mitigating Factor:  Equally Culpable Defendants 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  11 
Name:  Number of Aggravating Factors Present 
Code/Values: 0 = None present 
  1 = Any number of aggravating factors present 
 
Variable:  12 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Death during Commission of another Crime 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present  
 
Variable:  13 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death 
or life imprisonment was authorized 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  14 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing the 
offense 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable: 15 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Substantial planning and premeditation 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
 212
Code Sheet for Key Variables in the Federal Death Penalty Data Set 
 
Variable:  15 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Previous conviction of other serious offenses 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  16 
Name: Aggravating factor:  Procurement of the offense by payment 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable: 17 
Name:  Aggravating factor:  Continuing Criminal Enterprise involving distribution to 
minors 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  18 
Name:  Any Non-statutory aggravating factors 
Code/Values: 0 = None present 
  1 = Any present 
 
Variable:  19 
Name:  Aggravating factor: Vulnerability of Victim 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  20 
Name: Vulnerability of victim: Victim under 17 or over 60 or has a physical handicp or 
pregnant or gross difference in size with defendant 
Code/Values: 0 = not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable:  21 
Name: Number of Mitigating factors present 
Code/Values: 0 = No mitigating factors present 








Code Sheet for Key Variables in the Federal Death Penalty Data Set 
 
 
Variable:  22 
Name:  Sympathetic victim: Good citizen or in school or has dependents or is police 
officer or prison guard and not criminal 
Code/Values: 0 = Not present 
  1 = Present 
 
Variable: 23 
Name: Race of Defendant and Victim (non-white and white combinations) 
Code/Values: 0 = Non-white/non-white victim, white defendant/white victim, white     
defendant/non-white victim 
 1 = Non-white defendant/white victim  
 
Variable: 24 
Name: Race of Defendant and Victim (black and white combinations) 
Code/Values: 0 = Black defendant/Black victim, white defendant/white victim, white     
defendant/black victim 
  1 = Black defendant/white victim 
 
Variable:  25 
Name: Attorney General Final Decision 
Code/Values: 0 = Death penalty not sought 
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